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Rhode Island Lead Trial— A Travesty

I receive several emails yesterday after my Sherwin Williams (SHW) post on Wednesday asking how I could be so sure the lower courts decision would eventually be tossed. I am going to direct you to a paper from the Washington Legal Foundation that eviscerates the lower court’s handling of the case. It a matter of “when” not “if” this ludicrous ruling will get tossed. A note: The text below (except for the comments at the end beginning with “Sherwin’s stock…”) is taken from the paper and I have noted here what I feel are the most important sections for those of you who do not wish to read all 34 pages.

On a cold gray February day in 2006, a jury in Rhode Island found three companies liable for creating a “public nuisance.” In that case, styled as Rhode Island v. Atlantic Richfield Co, the State of Rhode Island sued four former manufacturers of lead pigment. The State claimed that the manufacturers were responsible for creating a “public nuisance” in Rhode Island during the century before residential sale of lead paint was banned in 1978. The case made national headlines because, for the first time, lead pigment manufacturers were found liable for problems allegedly caused by poorly maintained lead-based paint in privately owed homes.

One year later, on another cold gray February day, the Rhode Island trial court (the “Court”) issued a long awaited decision regarding the Defendants’ post verdict motions. In a 198 page decision, the Court found that a multitude of alleged legal errors by the Court an alleged misconduct by the State’s trial team either did not occur or were not sufficiently serious to require a new trial. In the same decision, the Court ruled that the State’s “non-delegable” duty to perform lead abatements was in fact partially delegable – so long as the State remained ultimately responsible. But the Court’s ruling was much more than a lengthy disposition of procedural and substantive issues regarding the trial and the verdict. In a decision that dispensed with the most fundamental requirements of American tort law, this Rhode Island trial court held that merely manufacturing and marketing a product is sufficient to impose liability on a defendanteven in the absence of any evidence that a defendant’s product produced harm to any person where the nuisance allegedly exists. With this broad stroke, the Court ruled that neither product identification nor evidence of specific injuries attributable to a particular defendant is necessary before a defendant is ordered to abate a nuisance.

As a result of this ruling—which is preliminary and may not be subject to appeal presently (it now is- my comment) —this Rhode Island Court has created an extraordinarily dangerous vehicle for lawsuit abuse—a tort where liability is based upon unidentified ills allegedly suffered by unidentified people caused by unidentified products in unidentified locations. At least in Rhode Island, product liability law has been swallowed up by the amorphous concept of “public nuisance”—a development that should alert every industry to the dangerous alliance of public authorities and private counsel, and their opportunistic distortions of traditional legal principles.

The extensive trial held in 2006 was not the first trial in this case. In 2002, a jury deadlocked 4-2 against the State’s original public nuisance claim.The jury deadlocked because they were not able to agree as to whether the State had established the existence of a public nuisance. In response, the State persuaded the Court to lower the threshold for finding a public nuisance. Additionally, in the second “all-in” trial, the Court allowed the State to try the manufacturers not on their own conduct, but on the conduct of their trade associations, conduct that did not occur in Rhode Island, but rather happened in other states. And then, in the second trial, the State refused to disclose new evidence that, by the State’s own standards, the childhood lead poisoning “problem” in Rhode Island was eliminated before the trial ended. In spite of this evidence, known only to the State, the State argued to the jury that the level of childhood lead poisoning in the State had reached a “plateau,” and was no longer declining. Thus, the jury was deprived of critical evidence—unknown to Defendants until after the verdict was returned—that flatly undermined the presence of the “nuisance” the State wrongly claimed to exist.

As a result of the Court’s jury instructions, and the State’s trial tactics, the jury’s decision against the Defendants, in hindsight, now seems predictable and, indeed, inevitable. Although the second jury was also initially deadlocked 4-2 in favor of the defense, post-verdict interviews indicated that the Court’s jury instructions essentially directed a finding liability.According to one juror, the jury instructions “didn’t give the paint companies much of a window to crawl through”. Some, such as the private contingent fee lawyers that Rhode Island hired to prosecute its case, claim that what happened in Rhode Island constitutes “justice.”

Others, including these authors, take a different view. The Judge’s rulings and the State’s conduct resulted in a monstrous mosaic of serious errors, many of which, standing alone, constitute reversible error. When viewed as a whole, the Rhode Island Court’s decision abdicates the judiciary’s fundamental role to ensure procedural and substantive fairness to all parties—a role that is enshrined in our most honored jurisprudential traditions. It is not the role of the judiciary—and certainly not the role of a trial judge—to blithely “change the law” when precedents raise barriers to a plaintiffs’ recovery, especially when, in order to do so, the court must sweep centuries of common law tradition under the rug. Such an analogy is particularly apt in this case because, like soil under the carpet, the injustice of the Court’s ruling persists—even when covered by almost 200 pages of creative justifications.

According to the Court, “based on the evidence that a public nuisance exists … and on common sense, the jury properly could have concluded that whoever sold and promoted lead pigment in Rhode Island proximately caused the public nuisance. In effect, the sale and promotion would complete the chain of causation that begins at manufacture, and ends with the existence of the public nuisance.” The authors wonder if “common sense” also dictated that the Court ignore all of the landlords and property owners who improperly maintained the lead-based paint or allowed it to deteriorate to where it became a health hazard.

The trial court defined a public nuisance injury simply as “the cumulative presence of lead pigment in paints and coatings in [or] on buildings in the state of Rhode Island”. This wrongly suggests that an injury to a large number of individuals is the same as an injury to the community as a whole. Case law clearly states that “harm to individual members of the public” (no matter how many) is not the same as harm “to the public generally”. In its jury instructions, the Court altered the language in comment g of §821B of the Restatement (“A public right is one common to all members of the general public”). Instead of following the Restatement, the Court instructed the jury that: “A right common to the general public is a right or an interest that belongs to the community-at-large. It is a right that is collective in nature. A public right is a right collective in nature and not like an individual right that everyone has not to be assaulted defamed, or defrauded, or negligently injured”.

As will be discussed elsewhere in this article, the State provided no proof that the “nuisance” existed anywhere except in private residences. Accordingly, the alleged problems did not threaten the exercise of any rights held by the public at large, such as the use of public buildings or resources, but rather related to the exercise of private rights by private individuals in their private abodes. Since no “collective” right was impacted that applied to the general public, the trial court’s instructions overstepped the bounds of public nuisance as defined by the common law, and dissolved the distinction between public and private nuisance as separate causes of action.

Thus, for the first time in common law jurisprudence, the Rhode Island Court held that the characterization of a nuisance as “public” or “private” depends not upon its impact on rights held by the community at large, but rather upon the number of persons allegedly affected by the problem. The State’s intrusion into areas governed previously by personal claims is an alarming expansion of governmental power. Using the “common law” to justify such a usurpation of private interests is not only unprecedented, but also sets a dangerous precedent that may be used to justify even greater expansions of governmental authority into private spheres.

As the situation now stands, the Rhode Island trial court has unleashed a phenomenon bounded only by its own ingenuity—a phenomenon that contains seeds of abuse that, unless constrained, threaten the fundamental structures of representative democracy by imposing liability without wrongdoing and remedies without injury. At its essence, the new “claim” imposes liability solely upon the basis of a person’s status as a product manufacturer, making them responsible not for what they have done, but rather for who they are.

Sherwin’s stock is being held back by this abhorrence, once this cloud is duly lifted, the stock will run. What I would like to see for a change is a shareholder lawsuit against the State of Rhode Island for the financial harm we have suffered as owners. Our loss would be both the artificial stagnation of the stock price, the money spent on this litigation that cannot be used for corporate purposes or returned to us owners as a dividends or share repurchases and the time executives have spent on the litigation, not the selling of paint and coatings.

Perhaps that would put an end to these games and discourage those greedy little localities in Ohio contemplating a similar exploitation of our legal system.

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Interview with Geoff Gannon

Recently I was interviewed by Geoff Gannon from one of my favorite sites, Gannon on Investing as part of his “20 questions” series. Please visit his site to see other “20 Questions” interviews.


Below is the transcript.

Todd Sullivan is a value investor who writes the ValuePlays blog. ValuePlays is a value investing site focusing on individual stock analysis, investing concepts, and market commentary.

Visit ValuePlays

1. Are you a value investor?

Yes.

2. What is value investing?

Purchasing a piece of a company at a price that is below a reasonable valuation.

3. What is your approach to investing?

Look for the current “red headed step children” and pick out the gems.

4. How do you evaluate a stock?

I look for industry leading companies who:

– Have a valuation that is equal to or at a small premium to other shares with a comparable earnings growth rate.

– Have a total return yield greater than the current corp. bond rates.

– Are buying back shares.

– Are increasing the dividend.

– And are increasing cash flow from operations.

All that takes about 20 minutes, if it passes those tests, I begin to dig deeper into SEC filings, annual reports, etc. Earnings call transcripts on Seeking Alpha recently have been providing me a ton of insight, not necessarily for the details, but the general “tone” of management.

5. Why do you buy a stock?

To own a piece of a company.

6. Why do you sell a stock?

The business deteriorates or its valuation becomes irrationally high.

7. What investment decision are you most proud of?

MO at the height of the litigation woes in 2003 and MCD during the “mad cow” scare of Jan 2003.

8. What investment decision do you most regret?

Selling USG in June of that year.

9. Why do you blog?

I love the market and love to write. It also makes me a better investor by forcing more detailed analysis and making me stick to my guns.

10. What’s your best post?

Did SBUX’s Donald Really say that?

Picked up in the WSJ Online

11. What’s your worst post?

SHLD: What Will Eddy Do? Just guess work. Of course if I turn out right, pure genius. 🙂

12. What financial publications do you read?

WSJ, Barons.

13. What investing blogs do you read?

Value Investing News, The Stockmasters, Seeking Alpha, Fat Pitch, Gannon, Peridot, Interactive Investor.

14. What’s the best investment book you’ve read?

“Buffett: The Making Of An American Capitalist”

15. What’s the last investment book you’ve read?

“The Intelligent Investor” – I try to read it at least once a year.

16. When did you start investing?

At 19. I’ve always loved the idea of being able to buy a piece of a company and “go along for the ride”.

17. How have you improved as an investor?

One word: Patience.

18. How do you need to improve as an investor?

Believe in my choices more, my biggest mistakes have not been picking the wrong companies but getting out too soon or not buying at all because I doubted my reasoning…. (see USG, CHD).

19. Where are the bargains in today’s market?

I am sky high on Owens Corning (OC)… SHLD: Eddie Lampert + $4 billion in the bank.

20. What’s the most interesting company we haven’t heard of?

Based on its small float and daily volume, Owens Corning. It is a leader in all its product categories, fresh off asbestos bankruptcy and just posted strong results despite the housing market and a benign hurricane season. When things turn around in those areas, they take off. Trades at about 6 times earnings.

Visit Gannon on Investing

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Housing: Enough already!!

“I got two words for you, shut the **** up” Robert De Niro, Midnight Run

Am I the only person who has had it with all the “housing” and “subprime” talk? My god, it is almost as if nothing else is happening out there. When the media get stuck on something they are like Rainman obsessing about Wapner being on in 5 minutes. Let it go gang. For two years all we have heard is “housing must slow down” and “there are too many risky loans out there”. Now that the housing market has slowed down and the home buyers with those risky (subprime) loans did exactly what we knew they would do, default, this is suddenly a big deal? Just in case you are not already sufficiently nauseated by the deluge of housing rhetoric out there, here is my one and only “two cents” on it. I want to go on record and say I am only posting on this topic as a response to emails I have gotten so I do not plan to comment further on this except to update this post much later to test its accuracy. Why? This is not really the big deal it is being made out to be. Some numbers:

  • Approximately 80% of the mortgage market as “A” credit
  • For “A” paper, the delinquency rate is in a comfortable 2.5% range.
  • 20% of the market as “subprime” of all types and terms.
  • Of the 20% slice, the Mortgage Bankers Association reported this week that some 13% of those loans were in some stage of delinquency, a number which has steadily risen over recent quarters.
  • While alarming, the flip side is that some 87% of subprime loans are performing fine
  • Only 6 percent of homeowners hold subprime ARMs (adjustable rate)
  • Even if we hit a 20% default rate among subprime ARM holders — a rate twice as high as the foreclosure peak after the 2001 recession, that is only about 1% of the national mortgage market.

Simply put, for homeowners out there 95 out of 100 of us are having no problems with their mortgages (or at least are not delinquent). So why the hysteria? Easy, we have 24 hour news coverage to fill and saying the housing market is “slowing down like expected” just does not capture a headline like “subprime carnage threatens to lead US into recession”, does it? But it is as good an excuse as anything though, right? In mean, most people cannot follow (nor do they want to) the intricacies of the Japanese yen carry trade that the talking heads blamed the market sell off a few weeks ago on but, most people own homes so lets go with that, at least they can relate to it.

The reality is that unless you are one of the unfortunate “subprime folks” who are stuck, these headlines will have no effect on you. What is of note here is in the majority of excess defaults are the “no documentation” loans. These were mortgages given to folks whose credit was so bad they were not forced to provided credit histories and in return agreed to pay interest rates in many cases more than twice the national average. So, we are now supposed to be surprised they defaulted? Another oft overlooked detail of many of these loans is that those taking them were not required to provide proof of citizenship. While the exact number may never be known, how many of these defaults are people just walking away from homes after some of the immigration raids that have littered the news lately? Chances are these were bought with invalid social security numbers anyway so there is no actual risk to their credit rating or future ability to purchase another house in another town as fake social security cards are as easy to get as a ham sandwich. Basically you have a mess of subprime mortgages created by lenders who gave money to anyone with a pulse (I am sure we will get reports of dead people getting loans soon enough). Faltering home prices are likely to blame for another portion of the default of loans. Borrowers with little equity (5% or zero down loans) who face difficult economic times or rising monthly payments (adjustable loans) have little chance to refinance their mortgages or sell their homes in hopes of making full repayment if the market hasn’t produced any “instant equity” for them to utilize. There is no easy way out, except to mail the keys back to their lender.

Now let’s look at housing. Personally the gauge I look at the most closely is inventory. It is the most basic economic law, supply and demand. High supply is bad for sellers (this includes home builders) because the more homes sitting out there for sale, the lower the prices they then command. Since homes are valued on a “comparative” basis, the lower the price of the home for sale next to you, the less your home now becomes worth. The lower the supply, the higher prices homes then command and then all the above issues become moot as they resolve themselves. So, for me, inventory rules. Let’s look.

Inventory (months of supply, New and Existing homes):

Year ————–New————- Existing
2002 —————5.8—————— 4.7

2003 —————5.5—————— 4.6

2004 —————4.1—————– 4.3
2005 —————4.8—————– 4.5
2006 (Jan) ——–5.7 —————–6.5
2006 (July)– – 7.2—————– 7.3

2007 (Jan) ——-6.8—————— 6.6

What can we deduce from these numbers? It would seem that the worst of the housing market was in July of 2006. It is my opinion that we in a trough now and probably will remain here until the new home inventory is worked off. As the new home inventory falls, buyers will begin to automatically work off the excess existing home inventory as by default less new home are available. The economy is strong and unemployment is low so there are no exterior factors pushing the market lower. The problems now were created by excesses on the part of lenders and homebuilders. Once they have taken their medicine, things will turn around.

Builder confidence in the market for new single-family homes receded in March, largely on concerns about deepening problems in the subprime mortgage arena, according to the National Association of Home Builders/Wells Fargo Housing Market Index (HMI), released today. After rising fairly steadily since its recent low last September, the HMI declined three points from a downwardly revised 39 reading in February to 36 in March. This too is good news as pessimistic builders will refrain from new projects, further reducing inventory.

So when will that happen? I have no idea and neither does anyone else. My guess is that we will see things start to improve by the end of the summer (this does assume no dramatic exterior events like another war, terrorist attacks etc..). The recovery and subsequent growth will be more orderly and restrained as lenders and builders avoid the Mardi Gras type behavior that got them into the present predicaments.

Another reason the market may have bottomed? Famed “Legendary stock picker Bill Miller (Seeking Alpha, Mar. 18th): , portfolio manager for the $20.8 billion Legg Mason Value Trust [LMVTX]: Recent Buys For Legg Mason Value Trust: Homebuilder Centex (CTX): 597,000 shares (cost: $28.4 million); total position now 6.1 million shares. For those of you who read Sunday’s post, Bill Miller is the only fund manager to beat the S&P 15 years in a row in the past 40 years, paying attention to what he feels is undervalued is usually a good idea.

I hope housing turns around soon, if for no other reason I won’t have to read or hear about it all day long….


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A Reveiw of Bogle’s "Little Book"

So here is the review. First, so that I do not error, here is the book description from the publisher:

“To learn how to make index investing work for you, there’s no better mentor than legendary mutual fund industry veteran John C. Bogle. Over the course of his long career, Bogle—founder of the Vanguard Group and creator of the world’s first index mutual fund—has relied primarily on index investing to help Vanguard’s clients build substantial wealth. Now, with The Little Book of Common Sense Investing, he wants to help you do the same.

Filled with in-depth insights and practical advice, The Little Book of Common Sense Investing will show you how to incorporate this proven investment strategy into your portfolio. It will also change the very way you think about investing. Successful investing is not easy. (It requires discipline and patience.) But it is simple. For it’s all about common sense.

With The Little Book of Common Sense Investing as your guide, you’ll discover how to make investing a winner’s game:

  • Why business reality—dividend yields and earnings growth—is more important than market expectations
  • How to overcome the powerful impact of investment costs, taxes, and inflation
  • How the magic of compounding returns is overwhelmed by the tyranny of compounding costs
  • What expert investors and brilliant academics—from Warren Buffett and Benjamin Graham to Paul Samuelson and Burton Malkiel—have to say about index investing

About the Author: JOHN C. BOGLE is founder of the Vanguard Group, Inc., and President of its Bogle Financial Markets Research Center. He created Vanguard in 1974 and served as chairman and chief executive officer until 1996 and senior chairman until 2000. In 1999, Fortune magazine named Mr. Bogle as one of the four “Investment Giants” of the twentieth century; in 2004, Time named him one of the world’s 100 most powerful and influential people, and Institutional Investor presented him with its Lifetime Achievement Award.

My two cents:

Bogle Maintains:

  1. Mutual fund investors are bound to lose (and in most cases you pay the fund manager outrageous sums to lose you money)
  2. Most investor are ill-equipped to pick individual stocks
  3. Index funds are the best way for the average person to invest in the market and reap the full benefits of the US economy.

I have some agreement and disagreements with him. I strongly agree that entrusting your money to 90% (maybe more) of mutual fund managers is a losing game long term. Some facts from the book:

  1. Between 1994 and 2004 Morningstar 5 Star (Top Rated) Funds returned 6.9% annually vs 11% for the Total Market
  2. After the market bubble of 1997-1999, the “Top 10” funds from those years plummeted. From 2000-2002, not a single one was ranked higher than 790 and they were outperformed by 95% of their peers.
  3. From 1982-1992, the top fund in each year averaged a ranking of 285 the following year.
  4. From 1995-2005 the top fund in each year averaged a ranking of 619 the following year
  5. Of the 1,400 mutual funds out there, in the last 40 years, only 1 has beaten the market for 15 consecutive years (and that streak just ended in 2006) Legg Mason Value run by Bill Miller.

That being said, if you do not want to do the homework but want to own stocks, index funds are the way to go. A caveat, there has been an explosion of these funds in the past 3 years and you can now buy an index fund for almost anything. If you truly want to mirror the results of the overall market, your only choice is an S&P index fund.

Personally, I strongly believe (and have been able to) that beating the market with individual stock picks is something people can do and you do not have to have an MBA or Harvard education to do it. According to Buffet, when it comes to investing “The business schools reward difficult complex behavior more than simple behavior, but simple behavior is more effective”.

Picking stocks is not all that difficult, people just make so.

Another Buffetism: referring to investing, “there seems to be a perverse human characteristic that needs to take simple things and make them difficult.”

We all have it in us to be successful investors, if you do not want to try, or do not have the time to dedicate to doing the necessary homework, do yourself a favor, spend the $11 for Bogle’s book (click on the link above, you can read it in a weekend and it is written for the novice investor), dump all your mutual funds and put your money into index funds…..

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Dow – Something Brewing?


Dow has been the subject a quite a few rumors lately:

First, a British newspaper printed a rumor in February that a group lead by KKR and Carlyle were going to make a $60 a share offer for the company. I went on record at the time with my plea to CEO Andrew Liveris to not sell the company. The rumor subsided (did not “go away”) and then market was hit with the events of the past two weeks that commanded everybody’s attention.

Then, Tuesday on CNBC’s “Mad Money” show Jim Cramer (who I beat to the punch on Google ) commented on the rumors admitting he has been waiting since February for DOW and AA to dip after takeover rumors which were printed a British newspaper. While he discouraged speculation on potential buyouts if the fundamentals are not strong, “the fundies for both DOW and AA are pretty good.” According to the rumors, Dow could be purchased by private equity firms at $60 a share, a substantial premium from its present rate of $42.94. He noted the company has a 3.5% dividend yield, has been raising prices and cutting costs. “Buy Dow and Alcoa because when there’s smoke, there’s fire.” Now, while I am not a fan of Jim’s bi-polar investment style, I do place value on his market commentary and the insights he gives on the “why” things happen. I also assume that he has plenty of “friends in high places” on Wall St. and given his obvious egomanism, he would not lend credence to a rumor unless the was a good chance there was actually something there. That is not to say that the interested parties are KKR and Carlyle specifically but that Dow is highly undervalued and people are taking a real close look.

Now there are rumors that Dow an India’s Reliance Industries are considering a joint venture or a merger. India’s top petrochemicals maker, Reliance Industries Ltd , is set to form a joint venture with Dow Chemical Co. for plastics and chemical businesses, the Economic Times said on Thursday.”Talks are at an advanced stage and the two sides are expected to make a formal announcement by the weekend,” the newspaper said, quoting unnamed sources. Top Reliance officials led by Chairman Mukesh Ambani are scheduled to meet Dow Chief Executive Officer Andrew Liveris and a memorandum of understanding may be signed. A Reliance spokesman denied a deal was in the offing, the newspaper said, while a Dow spokesman said it was not the company’s policy to comment on rumors about itself or its activities. The newspaper said Dow was unable to unlock the full value of its huge commodity chemicals and plastics business because of rising cost of feedstock and raw materials in the West. Dow’s basic chemicals and plastics business would be spun off into a separate company, with Reliance paying about $12 billion for its stake and Dow picking up the remainder, the paper said in an unsourced report. The Economic Times had reported on Thursday a deal could be be finalized soon and that the two companies were expected to make a formal announcement by the weekend. The Times of India said Reliance would hold the right to buy Dow’s proposed 41 percent holding in the joint venture if a third party offered to buy the American firm’s stake. Reliance was likely to fund the joint venture by selling some of its stock either to Dow directly or to investors and then investing the cash in the joint venture, the Times of India said.

In my plea the Liveris I expressed my belief that Dow was worth far more on its own long term to me than the quick $60 payoff a buyout would bring. If this joint venture comes to fruition, he would at least seem to believe the same and is taking steps to unlock Dow’s long term value. Since taking over in 2004 Liveris has done a brilliant job fixing Dow’s financial ship and is now embarking on growth and expansion. The easy thing for him to do would be to cash out at the $60 and walk away. The right thing for us shareholders is for him to keep doing what he is doing..

The business is financially sound and growing. It’s stock price is well below its real value and people are starting to notice. It was only a matter of time.

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This Panther Is Ready to Pounce



Owens Corning (OC) held an investors conference on Wednesday, March 7th.. These things are usually a regurgitation of the most recent earnings call and to be honest, rather dull but, there were a couple of important take aways here that have me more enthusiastic about my investment than ever:

Management estimates income from operations in 2007 to be $415 million ($4.02 a share), down from $433 million ($4.20 a share) in 2006 for a 4% decline. Bad news? No. This is based on housing starts consistent with NAHB estimates of 1.56 million (down 14%). It does NOT include additional profits from the St.Gobain joint venture expected to close in mid 2007, nor does it include revenue from the expected sale of the vinyl siding business and it also assumes a hurricane season similar to 2006 (almost non existent) and the effects of the 5% stock buyback recently announced are not considered. In short, this is a painfully conservative estimate which is something I like to see.

Why is it conservative? Could we have a worse hurricane season that the ZERO major storms we had in 2006? No. Is there a chance it will be equal too? Yes, But that result is what these earnings estimates are based on. Will the St. Gobain venture get regulatory approval? Yes, the question is not “if” but “how much” it will add to earnings. Will they sell the siding business? Yes. None of these events are included in the 2007 estimate and all will add to 2007 earnings. Because management at OC has no way of knowing the “how much”, they omitted their potential contribution. Good.

Now for housing, could it get worse? Yes. Will it? Not if you believe Toll Brother’s (and me) who expect things to turn around late this summer. Let’s assume it does get worse, OC did say that things would have to “dramatically deteriorate” for them to lower their forecast. I for one think we are at the housing trough and things are due to begin to climb. Now, that may take 4 months or a year, but OC has based its earnings, production and pricing forecasts on a 14% year over year decline. Any improvement here quickly adds to the bottom line. The following may an odd barometer but if nothing else it will teach us to pay attention to things other than our traditional data sources. I have a friend who is a firefighter. We were talking recently and he was saying how he has been really busy at work lately. When I asked why, he said “fire alarm inspections.” When a property is bought or sold, a fire alarm inspection certificate is required on the property (both residential and commercial). The more work my friend does, the more properties are changing hands. He said the past 3-4 weeks have been unusually busy. This may be just a seasonal trend or a sign of a housing turn around but, either way, it is not bad news. Now, if this gauge is accurate it may not show up for another month or so in the housing data since inspections are done before the closing on the property. I will be paying close attention.

So, what do we have? An estimate of earnings that assumes a worse case scenario for hurricanes, a negative housing view and one that does not include the value of a segment sale and join venture. If the buyback is completed this year, it alone will boost earnings of $415 million to $4.23 a share excluding all other factors.

An interesting note here. There was a great discussion (and I think the analysts missed this as I have not read anything else on it) on the hurricane effect. In anticipation of the “end of the world” scenario forecasters gave us prior to the summer of 2006, OC ramped up production of asphalt shingles. They did this during the late spring and early summer as these forecasts began coming out which, unfortunately also happens to be the most expensive time of year to produce these shingles (demand for asphalt is higher). Even in low grade hurricanes (Cat 1 or Cat 2) the majority of damage is roofing related. As a result of the invisible 2006 season that resulted, OC was left with an unprecedented surplus of expensive shingles that then commanded lower prices due to the non-existent demand. This inventory has since been worked off and prices have firmed. Why does this matter for 2007? An active 2007 hurricane season of any substance (by “any” I mean more than zero) will help offset housing weakness. An extreme season has the potential to make the housing market almost irrelevant. Another rather morbid result of an active hurricane season is that it does stimulate the housing market by creating unanticipated demand for new housing. Please do not email me claiming I am hoping for hurricanes so I can profit. I am not, but we need to be realistic. As unlucky as we were in 2005, we were just as lucky in 2006. Somewhere in the middle is the number of storms we should anticipate and it is far greater than zero. They are as inevitable in the South as snow is here in New England. That being said, a return to mere “normal” hurricane levels will provide OC with a substantial boost to earnings. How much? This segment’s sales which are about 25% of the total fell 38% last year. Even if this sales level stays the same, the lack of abnormally high priced inventory will improve earnings here.

In short OC has done a wonderful job of dampening expectations so that they are able to blow them away later or, if everything does go wrong, they are then able to meet them Even in the worse case scenario you have a company selling for just over 6 times earnings and buying back its stock Look for the first two quarters to be a bit slow with things really ramping up in the second half of 2007. Remember, as value investors we want to get in when things are at their worst, all of OC’s markets are in troughs now yet they are managing the business brilliantly through it, when things eventually turn around (they always do)…… boom

In the cartoon the Pink Panther always won…..what makes you think he won’t now?

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Moody’s – Flunking Out At Lampert U

“What we’ve got here………is a failure to communicate. Some men you just can’t reach….” Strother Martin in “Cool Hand Luke”


Yesterday I was doing my reading on Seeking Alpha and came across Chad Brand’s blog The Peridot Capitalist and his post pertaining to RadioShack (RSH). Since he was the first to recommend it as far as I know, I will direct you to his site when my posts reference them (got to give credit where it is due). Moody’s investment rating services recently downgraded the debt of The Shack saying:

“Moody’s Investor Services downgraded RadioShack Corp.’s long-term senior unsecured rating and short-term commercial paper Monday on lackluster sales and operations. The ratings agency lowered the electronics retailer’s senior unsecured rating to “Ba1” from “Baa3.” The move means the company’s senior unsecured rating is no longer investment grade. Moody’s also cut RadioShack’s commercial paper rating to “Not Prime” from “Prime-3.”

After reading it, the first thing that came to my mind was Sears Holdings (SHLD ) as the similarities are stunning. In his annual shareholder missive, Chairman Eddie Lampert lamented:

“We ended the year with more cash on hand than debt. On a combined basis (including Sears Canada) we have $4.0 billion of cash and only $2.8 billion of debt (excluding capital lease obligations of $0.8 billion). Domestically, our $3.3 billion of cash exceeds our debt balance of $2.3 billion (excluding $0.7 billion of capital lease obligations). Furthermore, approximately $350 million of the outstanding domestic debt represents borrowings by our Orchard Supply Hardware subsidiary, which is non-recourse to Sears Holdings. Despite the conservative nature of our capital structure and our improved profitability, the rating agencies have not upgraded us and continue to hold a non-investment grade rating on our debt. We believe Sears Holdings is an investment-grade company; the lack of response by the agencies is puzzling and is certainly something we continue to hope will change.”

Luke: Yeah, well, sometimes nothin’ can be a real cool hand.

Why is this a big deal? The downgrade, aside from being a negative in the eyes of potential investors means that when Sears and Radioshack do borrow money, it will cost them more. What did Radioshack due to deserve the downgrade? They had lower sales (it should be noted this was inevitable to fix The Shack). When CEO Julian Day, an Eddie Lampert U graduate took over Radioshack, it was stuck in the dead end loop of growing sales and decreasing profits. In an attempt to “just get bigger”, Radioshack fell into the “sales at all cost” mentality. It worked. Sales increase but the unfortunate cost of those sales was decreased profits. This apparently is fine with Moody’s as Radioshack had an “investment grade” rating on its debt (memo to Moody’s: This is bad). Day recognized that this was an unsustainable business model and that unprofitable locations had to be closed and the system wide discounting that was crushing margins and profits had to stop. The result of this would be lower sales initially but if done properly, increased profits. It worked as 4th quarter profits jumped 55% (Day took over in June) and crushed “analyst” expectations. In almost a year now, Day has decreased debt at Radioshack by 30% and increased cash on hand by a whopping 110%. According to Moody’s this was bad?

Boss: Sorry, Luke. I’m just doing my job. You gotta appreciate that.
Luke:: Nah – calling it your job don’t make it right, Boss.

Both Sears and Radioshack have business model that Moody’s clearly just does not understand. Here is the really odd part, they both have the ability at this second, to write a check and pay off all their debt and, have plenty left over! How can any reasonable person consider this a negative? This is even more bizarre when you consider that when both Day and Lampert took over their prospective companies, neither had the ability to pay off even 1/2 their debt and Radioshack was then considered “investment grade.” Let’s pretend you are applying for a mortgage. You have $250,000 in the bank , no other debt and are asking for a mortgage of $175,000. What would you say to the loan officer if he claimed you were a “bad credit risk” because as a sales person you only made $95,000 vs the $100,000 you made the year before (Radioshack had a 5% sales decline in 2006 vs 2005)? Personally, I would resist my initial urge to assault them and then inquire as to what they had drank or smoked for breakfast that morning.

What is Moody’s communicating to retailers? Sales are what count. Annoying things like profits, debt levels and cash levels are secondary. Lampert and Day are both saying by their actions that they have this cute little idea that profits and increasing shareholder value are what really count. Both Sears and Radioshack are in the best financial condition in years yet Moody’s just can’t seem to grasp (or refuses to) the Lampert U concept. Thank god for us shareholders that Lampert and Day ignore Moody’s and do not manage their business’s to appease them..

Maybe a “night in the box” will help Moody’s see the light…..Don’t get it? Watch the movie

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Taking A "Leap"

LeapFrog Enterprises, Inc. (LeapFrog ) designs, develops and markets technology-based educational products and related content, dedicated to making learning effective and engaging. The Company designs its products to help infants and toddlers through high school students learn age- and skill-appropriate subject matter, including phonics, reading, writing, math, spelling, science, geography, history and music. Leapfrog’s products include learning platforms, which are affordable hardware devices; educational software-based content, such as interactive books and cartridges, and standalone educational products. The Company conducts its businesses through three segments: United States Consumer, International, and Education and Training.

Since 2004, LF has been a subsidiary of Mollusk Holdings, LLC, an entity controlled by Lawrence J. Ellison. In 2006, the Company purchased software products and support services from Oracle Corporation (ORCL) totaling $391. As of December 31, 2006, Lawrence J. Ellison, the Chief Executive Officer of Oracle Corporation, may be deemed to have or share the power to direct the voting and disposition, and therefore, to have beneficial ownership of approximately 16,750,000 shares of the Company’s Class B common stock. The Class A common stock entitles its holders to one vote per share, and the Class B common stock entitles its holders to ten votes per share on all matters submitted to a vote of stockholders. Lawrence J. Ellison and entities control of approximately 16.7 million shares of the Class B common stock, which represents approximately 53% of the combined voting power of our Class A common stock and Class B common stock mean that as a result, Mr.. Ellison controls all stockholder voting power. I cannot decide if this is a good or bad thing. Larry is no dummy but, when you are worth $20 billion, one has to wonder how much interest he has in a company that in its best year earned $74 million. Now $74 million is not a large amount, but when you consider there are only 63 million shares out there, it does not take much to make the stock move and his investment is $167 million. I am guessing he is loath to lose any money no matter how small the amount so I will side with the “good thing” side until proven different.


LeapFrog’s business is highly seasonal, with retail customers making up a large percentage of all purchases during the back-to-school and traditional holiday seasons and although they are expanding their retail presence by selling products online as well as to electronics and office supply stores, the vast majority of U.S. sales are to a few large retailers. Net sales to Wal-Mart (including Sam’s Club), Toys “R” Us and Target accounted for approximately 70% of U.S. segment sales in 2006 compared to 80% in 2005 and 86% in 2004.

Sales in all segments declined during 2006 primarily as a result of significant reduction in the sales of LeapPad family of products whose design was overhauled. They increased their promotional activities to reduce existing FLY Pentop inventories as they plan to replace the FLY Pentop Computer with the FLY Fusion Pentop Computer in 2007. Sales of screen-based products were down slightly as retailers worked off excess inventories. Retailers’ inventories fell an estimated 40% at the end of 2006 compared to the same period last year, which also negatively impacted 2006 sales. To invigorate sales and margins, the company plans to introduce many new products in 2007, including the afore mentioned FLY Fusion PenTop Computer system, the largest launch of Leapster software titles (many of these will be licensed products through Disney (Cars, Nemo etc..). Nickelodean, and others), a ClickStart My First Computer system, and other products geared toward infants and preschool children.

The 2006 results? LeapFrog went from 28 cents a share in earnings in 2005 to a loss of $2.31 in 2006. That makes 2006 a “do over” year, meaning that new management realized the need to “do over” their main product lines and used 2006 to clear the deck. Now, it should be noted that the new team that did the deck clearing has an impressive resume. Let’s look at them:

Jeffrey G. Katz, Chief Executive Officer and President since July 2006 and as a member of the board of directors since June 2005. Mr. Katz served as the Chairman and Chief Executive Officer of Orbitz, Inc. from 2000 to 2004.

Nancy G. MacIntyre, Executive Vice President, Product, Innovation, and Marketing since February 2007. From May 2005 through January 2007, Ms. MacIntyre served on the executive team at LucasArts, a LucasFilm company, most recently as Vice President of Global Sales and Marketing. Previously, she had been with Atari, Inc as Vice President, Marketing from 2001 through 2005 and with Atari, Inc.’s predecessor Hasbro Interactive from 1998 to 2001 in senior sales and marketing positions.

Martin A. Pidel , Executive Vice President, International since January 2007. From 1997 through December 2006, he served in varying capacities with HASBRO, Inc. including key roles in Europe and the US, most recently as Vice President of International Marketing.

Michael J. Lorion , President, SchoolHouse since December 2006. Prior to that, he served at varying capacities at LeapFrog since June 2005. Prior to joining LeapFrog, Lorion served in different capacities at palmOne, Inc. from February 2000 to April 2005, most recently as Vice President, Vertical Markets Sales & Marketing.

While I expect these changes will improve performance, I would not expect them to contribute substantially until after 2007, due to the lead time associated with product development, and due to the year end seasonality that drives substantially (75%) all sales volume. So, expect a modest sales decline in 2007, improved gross margins from 2006 due to 2006 inventory reduction efforts and improved product mix and a decline in operating expenses from 2006, consistent with the decline in sales. Overall, expect a loss in 2007 but, I expect it to be significantly less than the loss for 2006.


Okay Todd, so why would we invest? A couple of reasons:

Cash:
Currently Leapfrog is sitting on over $200 million or $3.22 a share in cash. This is cash from operations since debt stands at zero, not “cash from financing”. Using our “if we were to buy the whole company” process, if we were to pay todays price of approx. $10.50 a share, we would be essentially be getting cash back of 30%, reducing our actual cost to $7.28 a share. This makes LeapFrog a potential takeover candidate in my mind but that is not a reason to invest. Now, here is where it gets interesting. By using that cash, they could in theory buy back 20 million shares of 1/3 of the company. They won’t and here is why. Just like share buybacks increase EPS when you are making money, they increase losses per share when you lose money. For instance, if you have 10 shares outstanding and lose $1 your EPS is -$.10 a share (10 divided by -$1). Now if you buy back 5 of those shares your loss per share jumps to 20 cents a share (5 divided by -$1). So, do not expect a share buy back in 2007 but, I would expect one in 2008 and this has the potential to make 2008 earnings per share to explode to the upside (that is the interesting part).

Debt:
None and the best news is none will be needed for the current plans of management. They have a $75 million line a credit that has not been tapped.

Products:
I have seen the new LeapFrog products and they are great. They are usable by my 4 year olds and are educational, not just entertaining. The quality is good, meaning they would have to work at breaking them and they are affordable. A Leapster Learning Game System in Target runs about $60 and the games are about $20-$25 a piece. Best of all, the kids really love them and they are learning (to read and write, not blow things up, it’s the little things).

Costs:
Capital expenditures for 2007 will be similar to prior years. In 2006 and 2005, capital expenditures were $20.1 million and $16.7 million. Much of the heavy R&D work on new products is done and those costs are in the 2006 results. 2007 will see the fruits of them. Account collections have been reduced from 90 to about 45 days.

Other Shareholders:
Marty Whitman
who runs Third Avenue Management LLC and has one the best track record in history (disclosure: my son’s Coverdale accounts hold positions in his Value Fund ) holds 8.6 million shares (almost 14%) of the company. Marty was an early investor with Eddie Lampert in both Kmart and Sears (we know how that turned out) and still holds a large position there. It behooves us to look closely at his actions.

What To Do?
At just over $10 a share I am going to take a “Leap of faith” (pun intended). Based on the first 6 months of Mr. Katz’s reign, he is doing everything right. Keep your position small because it is a bit speculative and the payoff will most likely be a bit off down the road. It will be added to the portfolio at the price I purchased it on Monday ($10.54) and this post hit the site the Tuesday giving Enhanced Features Subscribers a day to get in early. Here is how I did it. I bought the shares on the market and then sold a Sept. 2007, $10 put. This lowered my effective purchase price by 81 cents or (7.6%). Should the price fall, this does give us some downside protection. Should the price fall below $10 and we get “put” the shares, meaning we have to buy additional shares at $10, the trade is a plus as long as shares are above $9.19, ($10 minus the .81 cents we received for selling the put). If after Sept, the share price of LF is above $10, we keep the premium and maybe do it over again. All prices are the actual trade prices.

The option will be accounted for in the portfolio at it’s sales price. Since I have no plans to “buy it back”, the only price of it that matters is the price we receive. Now, if after Sept. it is not exercised, its proceeds will be reflected in the portfolio by a reduction in our purchase price of our original shares.

Be prepared for more put selling for some of out “watch list” shares.

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Ignore The "Noise"

“If a business does well, the stock eventually follows.Warren Buffett

The past two weeks have been the perfect example of why, as an investor you must ignore the market action as it pertains to your existing portfolio and focus on the reason you bought shares of the companies in it in the first place. I am going to use my favorite and largest holding in the ValuePlays Portfolio, Sears Holdings (SHLD) as an example.

We first have to remember the reasons why we bought Sears:
1- Retail operations improving
2- Increasing cash hoard for Eddie Lampert to invest (this is a large part of the “value” in SHLD, his 16 yr. track record of 28% annual returns)
3- Reducing debt and shares outstanding
4- Growing profits

Now we have to look at the past two weeks and follow the events of them. We will then see why we were wise to ignore those events and then what that did for us. Feb 26th saw the S&P (.INX) begin what would end up being a 5.2% decline over the next two weeks (it should be noted we added another 1.7% to our lead over the S&P during this slide). If you picked up a paper or watched CNBC you were inundated with dire prognostications.

We had Alan Greenspan aimlessly wandering around the Asian continent incoherently mumbling to any innocent bystander who would listen the US had a “1/3 chance of recession by the end of the year”. It was only after officials found him, reminder him that he no longer was the head of the Fed and that all economic indicators point to the opposite, he changed his statement to, “it is possible we could get a recession toward the end of this year, but I don’t think it’s probable.” Right, and it is also possible your reporter wife Ms. Saywer was first attracted to your chiseled looks, not your decades long access to Washington’s inner circles, but not probable. Alan, its over buddy, go home, take a bath, read a book, do whatever, just please shut up, Ben’s the guy now. Your predecessors where classy enough to be quiet and let you do your job, lets try to exhibit the same to Mr. Bernake and let him do his.

In Asia, the Bank of Japan raised rates 1/4 of a point. This set off a chain of events as people who had borrowed (we are talking billions of dollars here) money in Japan where it was cheaper to buy stocks here no longer enjoyed the lower rate (the “carry trade” you have heard about). This caused them to to then have to sell the stocks they had bought with that money to have to pay off those loans, putting downward pressure on the market.

We then had a sub-prime (these are mortgages given to the most risky prospects) mortgage implosion which, for some reason seemed to make everyone panic. They were actually surprised that when you give as person with a marginal credit history a mortgage you know they probably will eventually not be able to afford, they default on it. The only surprise was that it did not happen 6 months ago. The fear was that the defaults “would spread into the prime market”. Right, so because my neighbor bought a house he could not afford with financing he was not really qualified for and invariably defaulted on his loan, now I should on mine? This is the type of logic we are dealing with folks…

To top it off we had a home builder executive telling us in no uncertain terms that “2007 is going to suck“. An important note here: January 2007 home figures were the 3rd highest in history (despite the declines), this “sucks?” What he really should have said was “look we are fools, we bought way to much land because we thought the party would never end and now it is time to pay the piper.” Real estate has been in a bubble phase for 5 years now and just because they got stuck with their pants down does not mean it will suck, it just won’t be as good. Nothing goes up at a record rate forever and home-builders bought land and started building homes like it would. These guys are like a lottery winner who, after getting his winnings sprints into the nearest bar yelling “the drink are on me”. He then proceeds to fill up the bar with booze, turn around and only then realizes he is at an AA meeting.

All these events, when looked at individually were probably not enough to cause the problem but when you consider the S&P had not had a significant drop in almost a year (remember nothing goes up uninterrupted) you had the mix for panic. We got it.

In the middle of this mess Sears released 4th quarter and full years results. On March.1, the day of the earnings report, shares opened at $180.25 a share. What happened?

Profits- Increased 27%
Debt- Reduced by $815 million
Shares Repurchased- $429 million
Cash On Hand- $4 billion
Retail Margins- Improved 25%

On every metric we bought shares in the company on, it has improved. Would anything you saw make you think about selling your shares? Me neither. But lots of people, listening to the noise above and ignoring these results did as shares dropped $4 that day to $176. Those of us who sat tight and laughed at the panic stricken hoards watched as shares not only climbed out of the hole, but finished this past week at $180.38.

“Only buy something that you’d be perfectly happy to hold if the market shut down for 10 years” says Buffett. If the market was shut down and you looked at Sears last earnings report you would be thrilled, do not let to those who trade pieces of paper and do not “buy pieces of companies” affect your outlook of an investment, let the investment itself do that. The past week and a half saw a ton of “noise” and ton of panic but, those of us who stayed calm and focused came out just fine.

To quote Jesus (of the traders), “They know not what they do….”

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More Great Value Blogs

Here are couple more of my favorite sites. Both of these are littered with the wisdom of Buffet. It is my belief that you cannot read enough Buffet because it is necessary to reinforce the tenants of value investing and calm yourself during turbulent times like the past two weeks. If you are a regular ValuePlays reader I would suggest checking out these sites as the sentiment I express is echoed here.

Fat Pitch Financials

Fat Pitch Financials is a value investing and personal finance blog.

George seeks to invest with a wide margin of safety in companies that have wide moats (i.e., sustainable competitive advantages). This is very similar to Warren Buffett’s style of investing. We both try to wait for so called “fat pitches”.

While he waits for these fat pitches, he also researches arbitrage and special situation opportunities that provide individual investors an edge in short term opportunities. These include going private transactions, odd-lot tender offers, spin-offs, split-offs, and other opportunities. The inspiration for this type of trading was Joel Greenblatt, as well as Warren Buffett.

The current going private transactions table that he maintains is what originally attracted many of Fat Pitch Financials’ readers. That content, along with most of my other special situation tracking, is now in the premium section of Fat Pitch Financials called Contributor’s Corner.

He tracks two portfolios at Fat Pitch Financials so my readers can know how he’s doing. The first portfolio is the Fat Pitch Financials Port that is a virtual portfolio tracked at Marketocracy. This portfolio focuses on “Fat Pitch” discoveries.

The second portfolio, the Special Situations Real Money Portfolio, is a Coverdell Education Savings Account he started for his son at about the time Fat Pitch Financials started in 2004. This portfolio is very small and focuses on going private transactions and other special situation opportunities. It is based on the research provided in Fat Pitch Financials Contributor’s Corner.

Value Investing News

Value Investing News is a community driven value investing news site.
You can submit links to news items, bid up stories to the front page, bid down stories, and make comments. There is also a forum and a user powered link directory is starting to roll out.

Members are rewarded for the success of Value Investing News by sharing in the Adsense revenue.

There is also a monthly user contest. This month they are giving away a free pass to the Value Investing Congress West (This is the most valuable prize so far.)

Value Investing News leverages several web2.0 technologies including social bookmarking, social networking, user powered ratings, collaborative filtering recommendations, RSS feeds, and a submission bookmarklet. The goal is to harness the network effect of web2.0 technologies to help fellow value investors save time following the news.

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Eddie Lampert’s Annual Letter- SHLD

Last weekend I listed what I thought were the notable comments from Warren’s letter to the Berkshire Hathaway shareholders. Since I have entrusted the largest portion of my personal portfolio to Eddie Lampert at Sears Holdings, I ought to post the important “notables” from his.

Retail Operations
Lands’ End had a record year in profitability in its traditional business (i.e., catalog, online, and inlet stores). In addition, we saw a significant improvement in the profit performance of Lands’ End merchandise in our Sears stores. With a new leadership team and a more integrated approach to working across Sears Holdings, the business is moving in the right direction. Our customers are embracing the opportunity to buy Lands’ End quality merchandise in our stores, on the phone, and on the Internet, and we are working hard to make Lands’ End available across more of the chain.”

If anyone has seen the Land’s End “store in a store” concept in Sears, it is a real winner. I am fast becoming convinced that the future direction of Sears apparel will predominately be Land’s End merchandise.

“Home Services
is another business that achieved a record year of profitability in 2006. Home Services is not only a highly profitable business for us, but also an important strategic asset as it provides a point of differentiation from many of our competitors.”

“The apparel businesses at both Kmart and Sears also showed continued improvement. Kmart is further along in partnering with our sourcing and design groups, and we believe that we have improved our offering for our customers with higher quality, better fit, and appropriate fashion at great value. Sears apparel has turned around the decline that occurred in 2005 when it moved away from the styles our customers wanted to buy. The team has made significant progress this year, and is focused on creating the kind of breakthrough improvement that would return Sears to its previous levels of profitability in this area.”

On Cash flow

While we like to think of ourselves as a start-up, we are different from most start-ups in our cash flow generation. Since the merger closed in 2005, we have demonstrated a consistent ability to generate cash flow. This strong source of cash provides us the flexibility to deploy capital in the manner that we believe is best calculated to create long-term shareholder value. (Emphasis mine).

Ratings Agencies

We ended the year with more cash on hand than debt. On a combined basis (including Sears Canada) we have $4.0 billion of cash and only $2.8 billion of debt (excluding capital lease obligations of $0.8 billion). Domestically, our $3.3 billion of cash exceeds our debt balance of $2.3 billion (excluding $0.7 billion of capital lease obligations). Furthermore, approximately $350 million of the outstanding domestic debt represents borrowings by our Orchard Supply Hardware subsidiary, which is non-recourse to Sears Holdings. Despite the conservative nature of our capital structure and our improved profitability, the rating agencies have not upgraded us and continue to hold a non-investment grade rating on our debt. We believe Sears Holdings is an investment-grade company; the lack of response by the agencies is puzzling and is certainly something we continue to hope will change. Then again, we have taken these measures not out of a desire to please the rating agencies, but rather because we believe they are the right moves for our Company at this time.

Derivative Instruments

Our disclosure in 2006 that we had entered into total return swap transactions generated a fair bit of media attention and speculation. Perhaps this was prompted by the disclosures that we provided relating to the risk of the investments. As we disclosed in our filings, these total return swaps are derivatives, a term used broadly to describe a vast spectrum of financial instruments, which often have very different characteristics and purposes. Derivatives are so labeled because their value is tied to, or “derived” from, the value of one or more defined underlying indices, prices, or other variables. But it is important to remember that derivatives come in a myriad of forms and carry various levels of risk.

In our case, we entered into total return swaps, whose value is directly derived from changes in the value of the underlying securities. We could have purchased the underlying securities directly, but we elected to make our investments in the form of total return swaps because it can be a more efficient and cost-effective means of managing capital. As of February 3, 2007, the notional value of these derivatives was less than $400 million.

While we chose to include risk disclosures to make clear that, as with all investments, there is risk associated with the total return swaps, it is also the case that every company takes risks every day. Indeed, business is about managing risk. When these risks come in other forms, they are not always accompanied by the same level of detailed disclosure in public filings. Doing business in California will always carry “earthquake risk” and doing apparel business in winter clothing will carry “weather risk.” Investors and executives focus on some of these risks and tend to overlook others. If a company’s risk-management process is a robust one, the level of focus will be proportionate to the amount of risk and the probability of the risk occurring, as well as whether or not the risk can be effectively managed. At Sears Holdings, we try to manage risk in an effective way – whether it is in our investment decisions, our real estate decisions, or our product line decisions – and we are prepared to take risks where we believe the probability of success justifies the investment. We will not always be successful, but if we do a good job of evaluating opportunities and executing on them, we believe that our shareholders will be well rewarded.

A Strategy of Disciplined Growth

As we look ahead, I want there to be no doubt about one thing: It is certainly our intention to grow Sears Holdings. Some commentators have asserted that we want to shrink the Company, but that is simply not so. No great company would aspire to become smaller, and we certainly do not. But before embarking on a growth plan, it is critical to provide a sound base from which to grow. To this end, we have set out to improve the profitability of our business model. Our objective is disciplined growth. We do not want to grow simply for the sake of becoming bigger. Rather, our aim is to become more profitable, and as such we need to ensure that any revenue growth occurs at an appropriate level of profitability.

As we have said before, we do not want to spend $1 too much or $50,000 too little on our stores. Unless we believe we will receive an adequate return on investment, we will not spend money on capital expenditures to build new stores or upgrade our existing base simply because our competitors do. If share repurchases or acquisitions appear to be more productive, then we will allocate capital to those options appropriately. We will seek superior returns, wherever they may be found.

Many of our largest competitors, on the other hand, are primarily focused on growing their top line. To that end, and consistent with the conventional wisdom, they are quickly building new stores. This is a highly capital-intensive way to try to drive returns for shareholders, but provided the return on their investment in new stores is more attractive than their alternatives, it may be the best use of capital for them. Over the past three years, by contrast, we have shown that there are other ways to create value for shareholders. Sears Holdings’ stock has been one of the top retail performers for each of the past two years, as was its predecessor Kmart in 2004, in spite of this non-traditional approach.

We believe we have managed to create a lot of value for shareholders without excessive spending partly because of our disciplined stewardship of our shareholders’ capital. For Sears Holdings, in the near term we believe the greatest value will come not from increasing our store base, but primarily from better utilizing our existing assets to deliver more value to our customers and ultimately our shareholders.

Compensation

I believe one of the causes of the many well-known accounting abuses was this myopic focus on moving share price by driving short-term earnings. As we have explained, we do not attempt to manage earnings or expectations, we generally do not meet with Wall Street analysts, and, except in a few select cases, we have not provided options to our associates. Stock options can play an important role in compensation arrangements if handled correctly, and many companies have used them to motivate and compensate their executives and employees appropriately. The requirement that companies account for stock options as an expense is helpful in highlighting to investors and directors the cost of these programs.

At Sears Holdings, we have linked a very significant part of our executives’ variable compensation to the EBITDA of Sears Holdings or one of its businesses, adjusted for certain items that are not within the control of our associates. We consider EBITDA a superior measure of operational performance, as it provides a clearer picture of operating results and cash flows by eliminating expenses that are not reflective of underlying business performance. We have both a one-year EBITDA goal used for annual bonuses and a longer-term goal that is generally based on EBITDA performance that we have used for our Long Term Incentive Plans (LTIPs). Unlike some companies, which set targets at levels that are difficult to miss, we set targets that are achievable but require us to perform – it is important to set goals that challenge and stretch us.

Members Of The Military

One aspect of Sears Holdings’ commitment to the military – our Military Service pay differential and benefits continuation program – has received a fair bit of grassroots attention in the past couple of years. I have seen a number of emails and blog entries about this program, most of which ask whether it’s true or an urban legend. The initial skepticism is understandable, given the unfounded rumors and exaggerations that can circulate on the Internet, but in this case the program is real. For associates of Sears Holdings (other than certain part-time and seasonal associates) who are called to duty in the National Guard or Reserve, we make up any difference between the associate’s pay at Sears Holdings and his or her military pay – for up to five years. We will also hold a comparable position for an eligible deployed employee for up to five years, and allow those employees to continue most benefits while deployed. Since 2001, we have had over 3,500 associates participate in our military leave program; at present, there are about 400 Sears Holdings associates in the program. We are proud to support these individuals as they serve our Nation.

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A Book, A Robbery & A Great Blog To Visit

Friday Tidbits:

* Publisher John Wiley has sent me a copy of “The Little Book of Common Sense Investing” by the legendary John Bogle. I will try to get through it this weekend and if I decide to recommend it will post an Amazon link here for you if you then wish to purchase it.

* Topps (TOPP).

Founded in 1938 as Topps Chewing Gum, and in its early years produced a popular penny “Topps Gum” from a factory in Brooklyn, N.Y. After World War II, the company developed Bazooka Bubble Gum, and in 1950, added trading cards to its product line. Baseball cards appeared in 1951 and quickly became a vital part of pop culture, a tradition that continues to this day, and includes football (both American and European) and basketball, in addition to entertainment cards and stickers and albums. In July 2003, Topps acquired WizKids, LLC a designer and marketer of collectible strategy games. Topps maintains offices in Canada, the United Kingdom, Ireland, Italy, and Argentina, in addition to the U.S. Topps also manufactures the popular lollipop brands marketed as Ring Pops, Push Pops, Baby Bottle Pops and other novelty candy and gum products. Now headquartered in New York City, the company has worldwide distribution, annual net sales for Fiscal 2006 of $293,838,000, and employs over 487 people worldwide.

Recently, Micheal Eisner lead group that offered $385 million for the company. In what might be the best and latest example of boardroom incompetence, Topps agreed to the buyout. This should be criminal. A cursory look reveals what I am talking about.

Topps
Cash on hand $81 million
Shares Outstanding 39 million
Debt – ZERO
Cash per Share $2.07
Offer Price $9.75
Closing Price Day Before Offer $8.91

Do you see where this is going? We have to subtract the cash on hand from the offer price because Eisner’s group will receive that cash (and have no debt to pay off) once the deal closes. We then take the offer price of $9.75 minus cash on hand of $2.07 and we have an answer of $7.68. What does that mean? If you are a shareholder your management just agreed to sell the company 13.8% BELOW the current market value! If you are one of those “lucky” shareholders you now know how Ned Beatty felt in “Deliverance.”

Here what it should look like, $8.91 closing price plus $2.07 in cash = $10.98 starting price for bids.

Fortunately there is a white knight: Topps director Arnaud Ajdler, along with the investment firm Crescendo Partners II, have launched a campaign to kill the deal. Crescendo owns about 6.6 percent of the company’s shares, according to filings with the Securities and Exchange Commission. Ajdler is also a managing partner of Crescendo. In his filing he says “Since the Board of Directors has decided to pursue this transaction over the significant concerns which I have continually and repeatedly voiced to the Board, I intend to actively solicit votes and campaign against the proposed transaction.”

Here’s hoping he succeeds………


Recommended Blog:

Gannon On Investing

“Value investing blog and value investing podcast influenced by Benjamin Graham, Joel Greenblatt, and Warren Buffett’s value investing model. Built upon the value investor insights of intrinsic value, margin of safety, competitive advantage, and protection of principal.”

Basically, it’s a value investing blog with longer articles about investing concepts, specific stocks (analysis), and the market (at least insofar as my normalized P/E posts go). He has some stuff from three other contributors in the “Columns” and “Book Reviews” sections.

Some people might like the “Encyclopedia” section which links to and contain entries like this one:

Finally, there’s the directory of other investing sites. Also, there’s the podcast – new visitors might enjoy listening to the podcast episodes.

He does a “20 Questions” series with other bloggers that is something I enjoy (and will be features on soon)

Some of his best work is on “normalized PE ratios”, definitely worth checking out.

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Ethanol- Debunking A Few Myths


Since President Bush is in Brazil this week to talk about ethanol, I though it would be appropriate to present portions of a paper by Vinod Khosla, a venture capitalist who, for those who do not know him was a internet pioneer and a founder of Sun Microsytems. You can view a bio of him here. Kholsa is himself investing millions of his own dollars building ethanol plants. The paper here, is very long and detailed. I am going to present the most topically relevant items based on what the media usually presents.

Much has been said about the energy balance of ethanol:

Kholsa answers:
“Energy balance is not even the right question to answer. It is not the energy balance of ethanol that matters but the energy balance of ethanol relative to the energy balance of gasoline. Dr Wang at Argonne National Labs has built one of the most rigorous and transparent public models for energy balance calculations. His results indicate that corn ethanol has almost twice the energy balance compared to gasoline, yet this crucial fact is seldom mentioned in the press. According to the majority of studies, corn ethanol has an energy balance between 1.3-1.8 while gasoline is substantially worse, at about 0.8 (since it takes energy to extract, transport, refine and handle gasoline). Electricity has an energy balance four times worse than corn ethanol. Do we stop using electricity? No, because as Dr. Wang concludes, this is not even the right question. Dr. Wang goes on to say that energy balance is “not a meaningful number for any fuel in evaluating its benefits”.

Why then does the press continue mentioning it? Why do they fail to mention that electricity has a substantially worse energy balance than ethanol? Do they recommend we stop using electricity? What is often inferred by the press is that it takes more petroleum to make ethanol than is displaced. This is emphatically NOT true, even in the most vintage of plants. Ethanol causes a very significant (more than 90%) reduction in petroleum use. The debate in scientific circles is about whether producing ethanol uses more fossil energy (not petroleum) than it creates. That is an entirely different question because if the objectives are lower cost gasoline replacement fuel, energy security and less reliance on imported oil, then in fact converting non-petroleum forms of fossil energy (mostly natural gas in the case of corn ethanol plants) into ethanol would be a perfectly acceptable strategy, especially since the production costs of a gallon of ethanol are lower today than the cost of gasoline produced from oil. Only when the climate change questions are addressed is energy balance even a relevant question (though carbon emissions per mile driven is a much more appropriate question). In fact if we have to pick an alternative to gasoline then ethanol is the best choice today.

More importantly it is a choice that starts a progression to increasingly “better” technologies and has far more room to improve technologically on feedstocks, development process, and ethanol and ethanol like fuels (biohols) that are more compatible with the existing infrastructure than alternative technologies. Equally important, ethanol is compatible and complementary to other petroleum reduction technologies like hybrids and plug-in electric hybrid cars. Even more critically, the key question is not energy balance but rather the greenhouse gas emissions. Certain energy sources like natural gas (the principal fossil fuel in the majority of ethanol plants) are much cleaner and greener than others, like coal. It is not the energy input but rather the total greenhouse gas emissions, from source feedstock, production and consumption of the fuel (per mile driven) that is most important according to the NRDC. Energy balance is the wrong question. Greenhouse gas emissions per mile driven is the right question.”

Increasing Production Yields:

Not your father’s ethanol anymore: The energy required to produce corn ethanol is declining every year. Corn yields are increasing and fertilizer intensity is decreasing, further improving its energy balance. In five or so years we should start to see corn crops with a nitrogen fixation gene, materially reducing the fertilizer requirements and the energy consumption it entails. Even the crops used to produce ethanol will diversify. Sweet sorghum for example, uses a lot less water and fertilizer, can be harvested twice a year, and makes for a cost effective and environmentally better feedstock that can be grown on marginal lands, lands that ordinarily cannot be effectively used for feedstock. It is the major source of feedstock for ethanol being investigated in India. But such “optimizing” options will not be seriously pursued till after the market for corn ethanol is established. Once ethanol becomes a substantial market, all parts of the production process, crops & feedstocks, manufacturing, chemistries, transportation, and more will be the subject of intensive attention and innovation. The world does not stay still when large scale economics are involved.

As to the production process, again the Wall Street Journal reports that the Broin Cos., based in Sioux Falls, S.D., has pioneered a method to convert corn to ethanol at 90 degrees, rather than the previous 230 to 250 degrees, improving energy efficiency by 10% to 12%, according to co-founder and Chief Executive Jeff Broin. And E3 Biofuels LLC is finding ways to get more out of all parts of the corn, by building plants near dairy farms and feeding cows the byproducts of ethanol processing, then using energy from the animal waste to help power the plants. “Wastes are converted to valuable products, such as biogas and biofertilizers, which replace fossil fuels and their derivatives,” according to David Hallberg, co-founder of Omaha-based E3. E3 Biofuels achieves an energy balance for corn ethanol of approximately five, using the Argonne National Labs GREET model – a number higher than what many cite for cellulosic ethanol! We have seen plants at every point in the continuum form old energy inefficient plants to highly optimized plants.

Myth: Not Enough Cropland

The next question we see a lot of fear, uncertainty and doubt about is the question of land and the related issue of food. Is there enough land to meet our energy needs? Beyond the traditional critique of ‘energy balance’ mentioned above, the question of land use is often cited by critics. If all the ethanol were produced using the ‘corn-to-ethanol’ process, we would simply not have enough land. Quite true, but equally obvious is the fact that relatively predictable pathways exist to cellulosic ethanol. Using switchgrass as an energy crop, the NRDC estimates we would need about 114 million acres of land. We need to look at this another way – 73 million acres of soybeans have been planted. Why can’t we do the same with energy crops? Instead of exporting soybeans we could be reducing oil imports. In addition we have 40 million acres of CRP lands. What if we used them for energy production by growing natural prairie crops like switchgrass (more likely grass “cocktails”) on them? Between export crops and CRP lands we have more than 120 million acres in this country. We believe that a fraction of our export crop lands could more than replace all our oil imports while improving our trade balance, increasing farm incomes, improving biodiversity in the fields, and making our fuel cheaper.

Improved efficiency in ethanol production and use of waste biomass like corn stover, rice husks, and sugarcane baggasse, leads to a smaller land area requirement. Former Secretary of State George Schultz and former CIA Director Jim Woolsey have estimated that, with some efficiency improvements, we will need only thirty million acres of soil bank lands to meet half our gasoline needs by 2025, in total, a small fraction of the land mass devoted to the soy crop. The Department of Energy estimates in an April 2005 report that 1.3 billion tons of biomass could be made available relatively easily from existing cropland, resulting in over a hundred billion gallons of cellulosic ethanol without changing agricultural practices materially.

Myth: Food Prices Will Go Up

To allay another common misconception, it is extremely unlikely that ethanol will be competing materially with food. The current process takes the starch from corn to make ethanol and leaves the protein and fiber for livestock feed. A current rule of thumb is that 1 lb of dried distillers grains (DDGs), the corn ethanol byproduct, replaces a ½ lb of corn and a ½ lb of soybean meal in a cattle feed ration. By the time we get to needing sufficient quantities of ethanol, we will be producing most of it from cellulosic feedstocks. This is why the land use arguments are incorrect. In fact many energy crops like switchgrass and miscanthus perhaps could make for excellent crop rotation plants with traditional row crop agriculture. The idea is to develop mixed grass “cocktails” that will serve as crop rotation crops for today’s row crops , increasing bio-diversity , while producing feedstock for liquid fuels. This mix will enhance the soil, keeping farmland more productive and biodiverse, according to the NRDC study “Growing Energy”.

Some impact on food prices is possible, even likely over the short term, but we suspect total household costs for food and transportation fuels will go down. It is worth noting that for the US as a whole we are most likely to do crop rotation of energy crops with traditional row crops like corn and replace export crops (like soybean) with energy crops. Export crops will be replaced by reduced imports with higher value to farmers and a better balance of payments for our economy. Since a majority of our agricultural land is used to produce animal feed proteins, the NDRC believes in the potential of producing cellulose for ethanol and feed protein simultaneously. The land use argument and the related food price argument really disappear in that case.

At the international level, why have the developing countries been fighting so hard to eliminate the food subsidies? The press likes to conjure up images of food supply shortages, when the reality is that we have had burdensome surplus crops in the last few years, large enough that the western world has to support its farmers with subsidies. There is no scarcity of food but rather a scarcity of income to buy it for the poorest of the poor. The current Doha round of talks on international trade broke down mostly over this issue.

Myth: Ethanol Is More expensive

Production costs and market prices are different things. Today, prices may be high caused by the rapid demand spike we have seen as oil companies have rapidly switched away from MTBE to avoid the legal liability they are incurring today, and to avoid the potential of additional liability they will surely incur from volatile organics, especially benzene, that are material components of today’s gasoline and are known carcinogens. The Foundation for Consumer & Taxpayer Rights released a new study of rising gasoline prices in California that found corporate markups and profiteering are responsible for spring price spikes, not rising crude costs or the switchover to higher-cost ethanol, as the oil industry claims.

But just as surely as profits are high and margins exorbitant for ethanol producers today, additional capacity, maybe even excess capacity is coming on line rapidly. There is more capacity under construction and under planning today (planned to be operational by 2008) than we have built in the last twenty years in this country. Payback periods for new plants are six months instead of the seven years investors would normally expect! Ethanol production costs in the US today are about $1.00 per gallon before any subsidies or taxes,

Myth: Ethanol Cannot Use Existing Infrastructure

Not really true. Brazilian experts laugh at these misleading assertions. Brazil has thousands of gas stations using the same tanks, pumps, tankers for transportation, some with minor modifications and Brazil is building new pipelines to transport ethanol. For sure not every tank or tanker can be used as is, and we have environmental regulations more stringent than Brazil that will require us to have new nozzles for our gas pumps, but the dollars required to achieve this are immaterial compared to the size of the market. For a multi-hundred billion dollar market, I estimate that to convert 10% of the stations to offer at least one E85 pump will take no more than a few hundred million dollars over about five years, or less than 0.1% of revenue annually. Many (but not all – and we only need 10% in my estimation to kick start the market) of the same pumps in the ground can be cleaned and adopted. Ethanol can be piped in pipelines contrary to popular belief, but not if the ethanol is going to be used as an additive to gasoline. Piping E85 or E100 ethanol is no problem since the small amounts of water it may pickup in the pipeline is only problematic when added to gasoline in low blends like E6 or E10 (6% and 10% ethanol respectively). But the opponents like to spread these myths as general roadblocks when it is only an issue for the narrow use of ethanol as a blend stock. There are thousands of leaking underground tanks at our gas stations and we have an existing multi-billion dollar fund for replacing leaking underground storage tanks (LUST Funds). When this “fix “ is done, we can use tanks that will accommodate both ethanol and gasoline. Maybe E85 is the reason to expedite the replacement of these leaking tanks?

I believe ethanol is the answer to our oil dependence. I said it in a previous post ValuePlays Portfolio member Archer Daniel’s Midland, ticker (ADM) is the best way to go if you want to invest in it. ADM is already doing cellulosic research on current feedstocks. The process involves thermochemically treating corn hulls—or cellulose from corn waste—to allow part of the fiber to be fermented to alcohol. “We believe this process would boost our production of ethanol by 15% without requiring an additional ear of corn,” says Woertz. “Cellulosic applications such as this, on existing feedstocks, may be as little as 2 years away. Other technologies, involving other feedstocks, may arrive in 5 to 7 years. “We believe that advanced levels of federal research and development will be needed to speed new solutions to market,” she says. “Funding for this research should be technology neutral, feedstock neutral and look for the best solutions from all options.

PS. More irony… Do you Bush bashers out there have a hard time admitting that Bush “the oil man” has done more for the “alternative fuel” movement in this country than any other President? History will look at his Presidency as the turning point in these fuels from a novelty to mainstream acceptance.

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AIG’s Insurance Business: Not Really Improving

AIG reported solid increases in income in 2006. Our results for 2006 were lead by our General Insurance business”. AIG President and CEO Martin J. Sullivan (no relation) 3/1/2007

I make it a point to talk to my friends about the businesses they work in. This is not an effort to get “inside” information about a company, but to learn more about the businesses they are in and the challenges and opportunities they face. Last summer several friends of mine who practice personal injury law (worker’s compensation and auto) were lamenting that AIG just “stopped settling cases.” Now, had this been one person in one office in one state, I would have brushed it off as being associated only with him and not indicative of AIG business practices. But, when you have different lawyers in different states whose businesses are unrelated to each other saying the same thing, one has too wonder. I made a mental note about it and did not think too much about it after that. Recently, I was talking again to a few of them again and heard the same refrain from them, “AIG will not settle cases.” I waited until AIG released their 2006 10-K and decided to dig through it to determine if their claims had merit. Let’s break down some numbers: All the following pertain to the Domestic Insurance Operations.

Underwriting Profit. This is simple to determine. It is equal to Net premiums minus net losses (payments to insureds)

Personal (Auto) Underwriting Gain (Loss)- Millions
2005 $74
2006 $204
Domestic Brokerage (Workers Comp) Underwriting Gain (Loss)
2005 ($1.5) Billion
2006 $2.4 Billion

Conclusion? AIG experienced a gargantuan improvement in results in 2006. It should be noted that 2005 results here do not include losses from catastrophes like hurricanes, floods, etc. These numbers are from ordinary operations to make comparisons relevant. It should also be noted that Domestic Brokerage results are not all worker’s comp (WC), but that is the category WC is classified in and AIG does not break it out. It is a fair comparison as WC is the largest single variable in this category so WC results have the largest impact on this segment. This improved profit picture alone does not prove our point though, it is possible that AIG wrote more policies and from those new policies netted more profits. Well let’s look:

Domestic Lines Premiums Earned
2004 +5.6%
2006 +5%

For the past two years premium earned have been essentially flat so it cannot be responsible for the 540% increase in profits. Maybe they cut costs to the bone? Let’s just look closer again:

Combined Domestic Expense Ratio
2005 21.0
2006 21.5

By looking at the expense ratio, we can determine that the percentage of expenses associated with domestic operations remained the same so this eliminates expense cutting as the cause of the gain. This tells us that $21 of every $100 in premiums went to expenses, virtually identical in 2004 and 2005.

Once the insurance company has premiums (float), they invest them. It is possible that AIG had a banner year investing the money and that accounts for the profit difference. The answer?

Return On Invested Assets
2004 4.4%
2005 4.7%
2006 5.6%

While investing results were improved, they do not account for the surge in profits. The investing benefit to earnings was that they had more to invest, not that they earned that much more on what they invested. So we still need to find the reason they had “more to invest”.

Let’s review, profits surged in 2006 and it was not due to additional premium’s earned, expense cutting or abnormal investing gains. That leaves us only one way they could increase profits, pay out less claims. But that does not necessarily mean “they just stopped” settling claims and thus had to pay. Let’s look closer again. In the insurance industry, there is a metric called the loss ratio. This number tells us out of every $100 in premium’s, how many dollars are paid out as claims (losses). Barring a catastrophe, this number should be somewhat consistent year to year for a huge insurer like AIG. The following numbers are again excluding catastrophe losses in 2004 and 2005.

Combined Domestic Loss Ratio

2004 81.3
2005 82.5
2006 69.1

After consistent results in 2004 & 2005, AIG’s results dramatically improved. These numbers mean that after paying out over 80 cents of every dollar in premiums in 2004 and 2005, AIG suddenly paid out only 69 cents of every dollar in 2006. While 11 or 12 cents of each dollar does not seem like much, when you consider AIG had $108 billion in revenue last year, a little bit easily becomes something big.

It is looking like my friends complaints may be correct but, there is one more necessary step we need to do before we can know for certain. It is possible that there just were not as many claims in 2006 so AIG by default paid less settlements and thus realized more profits. If this is the case, then the rise in profits is perfectly understandable. We need to understand the claim process first. When a case (claim) comes in, the insurance adjuster for AIG sets a “reserve” on the it. This reserve is an approximate value of the case in terms of settlement. This allows AIG to gauge future labilities. When the case is settled, the amount of the reserve is reduce by the amount the adjuster set aside and the settlement amount then goes into the “loss” column when the check is cut.

We can now accurately conclude that since AIG did not write more polices to grow income, did not cut expenses to do it and did not realize dramatically improved investing gains, the only way they could have grown income over 500% would have been to either had a large reduction in claims OR, just not settle cases (and then be forced to pay). If it is a case where they refused to settle, we would see a surge in the “reserves” on the books for these claims as reserves are only lowered when cases are actually settled (this also lowers earnings), if the case is they did not have more claims, reserves would remain relatively constant. Now, these reserves are subtracted from earnings for accounting but what having money here does is give AIG vastly larger sums to invest (hence the “more to invest”) and the results of that increase earnings. What? If AIG sets aside $10 for reserves on cases, they take a $10 hit to earnings, but, they are then able to invest that $10 and add the results back to earnings, the more to invest, the more to earnings. Essentially they can “play” with the money until they need to cut a check. The longer they delay actually cutting a check, the more they can earn on the money. AIG in their 10-k said 2006 revenue growth “was primarily attributable to the growth in net premiums earned and net investment income from General Insurance.” Now we have to assume that AIG is accurately accounting for its reserves. Meaning if they say we need $100 million to add to reserves, when the claims are paid, it does equal $100 million. If they under report them they are forced to take an “adverse development” charge. If they are consistently taking these charges, we know that they are under reporting their reserves vs actual payments. 2005 was a hurricane year so we will not count that but in 2006 there were no catastrophes yet in Domestic Insurance alone AIG took a $110 million “adverse development charge” meaning they underestimated reserves by that amount. Here we go:

Workers Compensation Loss Reserves-Billions
2005 $11.6 Billion
2006 $13.4 Billion

BINGO…… AIG added $1.8 billion or 16% to it’s reserves for WC in 2006 (this is by far the largest reserve AIG maintains for all line of insurance business both domestic and international). This means that the surge in profits was due largely in part to AIG refusing to settle WC cases and thus not have to pay claims. This only pushes these liabilities off into the future. Here is the real irony, AIG is paying people who are out on WC a weekly wage check (the amount differs from state to state so I will not get into details but it is normally about 60% of their gross wages). In many cases AIG’s weekly payments will eventually surpass what they would have paid if they just settled a year ago. It should also be noted that this does not absolve them of a settlement amount either. In most states there is a formula based on the employees loss of function, weekly wages, age and other factors that dictate a range of settlement amounts. AIG will have to pay, it is just a matter of “when”, not “if”. This means that AIG will eventually end up paying almost twice these cases initial value when all is said and done.

While AIG’s strategy of refusing to settle claims may have helped them last year, there is a growing bulge in future liabilities out there that will have to get paid. Investor’s beware….

PS. Does anyone else find it ironic that when an insurance company does what it is designed to do, pay a claim, they refer to it as a “loss”? Isn’t it just a cost of doing business? Isn’t this akin to a restaurant classifying the food people eat as a “loss”?

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The New Gap CEO- A Lampert University Grad…Please?



Having mention Gap (GPS) as a possible investment in a previous post , we must revisit the most recent conference call to see if any of the goals we set for it are being met.

Gap earnings call highlights (at least the ones that matter to me)

2006 Earnings down and 2007 does not look much better- No surprise

-Closing Forth & Towne. Given the sales, productivity levels, and the traffic momentum we had seen to date, they felt that the probability of achieving an acceptable return on investment from a full rollout of the brand was too low. As a result, they will close 19 Forth & Towne stores by the end of June, 2007.

– Converting Old Navy outlet stores to Old Navy stores. Given the change in competitive environment, there is no longer a clear distinction between the two businesses. They expect to convert the 45 outlet stores by October of this year. This decision has no impact on Gap Outlet and Banana Republic factory stores.

– In addition to gaining cost efficiencies in management structure, this decision also allows them to close one of our Northern Kentucky distribution centers. The expenses associated with converting the Old Navy outlet stores and closing the distribution center will be about $6 million in 2007. However, annual savings from these measures are estimated to be $12 million.

– Regarding share repurchases, they plan to continue to use excess cash to opportunistically repurchase shares. At the end of the fourth quarter, they still had $200 million available under the current authorization. Gap has plenty of cash and still generates enough to buy much more back. My guess is that it will be left for the new CEO to announce the new amount to get him (her) off to a good start with shareholders.

The real estate strategy for 2007. At this time, they expect to open about 230 new stores and to close about 200. The openings are weighted towards Old Navy as they continue to believe there is additional real estate opportunity and the returns remain attractive, and the closures are weighted to Gap and include the impact of the 19 Forth & Towne store closures. Please also note the 45 Old Navy outlet conversions will be recorded as both a closure and opening to reflect the reassignment. Full year net square footage is expected to be up about 1%.

Gap is off to a decent albeit anemic start. The Forth & Towne closing was a no brainer because it should have never been attempted in the first place. As for the other closings, there will be net gain of 49 stores at year end, mostly Old Navy. Of the 135 stores to close, most will be Gap. Here is my issue, they are only scratching the surface here. Gap does not need to get bigger, it needs to get more profitable and when you are not performing well given the present scale of your company, what make you think being bigger will magically fix that? In 2006, Banana Republic sales were up 14%. Old Navy’s were flat and Gap was down 6%, so we aren’t in a situation where the whole company is struggling, just Gap brands. The move to convert a few of them to Old Navy stores again is a good one but still not enough. What was not discussed was Banana Republic, why not convert some Gap’s into them? Currently Gap is a retailer with an excellent premium brand (Banana Republic), a good value brand (Old Navy) and a John Candy like bloated mid-level brand (Gap). I need somebody to come in a say “we need to be more profitable, not bigger” because the two are not always directly related.

The CEO search continues and I cannot even think about investing until I know the who’s and what’s of what they plan to do. If they are of the Julian Day of Radioshack (RSK) or Eddie Lampert of Sears Holdings, (SHLD ) mold then I will be racing to buy Gap shares (for more on Radioshack, visit Chad Brand’s blog The Peridot Capitalist ). Can you imagine what somebody like them could do with the Gap? What do I mean? Sears Holdings shares are up over 1000% since Lampert took over almost 3 years ago when both Sears and Kmart were left for dead by everybody. Radioshack has gone from one foot in the grave to seeing its shares up almost 80% since Day took over last summer. How did they do it? They have this novel approach that the most important thing they can do is grow profits, not just sell merchandise. Somewhere along the way, retailers got the “bigger at all cost is better” mantra ingrained in them and began to chase sales over profits. Lampert and Day have said, profits matter most, not just sales. This has lead them to close under performing locations, sell off unnecessary assets, keep closer tabs on inventory and not just discount merchandise to drive unprofitable revenue growth. They then take this extra money and begin massive share buybacks, pay off debt and to re-invest in the current locations that are performing satisfactorily. The potential here for a CEO like this to make shareholders very wealthy is just waiting to be had as Gap has $2 billion in the bank, produces another $1.5 billion of operating cash flow per year and is virtually debt free. If they would stop investing in trying to just get bigger and got smart, they could return a ton to investors via buybacks (I estimate 15%-20% in year one at current prices). Currently Gap (GPS) shares are trading over 10% below their early year buyout rumor highs.


If they new guy (gal) has more store growth aspirations or a “new product mix” goal, I will be watching from the sidelines. Gap has a lot to like about it and I think there is a ton of hidden value there, it just remains to be seen what the new CEO will do with it. Think of it this way, if both you and Emeril Lagasse
have the same ingredients in your kitchens, my guess is his final results cooking dinner with them will be far superior. Thus is the dilemma with a CEO-less Gap, are we going to get Emeril or Norm Peterson’s dinner from the “Hungry Heifer”? Please don’t tell me you do not know who he is…….