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More Pershing/General Growth Factual Inaccuracies

What is going on out there with folks and General Growth Properties (GGWPQ) and Pershing? Is anyone actually doing any research before they put “finger to keyboard” Hat tip to reader Mark for bringing this to my attention.

First we had the NY Times this weekend not know Pershing is required to file with the SEC disclosing its activity in General Growth.

Now we have Deal.com and this story:

General Growth Properties Inc. (NYSE: GGP) was the Titanic of the Real Estate Investment Trust ocean that Morgan Stanley (NYSE: MS), Fidelity Investments and Pershing Square Capital Management L.P thought they could save from sinking. The three put their money into the Chicago-based REIT over the recent near term when its stock continued to swan dive, which culminated in a Chapter 11 filing last week. Now, Morgan Stanley, Fidelity Investments and Pershing Square have nothing to show for their stakes in General Growth but regret.

Pershing led by Bill Ackman owned a minority stake in General Growth of 7.4%. Mutual find company Fidelity owned a 13.4% share while Morgan Stanley reportedly owned a 5.1% stake.

So, what did all three as well as many others see in General Growth, whose $27.3 billion in debt, caused its knees to buckle to fall into bankruptcy?

The three likely thought that General Growth would be able:

1- to significantly lower the REIT’s massive debt load payments because they thought refinancing was a strong possibility
2- to use bailout money to payoff its existing debt and act as collateral
3- to maintain or increase revenue from retail tenants in its 200-plus malls to sustain its debt payments.

Full post

First, Ackman’s stake is just under 25% (including swaps) as indicated in the Friday SEC filing

Second, Ackman from DAY ONE was calling for Genral Growth to file Chapter 11 and hehas done at least half a dozen interviews stating the same.

Here is some of that commentary

In other words NONE of the above proposed items on the “wish list” were ever on the minds of those at Pershing.

Is it just me? It is one things to express an opinion, but what I am seeing is just really sloppy work…


Disclosure (“none” means no position):Long GGWPQ

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NY Times Story on Ackman & It’s Stunning Error

So I am reading the NY Times (yea, I do that every so often) and come across the following article on Bill Ackman. Being a fan, I read it.

Then I get to this (bold italics mine):

In the case of General Growth, Mr. Ackman was clear from the start that the company should file for protection from its creditors. He invested last fall, as the financial crisis reached a fever pitch, and for months urged the company to seek bankruptcy. (Pershing has not disclosed the price at which it bought its General Growth stock.) General Growth controls Faneuil Hall Marketplace in Boston and the South Street Seaport in New York, and Mr. Ackman argues that its properties are worth far more than they are valued on its books.

Has not disclosed the price it paid?

WHAT??!!???!!???!!???!

So , I go to this neat little organization called the SEC and look it up. It took little ‘ole me blogging along 35 seconds to find it so I can understand why an organization with the Times resources thinks IT DOES NOT EXIST!! Here is the link the GGP SEC Filings. Ackman’s will be in 13D section

They also could have found it on my blog here

This post of mine actually has the exact trades Ackman made as of its date

Full Article

I always knew The Times did shoddy work when it came to its politics, now I guess its business section needs to be included too? How can anyone writing for a business section not know this information is available…..how????


Disclosure (“none” means no position):

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Pershing Files 13D/A in General Growth Properties

Here is the filing in General Growth Properties (GGWPQ) as well as the comittment letter and term sheet for the DIP financing.

The 13D/A
Pershing 13D/A GGP

Commitment Letter
Pershing GGP Comittment Letter


Disclosure (“none” means no position):

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Thoughts & Information on General Growth’s Chapter 11 Filing

It finally happened this morning.

Here is the 8-K Just filed:
General Growth 8-K General Growth 8-K todd sullivan SEC filing

Publish at Scribd or explore others: Finance Business & Law general growth prope

Here are the voluntary filings filed with the court

General Growth Properties’ Bankruptcy Filing

Publish at Scribd or explore others: Finance Business & Law general growth prope

So, what to think.

* Liquidation is not happening. It would destroy the entire CRE market and take the banks down with it.
* GGP is current on its mortgages and has asked the bankruptcy court to allow them to remain current while reorganizing, this is a huge point as it goes to solvency vs seized credit markets
* The incentive for the banks is to be “made whole” on the debt. That give validation to the marks they currently carry on other CRE.
* Because of that, GGP’s plan to ensure that, will receive serious consideration from the court.
* This is not a typical Chapter 11 as the reason for reorganization is not due to a company that cannot pay bills, credit markets have cause extenuating circumstances. because of that, the “usual outcome” some assume must be discounted and other options receive more weight.
* There is legal precedent in 11 for equity remaining whole.
* Pershing and Bill Ackman. They have a stake in 25% of the equity, own debt and are the DIP financier. In other words, he will have a seat at every negotiating table as a large holder, that is more than a little significant

More after the call at noon today…

WSJ Article

Reuters Article

Disclosure (“none” means no position):Long GGP

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Target Continues It’s Slide

I am hoping Target (TGT) shareholders are getting sick of the current strategy by management of sitting back and doing nothing, because those are the results operations are getting.

Here are the latest retail figures.

Here is my problem. Wal-Mart (WMT) has gone back to its “low price” message with consumers and clearly it has worked. They cut back expansion plans and plowed that money into improving existing locations. Sears Holdings is currently in a big push for its appliance sales and internet and both are working. Target, has gone, well, fetal.

Now, the environment out there is clearly very tough, of that there is no doubt. But Target has gone from outperforming Wal-Mart to getting lapped by it. It is one thing to have sales sliding and to be taking steps to stop or reverse it and it is another entirely to do nothing about it.

Curling up in a ball and “waiting for economic conditions to improve” is not a strategy. We may not see actual economic growth until late 2010-2011. Are shareholders prepared to wait until then? Is the theory that people will just return to Target when things get better? Is it a case of current (and becoming entrenched) shopping patterns being reversed without any effort on managements’s part?

Recessions are where the best management shows as they use it as an opportunity to expand market share and entrench their brand with the consumer. Now, Target COULD do those things if they freed up some more cash. IF they choose to put even some of Bill Ackman’s idea to work, that cash would be there.

If I had wrote here last year that at this time this year there would be more positive news coming out of Sears than Target people would have said I was insane, yet that is precisely what is happening now.

Target shareholders are lucky in that they have a real viable option to them other than selling shares. They can elect Ackman’s slate of nominees to the Board and start to see some changes at Target, or, they can do what management is and do nothing….and get nothing..


Disclosure (“none” means no position):Long SHLD, WMT, none

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On Wall St. Media 4/7

Talking about General Growth Properties (GGP), RHI Entertainment (RHIE), Best Buy (BBY), Sears Holdings (SHLD), Bill Ackman, The Economy and the Red Sox.


Disclosure (“none” means no position):Long GGP, RHIE, SHLD, None

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Ackman & Target: Dueling Shareholder Meetings

Now, If you are a shareholder, where are you going to go. Think about it. Target (TGT) management has already said they do not feel any changes are necessary and they “just need to manage through the downturn”. OR, will you go see what the guy who has successfully implemented changes at McDonalds (MCD), Wendy’s (WEN), Longs Drug (LDG)etc.. and, oh yeah, also happens to be the largest shareholder of Target?

It is a no-brainer….

Ackman really is stoking Target shareholders emotions in this letter by making the direct and unavoidable comparisons to Wal-Mart (WMT) in what has to be a painful step by step process for shareholders. He details the divergence of the two companies over the past year. It really is stunning..

He also says, “Despite the fact that Target’s two principal business lines are retail and credit cards, Target currently has no independent directors with senior, executive-level experience in these two businesses,”.
The letter

Ackman’s Letter to Target Shareholders Ackman’s Letter to Target Shareholders todd sullivan A classic

Publish at Scribd or explore others: Finance Business & Law target pershing squa

Target responded to the letter saying:

The company said, “We believe that the current Target Board has the strength, diversity, experience and qualifications to provide effective and independent oversight and direction to the company. Target’s Board consists of highly qualified directors, all but one of whom are independent. Each member of Target’s Board is committed to delivering superior results and serving the best interests of all Target shareholders.”

Yeah, ok, thanks for that. Where is Ackman speaking again?

I have said from day on this issue that the folks at Target are not doing themselves any favors by keeping Ackman on the outside and summarily rejecting all of his proposals. Some folks just gotta learn the hard way I guess.


Disclosure (“none” means no position):Long MCD, WMT, None

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Latest Appearence on Wall St. Media (video fixed)

Thanks to Doug and the folks at Wall St. Media for chatting with me on Thursday morning.

Topics covered:

– The Economy
– FASB mark-to-market changes
General Growth Properties (GGP)
– RHI Enterntainment (RHIE), (as of this writing up 59% since video aired). Post on it here


Disclosure (“none” means no position):Long GGP, RHIE

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Ackman, Zell Comment on General Growth Properties

More commentary on the proposition of Generak Growth (GGP) shareholder being kept whole in bankruptcy. 

From Reuters

Ackman Commented:

“Bankruptcy is not just designed for companies that are insolvent,” Ackman told a packed room of real estate investors, owners, analysts and bankers attending the New York University Schack Institute of Real Estate 14th Annual REIT Symposium.

“Bankruptcy is also designed for companies that are solvent, but have liquidity problems that are due to events outside of their control,”…

“It’s one of the most interesting investment opportunities I’ve seen in my career,” he said.

“I’ve learned that, when a solvent company files for bankruptcy and you have a lead equity holder, you can marshal it thorough the bankruptcy process,” Ackman said.

“If you’ve got a situation where you have a small equity cap and you can sell 90 percent of your stock and de-equitize yourself or you can file and retain equity value for shareholders, you should look at that very, very seriously.”

He compared its plight to that of Alexander’s Inc, the failed department store. Real estate titan Steve Roth, chairman of Vornado Realty Trust (VNO), bought the shares and put the company into bankruptcy in 1992. The stock eventually  surpassed $450 a share

Read more on Ackman and Alexander’s (ALX) here:

Real Estate mogul Sam Zell, who sold Equity Office, the giant U.S. office owner, at what is now seen as the top of the market, said General Growth would likely file for bankruptcy protection.

“I do not believe GGP will be liquidated,” Zell said, speaking at the same conference. “I expect the company to file bankruptcy. It will do a prepackaged. It will be reorganized and it will be taken public.”

Here is more information on legal precedent for debt restructuring and equity being kept whole in bankruptcy

Now, a boilerplate warning for GGP. I know people have been following into this investment. If you do, you must be prepared to lose all of it. There is no guarantee of the above outcome. Buying this stock now is essentially buying a call option on the company’s survival. It is hits, you win big, very big. If not, what you invested is worth nothing. I believe the above scenario plays out, I am also not going to be broke should it not.


Disclosure (“none” means no position):Long GGP

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Borders Files 8-K: Debt Reduced 39%

Borders filed its 8-K for Q4 this am.

Highlights:

• On a full-year basis, cash flow from operations improved by $128.6 million at year-end as SG&A expenses were reduced by $96.5 million and inventory was reduced by $326.8 million.

• Debt at year-end was reduced by $217.8 million to $336.2 million—a 39.3% reduction.

• Total consolidated 2008 sales were $3.2 billion, down 8.8% from 2007. For the fourth quarter, total consolidated sales were $1.1 billion, down 12.9% from a year ago.

• Comparable store sales for the fourth quarter at Borders superstores declined by 15.3% and declined by 4.7% at Waldenbooks Specialty Retail stores. For the full year, same-store sales declined by 10.8% at Borders and declined by 5.1% at Waldenbooks.

• On an operating basis, the company generated fourth-quarter income from continuing operations of $63.8 million or $1.05 per share compared to income of $74.3 million or $1.26 cents per share for the same period a year ago. On a GAAP basis, including non-operating charges, fourth quarter income from continuing operations was $28.9 million or $0.48 per share compared to income of $67.3 million or $1.14 per share a year ago.

“Our top priority is getting our financial house in order by continuing to reduce expenses, pay down debt and improve cash flow,” said Borders Group Chief Executive Officer Ron Marshall. “We are working with vendors and others to enhance cooperation and are pleased to have the continued support of our largest shareholder with the recently announced extension of our financing agreement with Pershing Square. At the same time, we are focused on driving sales through improved execution and by re-engaging with our customers. Borders is a strong brand with millions of loyal customers. I am confident that by shoring up our financial foundation and reclaiming our position as the bookseller for serious readers, we will ultimately secure a viable future.”

Fourth quarter consolidated sales were $1.1 billion, down 12.9% from a year ago. For the full year, consolidated sales were $3.2 billion, an 8.8% decrease from 2007. On an operating basis, Borders Group generated fourth-quarter income of $63.8 million or $1.05 per share compared to income of $74.3 million or $1.26 per share for the same period last year. On a GAAP basis, fourth-quarter income was $28.9 million or $0.48 per share compared to GAAP income of $67.3 million or $1.14 per share a year ago. The fourth quarter GAAP income includes non-operating charges—primarily non-cash—totaling $34.9 million. For the full year, on an operating basis, the company posted a consolidated loss of $16.2 million or $0.27 per share in 2008 compared to a loss of $0.4 million or $0.01 per share in 2007. On a GAAP basis, the full-year loss was $184.7 million or $3.07 per share, compared to a loss of $19.9 million or $0.34 per share in 2007. The GAAP full-year loss includes an after-tax, non-operating charge of $168.5 million, also primarily non-cash.

Excluding non-operating charges, SG&A as a percent of sales improved in the fourth quarter by 1.8% from 20.7% to 18.9% due to the company’s aggressive expense reduction initiatives, which were offset by de-leveraging due to negative sales trends. Expense reduction initiatives helped reduce SG&A dollar expenses by $52.1 million in the quarter. On a GAAP basis, SG&A as a percent of sales decreased in the fourth quarter by 0.3% from 20.6% to 20.3%. For the full year, SG&A as a percent of sales on an operating basis improved by 0.6% from 25.4% to 24.8% due to expense reductions, which drove an SG&A dollar decline of $96.5 million. On a GAAP basis, SG&A as a percent of sales for the full year increased by 0.4% to 25.9% compared to 25.5% in 2007.
Operating cash flow improved in the fourth quarter by $18.3 million to $219.6 million compared to $201.3 million for the period in the prior year. For the full-year, operating cash flow improved by $128.6 million to $233.6 million from $105.0 million in 2007.

Full-year capital expenditures were $79.9 million compared to $131.3 million in 2007 as management took aggressive action to reduce capital expenditures. In the fourth quarter, capital expenditures totaled $6.2 million and further reduction is planned. Year-end debt totaled $336.2 million compared to debt at the end of 2007 of $554.0 million, a decrease of 39.3%. Inventory productivity improved as the company reduced its 2008 year-end inventory investment to $915.2 million compared to 2007 year-end inventory of $1.24 billion, a 26.3% reduction.

Borders Superstores

Total sales at Borders superstores in the fourth quarter were $816.1 million, down 14.8% from a year ago. For the full year, total sales were $2.6 billion, down 9.4% from 2007. In the fourth quarter, comparable store-sales decreased by 15.3% at Borders superstores with books generating same-store sales of -11.7% and non-book categories generating same store sales of -21.1% for the period. For the full year, comparable store sales at Borders stores decreased by 10.8% with books generating same-store sales of -8.2% and non-book categories generating same store-sales of -16.1%. Borders.com sales were $26.4 million in the fourth quarter and $45.7 million for 2008, which included eight months of operation.

Operating income on an operating basis in the fourth quarter was $86.5 million compared to $102.1 million for the same period a year ago. On a GAAP basis, operating income in the fourth quarter was $17.1 million compared to $87.4 million the prior year. For the full year, operating income on an operating basis was $17.7 million compared to $56.9 million in 2007. On a GAAP basis, there was an operating loss of $100.9 million compared to income of $30.6 million in 2007.

The company opened one new Borders superstore in the U.S. during the fourth quarter and closed five, ending fiscal 2008 with a total of 515 superstore locations.

Waldenbooks Specialty Retail

Total sales in the fourth quarter at Waldenbooks Specialty Retail stores were $195.6 million, a 14.3% decline compared to the same period in 2007. For the full-year, total segment sales were $480 million, a decline of 14.7% from the prior year. Comparable store sales in the fourth quarter decreased by 4.7% and decreased by 5.1% for the full year.

In the fourth quarter, on an operating basis, operating income was $16.0 million compared to operating income of $26.5 million for the same period in 2007. On a GAAP basis, operating income was $11.5 million compared to $25.5 million for the same period in 2007. For the full year, on an operating basis, the operating loss was $16.7 million compared to an operating loss of $17.3 million for the same period in 2007. On a GAAP basis, the full year operating loss was $27.5 million compared to an operating loss of $21.4 million for the same period in 2007.

The company closed 84 Waldenbooks Specialty Retail locations in the fourth quarter, bringing the fiscal 2008 closure total to 112. Borders Group ended fiscal 2008 with a total of 386 locations in this segment.

International

Total sales within the International segment (which consists primarily of Paperchase) totaled $43.2 million in the fourth quarter, which is down by 21.7% compared to a year ago. Excluding the impact of foreign currency translation, segment sales would have increased by 0.2% for the period. For the full-year, International sales were $136.7 million, down by 5.8% compared to 2007. Excluding the impact of foreign currency translation, sales would have increased by 4.7% for the year.

On an operating basis, operating income for the fourth quarter was $6.0 million compared to income of $7.0 million a year ago. On a GAAP basis, operating income in the fourth quarter was $5.5 million compared to income of $6.6 million the prior year. For the full-year, operating income on an operating basis was $4.5 million compared to $8.4 million in 2007. On a GAAP basis, full-year operating income was $3.7 million compared to $8.0 million in 2007.

When you look the results, it makes sense for Borders to keep Paperchase rather than put it to Ackman as was agreed to yesterday. It is a stable and profitable segment.

Yesterday I said I was looking for increased cash flow and cost cutting.debt reduction. All three have been accomplished and when one consider the environment out there, the near 40% reduction in debt and quite impressive.

Borders is on its way. Engineering a turnaround in the worst economic climate in 30 years in not easy. Clear progress is being made. It won’t happen overnight, but, when the economy does rebound, a very lean and a far less debt laden Borders will turn results quickly.


Disclosure (“none” means no position):Long BGP

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Lampert Ups Sears Canada Stake to 74%

This makes perfect sense and goes to a post I wrote 3/18 on the subject.

From Dealbook:

Sears Holdings, the giant retailer controlled by Mr. Lampert’s hedge fund, ESL Investments, bought 400,000 shares of Sears Canada on Monday, people with knowledge of the transaction told DealBook.

Add that to stock purchases made in December and early March, totaling 60,000 shares, and Sears now owns about 74 percent of its Canadian counterpart.

So what’s Mr. Lampert up to? He won’t say, and a spokesman declined to comment. But analysts and investors believe Sears could soon try to buy the remaining shares of Sears Canada that it doesn’t already own.

In the past year, Sears has been hurt by falling consumer spending. And the retailer faces the expiration next March of a $4 billion revolving credit facility it uses to pay suppliers and fund other working capital needs. Securing a new loan of that size could carry a hefty interest rate, given Sears’ already leveraged balance sheet, the ongoing credit squeeze and a continued drop in the company’s earnings.

But acquiring Sears Canada would actually reduce the company’s overall debt-to-earnings ratio and, therefore make it much cheaper to obtain a new multi-billion dollar loan. What’s more, it would cost Mr. Lampert and Sears virtually nothing.

Analysts point out that Sears Canada has more than $630 million in cash on its balance sheet and swaths of valuable real estate. Mr. Lampert could easily use Sears Canada’s own cash to finance a deal, or he could use Sears’ stock, which would be even cheaper.

According to a recent analysis by RBC Capital Markets, Sears could buy the remaining shares of Sears Canada for 23.38 Canadian dollars per share — an 18 percent premium to the current stock price — and still have cash that leftover that can be consolidated onto its balance sheet.

Sears Canada is also performing better than its American counterpart and any deal would be accretive to the combined company’s earnings.

Still, Mr. Lampert will have to deal with an old nemesis: fellow activist investor William A. Ackman, whose Pershing Square Capital Management owns 17.2 percent of Sears Canada and would likely to demand a big premium for its shares.

Under Canadian law, Sears must get the approval of all minority shareholders before making a deal for the whole company. That could lead to a showdown with Mr. Ackman, who isn’t shy about demanding a higher price.

Over two years ago, Mr. Ackman led a group of shareholders that rejected Sears’ first offer for Sears Canada. The price, $18 a share, or $792 million, was deemed too low by Pershing Square and other investors who voted down the deal. Mr. Lampert decided to walk away.

Mr. Ackman seems to believe another bid could be coming soon — Pershing purchased over a million shares of the thinly traded company in the last quarter. With the $4 billion revolver coming due next year, Mr. Lampert may not be so quick to walk away this time.

Lampert can effectively run his stake up to 83% before he is forced to deal with Ackman. At that point, he can simply just let his stake sit. Ackman has said in the past he want to avoid situations in which he cannot be a majority shareholder as he has no power to effect change.

It will come down to a test of patience. Lampert wants Sears Canada for it cash, Ackman owns shares for the buyout premium he thinks he’ll get from Lampert. Can Lampert wait longer for the cash than Ackman will wait to find a better use for the money he has invested in Canada shares?

One must also assume not much will happen on either front for a while. Lampert will probably just keep buying what is on the open market until he is only forced to deal with Ackman.

Either way it will make for a fun spectator sport this summer/fall


Disclosure (“none” means no position):Long SHLD

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Target’s Strategy Regarding Ackman: "Na Na, We Can’t Hear You"

It is clear Bill Ackman has plans for Target. It is also clear in public he has been very complimentary of Target’s (TGT) management. It is also clear that he has avoided a direct confrontation with them for over year, until now. It is also clear that management has no intention of even listening to their largest shareholder who has made investors billions doing what he is proposing Target do, unlock value.

What does it all mean? Management at Target does not have a clue that the landscape is changing out there and being outright dismissive of shareholders while sales crater and the stock languishes, is well, not a very good idea.

Ackman has an interest in 8% of Targets shares. If you are a shareholder, you should want to know, if management says his idea are bad for shareholders, how many shares do they own. The answer? .31%. Not 31, not 3.1 but POINT .31% or less than 1%. Now that includes the Board all management. All of them.

So, what are they more concerned about really? Their jobs maybe? Ackman has an interest in 25 times more stock than they do. If you are a shareholder, wouldn’t that mean to you that he probably has a rather large vested interest in the health of the stock? Maybe management is truly more concern with their nice salaries & perks than the share price?

This is not to say that they do not care about it, just that their pay and benefits trump stock price.

Here is the most recent pay figures:

Now, it is nice to see them taking the free shares from the company. But, one has to ask, “how many shares are they actually using their own money to buy?. The answer? None. In the past year only Chairman Seinhafel made a singe purchase and that was the exercise of an option that he did not turn around and sell.

Meanwhile, Ackman, his investors and anyone else who bought shares did so with their hard earned money.

Changes on the Board would probably mean changes in management as Target sought to be managed by those with more experience in those area such as food, real estate etc.

I think it is pretty clear that managements actions are about “protecting our jobs”, not “maximizing shareholder value”.

If you are a shareholder, who are you going to want to hear from? Are you wondering why the blanket dismissal? Are you wondering, “well, what is management going to do other than sit wait for the economy to turn?”

The letter:

To Our Shareholders:

You are cordially invited to attend Target Corporation’s 2009 Annual Meeting of Shareholders. The Annual Meeting will be held at 1:00 p.m., Central Daylight Time, on Thursday, May 28, 2009 at the Target Store located at 1250 West Sunset Drive, Waukesha, Wisconsin. Details regarding admission to the Annual Meeting and the business to be conducted are more fully described in the accompanying Notice of Annual Meeting of Shareholders and Proxy Statement.

At this year’s Annual Meeting, you will be asked to determine that the number of directors constituting our Board of Directors shall be 12, to elect the Class III directors to our Board of Directors for three-year terms, to ratify the appointment of Ernst & Young LLP as our independent registered public accounting firm, to approve the performance measures available under the Target Corporation Long-Term Incentive Plan, and to act on the shareholder proposal in the Proxy Statement, if presented at the Annual Meeting.

We hope you will be able to attend the Annual Meeting, but if you cannot do so, it is important that your shares be represented. We urge you to read the proxy statement carefully, and to use the WHITE proxy card to vote for the Board of Director’s nominees by telephone or Internet, or by signing, dating, and returning the enclosed WHITE proxy card in the postage-paid envelope provided, whether or not you plan to attend the Annual Meeting. Instructions are provided on the WHITE proxy card.

You should know that Pershing Square Capital Management, L.P. and certain affiliated entities, a group of hedge funds led by William Ackman that own Target shares and derivative securities (“Pershing Square”), have stated their intention to propose alternative director nominees for election at the Annual Meeting in opposition to the Board’s recommended nominees.

We strongly urge you to vote for the nominees proposed by the Board by using the enclosed WHITE proxy card and not to return any proxy card sent to you by Pershing Square. If you vote using a proxy card sent to you by Pershing Square, you can subsequently revoke it by using the WHITE proxy card to vote by telephone or Internet, or by signing, dating and returning the WHITE proxy card in the postage-paid envelope provided. Only your last-dated proxy will count—any proxy may be revoked at any time prior to its exercise at the Annual Meeting as described in the Proxy Statement.

Thank you for your continued support.


Disclosure (“none” means no position):None

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Ackman Sends Letter To Target CEO

Let’s put aside the fact Ackman seems to know Target’s bylaws better than they do (or at least pretend to). In the revised 13D/ a just filed, Ackman states:

Subsequent to the delivery of the Original Notice, we received a telephone call from your outside counsel informing us that the Board of Directors of the Company (the “Board”) currently consists of 12 directors and that only four directors are up for election at the 2009 Annual Meeting.

As we have explained in detail in a separate letter from Mr. Ackman to Mr. Gregg W. Steinhafel, Chairman, President and Chief Executive Officer of the Company, based on our review of the Company’s Restated Articles of Incorporation and its filings with the Securities and Exchange Commission, we are of the view that size of the Board remains at 13 members. While the resignation of Mr. Robert Ulrich on January 31, 2009 created a vacancy in Class III of the Board, the size of the Board has not changed.

This is pretty simple. Target, recognizing that Ackman is likely to win seats on the Board, is trying to shrink it to minimize whatever effect his nominees may have. But, if you are a shareholder you have to ask, why? Ackman left shareholders of McDonalds (MCD), Chipolte (CMG), Wendy’s (WEN) and Tim Hortons (THI) far better off than when he arrived. Shareholder also have to ask, if this guy is the largest shareholder of the company, aren’t his interests totally aligned with ours?

Here is the letter Ackman sent the CEO Greg Steinhafel:

Exhibit 99.1

March 26, 2009
Gregg W. Steinhafel
Chairman, President and Chief Executive Officer
Target Corporation
1000 Nicollet Mall
Minneapolis, Minnesota 55403

Re:Number of Directors for Election at the 2009 Annual Meeting of Shareholders

Dear Gregg:
On March 16, 2009, affiliates of Pershing Square Capital Management, L.P. delivered a Notice of Nomination to Target Corporation proposing to nominate five individuals for election as directors of Target at the Company’s 2009 Annual Meeting of Shareholders. The same day, Target issued a press release indicating that its board is comprised of 12 directors and that the Company is nominating only four directors for election at the 2009 Annual Meeting. Subsequently, we received a telephone call from your outside counsel informing us that the Target Board currently consists of 12 directors and that only four directors are up for election at the 2009 Annual Meeting.

We disagree with the Company’s position on this issue. We have reviewed Target’s SEC filings and have found no disclosure to the effect that the size of the Target Board has been changed from 13. We are aware that Mr. Ulrich resigned in January, but a board does not automatically shrink as a result of a resignation; rather, a vacancy is created, in this case, a vacancy in Class III of the Target Board.

Our view is informed by the Company’s Restated Articles of Incorporation, which provide that only the shareholders may reduce the size of the Target Board. Specifically, Article VI of Target’s Restated Articles of Incorporation provides the following:

“The business and affairs of the corporation shall be managed by or under the direction of a Board of Directors consisting of not less than five nor more than twenty-one persons, who need not be shareholders. The number of directors may be increased by the shareholders or Board of Directors or decreased by the shareholders from the number of directors on the Board of Directors immediately prior to the effective date of this Article VI; provided, however, that any change in the number of directors on the Board of Directors (including, without limitation, changes at annual meetings of shareholders) shall be approved by the affirmative vote of not less than seventy-five percent (75%) of the votes entitled to be cast by the holders of all then outstanding shares of Voting Stock (as defined in Article IV), voting together as a single class, unless such change shall have been approved by a majority of the entire Board of Directors.” (emphasis added)

Article VI was adopted at Target’s 1988 Annual Meeting of Shareholders. Immediately prior to the effectiveness of Article VI, the size of the Target Board was 13. Under Article VI any reduction in the size of the Target Board requires a shareholder vote. As the Company’s shareholders have not been asked to vote on any matter since the 2008 Annual Meeting of Shareholders, we believe that the size of the Target Board remains at 13. While Mr. Ulrich’s resignation created a vacancy on the Target Board, the size of the Target Board has not been changed to our knowledge.

If the Company continues to believe that the size of the Target Board is 12 and that only four seats are up for election at the 2009 Annual Meeting, we believe that the interests of the Company and its shareholders would be best served by a quick, low-cost resolution of this issue. Therefore, we would suggest that we jointly submit the issue to a binding arbitration that will take place in Minnesota and will be decided by a mutually acceptable arbitrator, pursuant to the AAA Commercial Rules of Arbitration.

If, on the other hand, you agree with our interpretation of the Articles of Incorporation, you can simply nominate a fifth director.

It is in all of our interests to resolve this issue promptly. Please let me know how you would like to proceed. Thank you.

Very truly yours,

/s/ William A. Ackman
William A. Ackman

So, what then is the problem with management? Why are they stonewalling every idea Ackman has to create shareholder value? Do they have other plans? If they do, none have been announced.

Here is the reason. Management is entrenched at Target. They have all been for for a long time. None of them have any experience running the type of organization Ackman is proposing (the Board members he has nominated do) and what they are fighting is the feeling that should he get his way, they become less important or worse, irrelevant. What they fail to realize is by simply dismissing him out of hand, they are doing just that.

How long do they think shareholders will sit for a fallen and stagnant stock price before they want to “see what the other guy can do”? Is there any plan to reverse the same store sales decline that is now over a year old? Shareholders surely have noticed that Wal-Mart (WMT) shareholders are not suffering the same fate.

Current management has done a fantastic job brining the company to it current state, a well respected retailer, probably the second in the nation. But, they are stuck and sitting back waiting for the economy do lift them out of their funk will not cut it with shareholder as they watch Wal-Mart’s taillights disappear into the distance.


Disclosure (“none” means no position):Long MCD, WMT, none

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Amerco Bankruptcy & GGP: A Blueprint?

The similarities are striking…Bill Ackman talks about it in the video at the end.

Why did Amerco file for bankruptcy?

Amerco took the action in 2003 to restructure its debt, officials said, adding that since the its assets are greater than its debt, it intends to repay its creditors in full pursuant to a full-value plan of reorganization. Amerco obtained a commitment from Wells Fargo Foothill (WFC) for a $300 million debtor-in-possession facility, officials said, and for a $650 million bankruptcy emergence facility.

On Oct. 15, 2002, Amerco defaulted on a $100 million principal payment owed to holders of 1997 asset-backed notes. That default triggered defaults on other debt outstanding. Until the filing, the company had been in negotiations with creditors about restructuring its debt.

“Business fundamentals at the company remain strong,” said Joe Shoen, Amerco’s chairman at the time. “Amerco has taken a positive step in choosing Chapter 11 to facilitate the restructuring of its debt. We are getting our financial house in order.”

Amerco’sJoint Plan of reorganization filed Oct. 2003

Debtors disclosure statement under the Joint plan

Here is the part is this bankruptcy that GGP shareholders need pay attention to

Specifically, the Debtors believe that their businesses and assets have significant going concern value that would not be realized in a liquidation, either in whole or in substantial part. According to the valuation analysis and the liquidation analysis prepared by management with the assistance of the Debtors’ restructuring advisors, Alvarez & Marsal, Inc. (“A&M”), and the other analyses prepared by the Debtors with the assistance of A&M, the Debtors believe that the value of the Estates of the Debtors is significantly greater in the proposed reorganization than in a liquidation.

So, as debtholders were made whole, through restructuring of the debt, this is what was propsed for the common and prefered stock

Existing Common Stock means shares of common stock, par value $0.25 per
share, of AMERCO that are authorized, issued and outstanding prior to the Effective Date. Other Interests means the preferred share purchase rights issued by AMERCO pursuant to that certain stock-holder rights plan adopted by the Board of Directors of AMERCO in July 1998, with each such right entitling its holder to purchase from AMERCO one one-hundredth of a share of Series C Junior Participation Preferred Stock (Series C), no par value per share of AMERCO, at a price of one one-hundredth (1/100th) of a share of Series C, subject to adjustment. The Plan does not alter or otherwise impair the Allowed Existing Common Stock and Other Interests.

Here was the thought process behind the debtors plan:

Shortly after filing for relief under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code, the Debtors focused on the formulation of a plan of reorganization that would allow them to quickly emerge from Chapter 11 and preserve their value as a going concern. The Debtors recognize that in the competitive arena in which they operate, a lengthy and uncertain Chapter 11 case may detrimentally affect the confidence in the Debtors by their respective vendors and employees, impair their financial condition, and negatively impact the prospects for a successful reorganization. The terms of the Plan are based upon, among other things, the Debtors’ assessment of their ability to successfully restructure their capitalization, make the distributions contemplated under the Plan, and pay their continuing obligations in the ordinary course of the Reorganized Debtors’ business.

Also, like GGP, Amerco had a very higher percentage of insider ownership of the common stock.

Well, you ask? What happened?

From 2003

AMERCO today announced that all of its creditor classes have approved the Company’s Plan of Reorganization. Creditors under the Plan will receive a combination of cash and new notes in AMERCO.

“Now that we have a 100 percent consensual agreement with all creditor groups, we are poised to emerge from Chapter 11,” stated Joe Shoen, chairman of AMERCO. “We are gratified that our creditors have recognized that our Plan is in the best interest of all of the company’s constituencies.”

According to Richard Williamson, Regional Managing Director at Alvarez & Marsal, Inc., “AMERCO is positioned to accomplish one the most successful restructurings in recent history. On the effective date of the Company’s Plan of Reorganization, AMERCO will have restructured, on a consensual basis, over $1.2 billion in debt and lease obligations with no dilution to equity holders.” Alvarez and Marsal, Inc. has served as the exclusive financial advisor to AMERCO since May 2003, with respect to its negotiations with creditors and in the raising of exit financing and its capital restructuring.

A Confirmation Hearing is scheduled to be held by the U.S. Bankruptcy Court in Reno, Nevada beginning on February 2, 2004. Subject to confirmation by the Court and the completion of all necessary documentation, the Plan should become effective and be funded shortly thereafter.

The plans were approved and common shareholders were let whole.

This is part of the blueprint Ackman is looking at in my opinion. Were is not for the credit markets, GGP would have refinanced the debt and because of its strong operations, the company itself would be functioning.

Because of the similarities to Amerco, GGP can make the same arguments for the debt restructuring and the survival of the equity.

Now, a warning. I know people have been following into this investment. If you do, you must be prepared to lose all of it. There is no guarantee of the above outcome. Buying this stock now is essentially buying a call option on the company’s survival. It is hits, you win big, very big. If not, what you invested is worth nothing. I believe the above scenario plays out, I am also not going to be broke should it not.

Disclosure (“none” means no position):Long GGP

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More Thoughts on General Growth Properties

Took the evening to digest the General Growth Properties (GGP) news. Here is what I came up with for to affirm the investing thesis of the equity (stock).

Wall St. Newsletters

First, here is the news (linked for those who have already read it):

So, why invest in the common stock, does bankruptcy destroy it, why aren’t lenders forcing it, will it be a Chapter 11 (reorganization) or Chapter 7 (liquidation)?

The answers are all tied up and related so lets go through it:

If (when) there is a bankruptcy filing, why 11 and not 7? The simple answer is having the second largest mall operator go into liquidation and throwing 200 million square feet of retail space up for sale would destroy the commercial real estate market. Why? The sudden supply of properties without bidders (loans still are very tough to get) would mean they would have to be placed on the market below “fire sale” prices to sell. Because of that, all other operators real estate values would fall, dramatically, and in turn, causing debt covenants for them to be tripped. That would create a cascading effect on the whole industry. For those not sure, this would be a very, very bad thing. You think you have seen write-downs in home mortgage loans at banks? Force liquidation of GGP and as the saying goes “you ain’t seen nothing yet”.

It also means the banks holding the loans on the properties would then be forced to take pennies on the dollar, very bad for them. In a Chapter 7, shareholders, debt holders and the industry as a whole suffer. No one wins.

So, if we rule out liquidation. What happens in Chapter 11? Who wins there? Here is what Bill Ackman said yesterday in the WSJ:

Some investors, however, consider a bankruptcy filing likely. Among them is activist investor Bill Ackman of Pershing Square Capital Management LLC, who bought 7.5% of General Growth’s stock in recent months and put another 18% under swap contracts in a bet that the company’s equity will survive a bankruptcy unscathed. Mr. Ackman also expects to soon get a seat on General Growth’s board.

“We think the company will ultimately have to file for bankruptcy, but we think that it’s a wholly solvent company with a liquidity problem,” Mr. Ackman said in an interview Monday. “I don’t think they’ll need to dilute shareholders. All they need to do is extend the maturities [in bankruptcy court] and they can refinance those debts as they come due.”

Now, one must know that Ackman took his stake AFTER GGP’s troubles were known. This is not a situation where we have an investor trying desperately to save a bad investment. He bought in knowing this scenario we now face was likely.

The typical bankrupcty is forced because the liabilities (debt) outsize the assets. In this case the common shareholders are wiped out. But, we know that the assets GGP has are in excess of the liabilities. In this case, even in a worse case Chapter 11, shareholders are not wiped out.

But, this goes even further. Again from Ackman “Most of the time, insolvent companies go bankrupt,” Ackman said. “It’s rare for a solvent company to go bankrupt. This is a solvent company with a liquidity problem.”

General Growth is not losing money. Rents are stable, occupancy rates are over 90% and FFO (funds from operations) remain healthy. What is the problem? Credit. GGP has loan due that they typically just rollover into longer maturities. With the current credit “lock down”, they cannot do that. That means bulk payment come due and the cash is not there. It should be noted that this is not an odd situation, this is what REIT’s typically do with their debt.

With a Chapter 11 debt holders are put in a room and told by a Judge, “we can pay you all 100% but we need to change and lengthen maturities OR we can liquidate and you can pick up scraps for pennies on the dollar”. Here are the new terms. The choice is rather obvious

The banks all recognize this too. This is the reason they have not been paid a dime since late last year and have not forced a Chapter 11 filing. They do not want to take the risk of writing down loan portfolio’s. Remember, our mark-to-market world means they just do not just write down GGP loans, they then have to write down ALL of them on their books. Again, this is very bad. So we get endless extensions to pay.

Why? The banks are riding this out. If we get MTM changes in Congress then we may see the log jam break. In that case a Chapter 11 would not have a cascading effect on their whole portfolio and restructuring the loans to again begin receiving payments makes perfect sense. They may be hoping for an economic turnaround late this year that enables GGP to sell some property to pay them off. They may all be playing a waiting game hoping someone restructures and set the bar for the rest of them that is better than a bankruptcy judge will do.

Who knows the exact reason why for each lender. We do know what they don’t want right now, a Chapter 11 filing. If they wanted it they could force it easily.

Because of the financial situation of GGP, there is no need to convert debt to equity. Restructuring the loans would allow for payments to be made, equity holders would remain intact, the banks again have performing loans on their books and everyone is happy…..VERY happy.

I think the specter of Ackman going on the board must give the banks pause and perhaps want them to restructure sooner rather than later. Then knowing he wants a Chapter 11 I am guessing will bring people to the negotiating table a bit faster…

Disclosure (“none” means no position):Long GGP

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