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The "Wicksell Rate" Explained

I had several folks wonder what this was when it was first discussed here

“Davidson” submits:

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One of the most difficult tasks one can have is to find a proper method of valuing the marketplace as so many competing methods are offered. I have looked to basics and once I learned of Knut Wicksell, much became clear.

My view which has developed over the years is that capital returns follow the Wicksell Rate which was first authored in 1898 by Knut Wicksell. This rate is the US Real GDP Trend + the trimmed core PCE (core inflation rate as run by the Dallas Fed). Written as the formula:


Real US GDP(long term trend) + 12mo trimmed mean PCE(Personal Consumption Expenditure per Dallas Fed) = Wicksell Rate

All long term returns arbitrage about this rate but with considerable deviation due to market psychology (Chart Below) and earnings swings. Long term this should be about 5% if inflation is kept between 1.5%-2% and equates to a 20 P/E on the SP500. The emergence of inflation can substantially depress P/E’s regardless of the strength or breadth of earnings and represents the greatest risk to undiversified portfolios. The Dallas Fed has information on Wicksell.

Coming to terms with periods of economic distress and the associated market declines can in my view be greatly fortified by looking at some of our economic and market history.

US Real GDP (Chart Below) shows just how resilient the US economic system has been over nearly 80yrs. There have been seemingly catastrophic events, i.e. Herbert Hoover followed by FDR, WWII, Kennedy’s assassination, rampant inflation, Richard Nixon followed by Jimmy Carter, “Death of Equities”-1982, Crash of 1987, Crash of Long Term Capital, Crash of the Russian and Asian currencies, Crash of the Internet Bubble and more yet we have ALWAYS snapped back. Note that in the early 30’s with 4 weak years we had 4 quite strong years so that the avg. US Real GDP trend has been in fact a fairly smooth procession from a smallish economy of ~3.9% to the one we have now of ~3.2%. I think you can rely on the fact that our society’s productivity has had resiliency that is basic to our system of government. I do not think that we have destroyed US productivity in our current situation. In fact the evidence suggests that productivity has improved. I for one trust that we will return to the normal trend in a couple of years including a few years better than 3.2% to reestablish the long term trend.

Turning to the SP500 chart(Below) note the earnings trend of ~6.1%. I observe that Greenspan’s tenure has resulted in higher than normal earnings volatility vs. Paul Volcker. Although I did not draw it on this chart, my previous trend had been slightly below 6% before I recently added on the last 5yrs of earnings. It would appear that as technology has entered our economy’s various nooks and crannies we have been more productive and our earnings from our existing capital has risen some what.

I view the earnings in 1974, 1982, 1987, 1990 and 2002 as low points. We are close to comparable low earnings levels today. The market psychology today is comparable with similar media headlines of crisis and fear of Depression. However, we have avoided Depressions since the 1940’s due to the Federal Reserve acting as a financial shock absorber thus giving our society and economy financial breathing space to adjust to new conditions. This is why the US Real GDP has had decidedly much less volatility over the years as the Fed has exercised its financial cushioning actions. I estimate the current Standard Deviation at +/- 2.4%. This is well below what we had experienced in the ‘30’s of +/- 14%.

Yes, we may see lower earnings than we have seen, but historically most of the damage is done in my opinion. The Fed has loosened the purse strings forcibly and in multiple modes. So that, even though the media argues in the same fashion as in the past that the Fed either has not done enough or not done it the “Right” way, the end result is that the Fed has acted forcibly and our economy remains free to sort out the process of recovery. I have sent you several studies that indicate the early stages of recovery are with us.

The advice I provide is also based on that proffered by some of the greatest investment minds of the last 50yrs, i.e. Warren Buffett, Bruce Berkowitz and many more too numerous to list. A continuous process is in use in my office to assess the current insight of the most astute investors which I believe to be extraordinarily helpful

The advice to add REITs( see 5th Chart), Nat. Res and EmgMkts as part of a balanced portfolio is based upon the longer term observations of US economic strength and history as well as other observations as noted above. The use of the Wicksell Rate and the 5yr MovAvg Return/Risk analysis( 4th Chart) is helpful to determine when asset classes evolve to carrying higher levels of risk than is appropriate. Today this means to avoid Treasuries. Berkshire’s (BRK.A) Warren Buffett just called Treasuries a “Bubble” in his latest Chairman’s Letter. A comparison of Treasuries with the current 5.4% Wicksell Rate confirms this view.

The reason for being in most available asset classes(but for Treasuries) today is simple. They all appear relatively cheap. To try to focus on one or another using an expected return is difficult. You can be right on the earnings trend, but if the market cares more about another area you will not be rewarded with expected gains. Psychology plays a huge role in all markets as most market players are trend followers. In my opinion they are “Players” not “Investors”.

Disclosure (“none” means no position):none

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Lack of Clarity Into Selling Causing Fear

“Davidson” makes a great point here. Things are getting a bit overdone here and the “who is selling and why” questions are the cause.

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Todd,

The current selling is pushing the SP500 down to 1xBV (~550). This occurred in 1974 and 1982 when the Wicksell Rate was ~14%(3.2% Real US GDP + 11% core inflation) and represented realistic pricing of the earnings yield for the SP500. Today, we are priced at ~10% on reduced ttm SP500 earnings in an environment of a 5.4% Wicksell Rate. This is equivalent to a Real Rate of Return for SP500 of 7.5%(10%-2.4%). This figure is at a historically high level for an inflation adjusted return back through the 1940’s.

To throw out basic financial reasoning and pricing that has been in place for ~70 years as we have done today, means that some one with little discipline is selling portfolios wholesale. I suspect foreign sellers who have used too much leverage are now delevering. Our markets have no transparency to this and are trying to make sense of something for which we lack adequate information. We are trying to garner information from price movements and making many, many wrong assumptions about risk that is not likely present. GE (GE) is a prime example.

GE’s Sherin noted that $35mil of trades over 2 days caused the fear that forced GE to lose $21bil market cap this week. GE has taken an extraordinary step to open up the books later this month to show all that they do not have the issues rumored in the market. But, note that there is great leverage in the CDS market when $35 mil can be levered into a $21bil move. That is a 600 multiplier.

I believe that GE’s Immelt is an extraordinary astute and honest manager. The insider buying in this company is so high at this time that the term “of historical proportions” does not express the true meaning. I was once a GE insider and I know the culture. It is much, much better now than when under Welch and in sound hands in my opinion.

I think we are seeing much selling from sources not transparent to us and attributing this to some one knowing more than is widely available. This is the “Boogy Man in the dark room” syndrome. If we had a benchmark which is not susceptible to emotional pricing, then we could fairly compare returns on all assets and then discount for financial risk rather than be in this overblown panic. I propose the Wicksell Rate which is based on longer trending economic fundamentals and not subject to emotional volatility.

At the current level the SP500 provides extraordinary returns. I think we are seeing liquidation by foreign companies that took cash on the books and traded it in our markets to boost earnings. This occurred during the “Japanese Bubble” and was known to have been going on with the recent boom. It is my belief that these corporate treasurers are panicking and selling to recover much needed cash.

I would be buying with cash in both fists if I were not already in. Perhaps the world should step back from the precipice and see the current activity as crazy and go in the opposite direction.

I have sent you a chart via another email of the Percentage of MM Funds vs. MM Funds and Corp Equities. The panic is clear.

“Davidson”

Here is the chart:

Disclosure (“none” means no position):Long GE

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Should We Apply Wicksell Rate to Monetary Policy?

“Davidson” took a stab at having an influence with the Dallas Fed using their own published data and their statement that Wicksell is the “Father of Modern Monetary Policy”. The following letter was sent..

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To whom this may concern:

Below you will find a comparison of what I call the Wicksell Rate based on Knut Wicksell’s observation that the cost of capital is arbitraged on the Return of GDP vs. comparable fixed alternatives, namely the 10yr Treasury Note. I took the Dallas Fed trimmed mean12mo PCE values and added these to the long term trend line of the Real US GDP(2nd Chart) to produce the Wicksell Rate(1st Chart). The reason for using longer term trends is that business investors typically make capital commitments with 10yr time horizons and ignore year to year fluctuations.

I think this comparison helps to differentiate the enormous short term effect of market psychology which can be observed in the multiple deviations reflecting both periods of enthusiasm and gloom. Net/net the proper relative return relationship holds over long periods. Perhaps, one will find a better fit with changes in tax treatment of capital gains, but I am a lone practitioner and have neither the resources nor the time for extensive analysis.

I note that a better alternative for making the same point which would strip out the economic swings of earnings (because the market does look ahead on the expected returns on assets) is to use a 5yr MovAvg ROE for the SP500 and its P/BV multiple thus producing a ROE/(P/BV) = hypothetical Asset Based Return Yield.

Not all returns come from earnings. For instance, oil companies and real estate companies have asset gains due to inflation which are eventually converted to earnings at some point in the future in the form of higher rents or asset sales. This is less true of companies like GE and PG which have finished products with rising cost inputs but do not have the ability to convert the rising cost of production (rising value of factory equipment) into higher margins during inflation periods as do oil and real estate based businesses. The problem with this approach is that SP500 has to my knowledge stopped issuing BV information as it is deemed unreliable as a financial indicator. However, I think that as a gross measure of the asset base of the economy, I have seen from Ned Davis Research an avg 14% ROE and ~6.1% BV growth rate which is much smoother than the ~6.1% earnings trend you see below for the SP500(3rd Chart).

The point to be made is that Knut Wicksell had the correct observation in 1898 even though the tools for proving it were not available till much later. By using his observation a less volatile monetary policy should produce a less volatile economy, less volatile inflation, fewer economic headaches and Federal Reserve decisions with substantial genius.

It is clear to me that the activities of the Federal Reserve have proven to have been since the US Real GDP trend from 1930 very beneficial as a shock absorber. However, under the Greenspan years the availability of cheap money followed by comparable contractions has resulted in higher corporate earnings volatility(see 3rd Chart Earnings Trend Line)

I ask that you consider using the Wicksell Rate. I ask that you publish this for all to see so that corporate and investment decisions can be made with greater long term clarity. My suggestion is that in the current environment an immediate implementation would be disruptive, BUT, if you were to announce that you were going to work towards implementing Wicksell Rate as a policy over the next 5yrs-10yrs, I believe you would bring great clarity to many financial decisions as well as give all a period in which to make adjustments that would not be unduly disruptive. Importantly this would result in far less speculation as returns would have to breach the Wicksell Rate and all would realize that the cost to doing this would be considerably higher than with funds much lower. Perhaps it would also be helpful to dampen rampant speculation that the Federal Reserve promote the concept of “matching maturities” when investment commitments occur and recourse as opposed to non-recourse financing.

I think some of these suggestions would result in higher levels of individual discipline and common sense.

Humbly submitted,

“Davidson”

Disclosure (“none” means no position):

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"Davidson": Traders Rule the Moment

He has a very valid point, there is no talk of valuation out there currently. That both creates tremendous markets swings and for the patient of us, tremendous opportunity.,

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I thought that these charts (below) told the story of the credit freeze. I think the Traders rule at the moment. Valuation for the moment does not carry much weight. The forecasted earnings yield of ~8.6% 12mo forward for SP500 seems to stimulate some to forecast worse earnings than this in order to get their 20 secs on CNBC. I interpret these charts to indicate that it appears that earnings are forecasted to be well below the long term trend. I do have a chart that takes the earnings trend back to the late ‘40’s with what appears to be the same variance within the same channel at ~6% compounded for the entire period. Today forecasts are well out side the historical range.

To get a similar collapse of valuations in the past required a high rate of inflation, 1974 and 1982 both had 7 P/E’s and 12%-14% earnings yield range. This was required. I have observed that since 1978 when we have reasonably good data that the market requires a return that provides just over 3% Real Rate of Return. In 1982 with core inflation (see Dallas Fed trimmed mean PCE data 1982 inflation at ~9%-11% + ~3% Real Rate of Return = 12%-14%) in the 11%-12% range the SP500 earnings yield was in the 12%-14% range.

Over the past few months 12mos forward earnings yields have ranged over 11% to the current ~8.6%. The market appears to be pricing inflation in the next few years at the 5.5%-8% range or a period of earnings well below that which has been in place since the 1940’s.

I cannot forecast the future any better than the many professionals who are paid handsomely to do this. But, I do not think our national productivity, our willingness to work our desire put our kids through school and our general improvement of our condition has not changed from last year to this. My view is that the SP500 which represents some 90%+ of US public companies mirrors the results of these efforts. We can measure this with some certainty since the ‘40’s. We have certainly had many issues along the way. We have always recovered.

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"Davidson": Thoughts on "Fair" vs "Free" Markets

Davidson has a very thoughtful pieces on markets, the government’s roles, investors and traders vs value investors.

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Under the Bush Administration it would appear that “Fair Markets” which was the theme of Securities Act of 1934 and other responses to the events that produced the Great Depression became “Free Markets”. Free Markets which have little restraint become dominated by the avarice of the marginal investors who are bright enough to skirt all the laws then enforced to take undo advantage of all other investors who being responsible and in the view of these few operate within the doctrine of “Fairness”. The “Free Market” syndrome simply missed the fact that there are always individuals who will “game” the system and because they have greater resources manipulate markets for their own advantage knowing that most will follow a sense of “Fairness”. These few are not stupid people. They are very bright. Bright enough to understand the system, see its flaws and acquire the means by which to enrich themselves at the expense of others who believe in the concept of “Fairness” as originally conceived.

It would appear the April 28, 2004 SEC regulatory meeting much discussed today at which investment banks were freed to lever up to 40-50X was simply part of a general belief that “Free Markets” self-correct and self-monitor. Unfortunately what was missed is that this is only possible in a medium of complete and utter transparency. In fact, while we gradually forced Warren Buffett to expose his holdings thus taking away some of his freedom to move about the market place, we gave HF’s invisibility. We also gave these folks invisibility as to the new securities contracts they created with the incredibly wrong belief that they would self-monitor. Many including Alan Greenspan supported this construct.

“Free Markets” will never be completely transparent as individuals will always find a means to game the system dishonestly. This is why rules are necessary to make markets “Fair Markets” to all with the individual investors who are the fundamental base of all investing through their daily effort, their labor and creativity, to produce GDP. We lose sight that our economy and the stock and bond markets rest on the efforts of people earning a living. We lose sight of the fact that the investment markets are not a world unto themselves that can be mathematically analyzed and thrown in to formulas by which to create wealth. The investment markets are simply a representation of the productivity of our society. I like to think of the markets as a console full of dials. It simply measures the results of all the inputs to society as it pertains to our productivity. The markets reflect our hopes, our generosity, our legal system and our political system. The markets reflect our entire value system and how we organize our efforts to self improve.

Markets need to be “Fair” not “Free”. Transparency of every contract, every levered position, every trade and every association of one contract holder with another should be paramount. If there is an ability of one investor to gain advantage over another with secrecy, then there should be rules that forces this into the light of day so that we can determine if it is “Fair to Individual Investors”.

There should also be a “Recourse Rule”. If you buy a house today it is non-recourse to the buyer. It is up to the bank to have performed the underwriting to the level that assures safety of principle and interest. This lets single buyers own multiple homes to speculate without personal risk. We are all suffering today from the fallout of housing speculators who have walked away from recent transactions leaving our financial institutions with the losses. All obligations should carry some form of recourse to the parties involved. It would add personal risk to speculation and reduce the risk to us all. How this can be done regarding investment contracts and investment firms can be left up to them to develop a fair solution. The concept is that there should be some recourse to the individual who created the contract till the contract has terminated.

“Fairness” should be the rule-personal responsibility of behavior should be the goal. “Free Markets” leads to avoidance of responsibility. I liked Pres. Bush, but he simply got it wrong. This mess will be his legacy.

We have Traders and Value Investors. The former believes that price accounts for all information, Efficient Mkt Hypothesis. The latter believe in understanding a business and buy with cash flow, Owner’s Earnings and etc.

First, the Traders support Mark-to-Market while the Value Investors scream that it is a bogus benchmark. The Traders sell stock and if it goes down they say, “See!! If it goes down, it was meant to go down to find its real “value”!!” It is an amazing set of mental gymnastics that Traders use to convince themselves that “emotional pricing” of securities represents a valid method of “fair value accounting” for which Mark-to-Market was designed to effect.

Second, there are many, many more Traders with their simplistic approach and strong self belief/confidence than there are true Value Investors. It is easy to see that Value Investors do not by their selling create tops nor by their buying create bottoms. It appears to be more a factor that Traders simply exhausted their fire power. Where this level is I do not know. Unfortunately, “Mark-to-Market” is a destructive feed-back device. It supports erroneous contention reinforcing it’s own effect. It goes in the wrong direction till you reach such a silly level that eventually some percentage of Traders see the folly and an apparent “Value” becomes obvious. The snap back becomes very sharp.

I don’t know where that level is. Obviously this past week was not that level.

Disclosure (“none” means no position):

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Do We Get A "V"??

There is a growing chorus that feels the current situation will be resolved with a “V” recovery in which upside is a violent as the downside has been. To wit:

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Here is the theory:

“Davidson” submits:

Wesbury has had this stance for some time. One way I would explain this is that this was not a consumer lead economic slow down. Consumers were actually still in good shape re: credit scores and could have continued to buy cars and houses if the lending institutions were lending. BUT, the lending institutions stopped lending and consumer sales hit a wall. Consumers do not stop dead this way, especially after nearly 3yrs of slow down that began at the beginning of 2006 in housing and autos. This whole slow down is an institutional/governmental heart attack on top of a normal slow down that began with the effect of Mark-to-Market on Lehman, AIG, Bear Stearns and then was kicked over the cliff with SEC Cox’ ban on short selling.

This has been such a misunderstood economic panic that was caused by first cheap money, then encouraged by political avarice, fostered by poor regulation and the incredibly stupid belief in the “Free Markets Self Correct” syndrome and then topped off by incredibly inane elimination of the “Up-Tick Rule”, the passive approach to naked short selling, the political decision to let Lehman fail so that Republicans could display some “Character?” during the Presidential election and the rest is history. The consumer was in fact OK till the credit markets and importantly the Money Markets seized with now bankrupt Lehman commercial paper.

Politicians and regulators just do not see that it is they who are the problem, it is they who have failed to act in accordance with the regulations that they passed. Politicians and regulators are looking for some one else to blame because they are so thick in the middle of causing this mess that I really don’t think they even have a clue as to what they have done. And they think that they are the solution to the problem??

The market is healing on its own. That this is occurring you can see from the rise in Treasury rates as funds flow into various market channels looking for opportunity. I watch with fascination the activities of Warren Buffett and numerous savvy investors buying up discounted assets especially real estate. The signs are there for all to see.

I am all in and have been since January ’09.

Could it be? Consider the following chart from Howard Lindzon

It shows, far from being an abnormality, “V” recoveries in equity markets are the norm. Now, the question we need to answer is “Are we at the bottom of the “V” or are we going down to a point between where we are now and the bottom of the 1931 “V”?”

The optimists will say we are at the bottom while the pessimist will say we will pass 1931. I lay not in either camp. My take is that we fall further then shoot up. How much further, who knows, and anyone who tells you they do is lying, they are guessing. My take is that based on the news flow and economics trends, which are still negative in the aggregate, more downside is in store. I know recent numbers have been encouraging but a month does not a trend make (nor does two).

In that vein, Henry Blodget writes:

Prof Shiller’s work (above chart) shows clearly that stock values are mean-reverting. The only trouble is the time they take to mean-revert. If things go badly over the next few years, stocks could bounce along the bottom for another decade or more.

For example, Jeremy Grantham, whose shop (GMO) produced the forecasts above, reminds us what happened in the 1970s:

“Today all equities are moderately – one might say, boringly – cheap. The forecast for the S&P has been jumping around +6% to +7% real, with other global equities slightly higher. 

To put that in perspective, a 1-year forecast done on the same basis we use today that started in December 1974 would have predicted a 14% return (which, by the way, it did not deliver since the market stayed so cheap). For August 1982, the forecast would have been shockingly high – over 20% real! So do not think for a second that this is as low as markets can get. “

(It’s worth noting, though, that 1982 was the start of the great bull market. Jeremy also warns of the possibility of another sucker’s rally, so don’t get too comfortable waiting for the bottom:

“Now, I admit that Greenspan and 9/11 tax cuts caused the “greatest sucker rally in history” from 2002-07. We therefore cannot rule out another aberrant phase in which extreme stimulus causes the market to rally once again to an overpriced level for a few more years, thus postponing the opportunity to make excellent long-term investments yet again. But I think it’s unlikely. “

One thing seems certain: Stocks are cheaper now than they have been at any time in the past two decades. That’s encouraging for those with another couple of decades to invest and–increasingly rare these days–cash to put to work.

We’ll see….I think we have a bit deeper on the “V” to go..

Disclosure (“none” means no position):

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The Mark-To-Market Debate Continued

A follow-up to last weeks conversation…

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“Davidson” chimes in about the following piece:
“Wesbury had a follow-up to his prediction that last Monday would see some Mark-to-Market modification. He stated that Sen. Dodd had told him that this would happen and my guess that Wesbury was so miffed at being used as a trial balloon that he decided to reveal his source in this video. Keep up the pressure on this issue as the tide is turning I think.”

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"Davidson" Says: PG Is A Buy!!

“Davidson” is back with a breakdown of Proctor & Gamble (PG)

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He writes:
I calculated the ROE/Multiple of BV for PG from 2000 till the lastest Morningstar report. Gillette was bought in 2006 and it was a transition year which did not have simple year end values.

For the time period the Current Market Rate of Return has been between 5-6%. Currently the value is 5.4% and for a return that makes a LgCap equity attractive the average is 150% x CMRR = 8.1%

With PG about $52shr this makes it buyable for the 1st time in the last 10yrs. I have looked at the margins and have been very impressed with the debt pay down from 80% Debt/Equity in 2005 to 32% today, this company has very a conservative financial position and appear to have seen our current environment coming. Their business has been steady even during the last slow down 2001-2003. Business is international with a manageable commodity input cost.

He provides the following information:

Disclosure (“none” means no position):None

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Berkshire Now Just Might Be A Buy??

After a a year of saying Berkshire Hathaway (BRK.A) was no value, I’m thinking it just may be getting there.

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In July 2008 I said:

Wholly-owned subs such as Shaw Industries, Clayton Homes, Jordan’s Furniture (the are 4 furniture companies), Benjamin Moore, Home Services and Acme Brick and directly tied to housing and will suffer in the downturn.

For all its holdings, Berkshire is essentially an insurance company. It has operated under “perfect” conditions for the last two years according to Buffett and eventually to run must end. Premiums are already falling and as houses are re-poed and fewer new cars are purchase, insurance premiums derived from those products will fall accordingly. I know people who are looking at homeowners and auto policies for way to decrease coverage and save money. Whether or not this is a good idea is irrelevant (I do not think it is), it is happening. Throw in a hurricane or two (we are due) and insurance could suffer quite a poor year.

For more on Berkshire’s insurance read this former post:

Back in March when shares sat at $133,000 I argued they were not a “value”. Today they sit at $111,000. Are they a value now? Perhaps but one also has to expect that the near term, if Tilson is correct is fraught with potholes for Berkshire and earnings ought to take a hit.

Based on that, share price ought to suffer also meaning you will probably be able to pick them up cheaper down the road. If I owned shares would I sell? If I needed the money in the next year, yes. If I had a multi-year time frame would I sell? No. If that was the case I would be watching down the road for a cheaper entry price, I think you’ll get it.

What has happened since then?

From Barrons:

Berkshire agreed to purchase $150 million of 10 1/8% notes due in 2015 and $250 million of 10 3/8% notes due in 2018 from Birmingham, Ala.-based Vulcan. The note sale was reported in late January, but Vulcan didn’t identify the buyer of the notes until Tuesday’s earnings conference call.

Other recent Berkshire bond purchases include $300 million of Harley Davidson Inc. (HOG) 15% notes due in 2014 and $150 million of Sealed Air 12% notes due in 2014.

These purchases follow big transactions in the fourth quarter, when Berkshire purchased $5 billion of 10% preferred stock from Goldman Sachs (GS) and $3 billion of 10% preferred from General Electric (GE). Both those deals came with a sizable amount of equity warrants. During October, Berkshire also bought $4.4 billion of 11.45% subordinated notes and $2.1 billion of 5% preferred stock issued by Wrigley, which was purchased by Mars in a leveraged buyout.

One deal that Buffett probably regrets is his agreement to purchase $3 billion of convertible preferred stock in Dow Chemical Co. (DOW) if it goes forward with its deal to buy chemical maker Rohm & Haas Co. (ROH) for $15 billion. Berkshire’s purchase is contingent on the consummation of the deal.

Buffett may be hoping that the deal dies, or that Dow comes back to Berkshire with more generous terms to get a larger investment from Berkshire if Dow goes forward with the deal. Dow is resisting completion of the transaction, arguing that the debt that it would have to take on would be ruinous financially. As it stands, the Dow convertible preferred that Berkshire agreed to purchase will carry an 8.5% interest rate and a conversion price around $40, way above Dow’s current share price of $10.

If we do some simple math, Bekshire has put roughly $17.9 billion to work at 10%. That will provide Berkshire $1.7 billion a year for the next three years (some of it may convert to equity at that point). When one considers Berkshire has earned $7.8 billion of the last 12 months (Q4 2008 numbers not released yet), Buffett’s recent moved will add 21% to those earnings.

Now, insurance. Yes as stated above, the party is over but, rates are scheduled for increases. As insurance companies look to cover losses in investment portfolio’s, the aggressive pricing that has taken place in the past few years will abate, causing industry rates to rise. Also, one should expect those insurance companies feeling the pinch to take fewer larger risks. Since this is an area Berkshire loves to play in, fewer players will mean stronger pricing power on the part of Berkshire.

We will not a resurgence to the “glory years” in insurance, but conditions for the first time in a few years will improve. Remember, Berkshire is essentially an insurance company, since that business seems to have stabilized, being the best of that lot, we must assume Berkhsire has.

Berkshire’s investment portfolio has been hurt this year by the weak showing of some of its major equity investments, Wells Fargo (WFC), U.S. Bancorp (USB), Kraft (KFT), Coca-Cola (K) and Procter & Gamble (PG). While prices here are depressed, there is no permanent impairment to earnings and that is a point being missed by folks. To believe these companies will be at depressed prices 3 years from now means the global economy will not recover. If you believe that, buying any equity is a waste of time.

Berkshire is big holder of those three companies’ shares and it also is short $37 billion of long-dated put options on the S&P 500 and other equity indexes. As the market has dropped, Berkshire has taken a charge to earnings (no cash) in the write-down of the value of these options. When the market rises, the opposite will happen (write-up). Again, to assume no improvement here implies US business is stagnant for the next decade.

Now, Berkshire is down roughly 33% since my fist post on it. The difference now is that several of its businesses are showing signs of life and Buffett has put billions to work at 10% vs the pittance is was getting previously in Treasuries.

The next piece of the puzzle is the Berkshire manufacturing businesses listed above. They will turn when the economy does. If you believe that is the 2nd half of this year, the time to buy is now. If you believe that is 2010, you have time to wait.

Will Berkshire go lower? I do not know but I do know that there isn’t a good reason for it to go much lower barring further dramatic worldwide economic collapse.

Time will tell but I think Berkhsire at its current levels do not have much more downside….

Disclosure (“none” means no position):Long WFC, none

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"Davidson" on Blankfein vs Westbury

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Seeing the Blankfein piece in the FT against Mark-to-Market vs. Wesbury is the dichotomy of the market place. Those who believe in Efficient Market Hypothesis believe that price trend represent all the information available for a particular security. Mark-to-Market is valid in all environments for traders, technical and momentum investors. Efficient Market players have investment horizons from minutes to months. If they hold longer than a year, it is only due to a series of short term technical signals that reinforced holding.

The “Value Investors” on the other hand look for mispricing vs. fundamentals, i.e. discount to Book Value, Cash Flow or some other value parameter that is measurable and quantifiable. Warren Buffett is the prime example of Value Investing, the best known, but there are numerous others. However, the number of true “Value Investors” is far less than all other investors. Value investors investigate, analyze and parse a target company’s business till they are comfortable with the decision to commit funds at a level at which they feel an anticipated rate of return is likely to be had over a multi year period. It is not unknown for Value investors to hire investigators and analysts to look at each business site of a company’s operation, individual tax filings, competitors and vendor information in an effort to sleuth the locations of all values within a company. Value investors have an investment horizon that is typically greater than 5yrs.

Mark-to-Market accounting during down markets provides opportunities for Value investors. Their records are well known. There are no traders famous for their investment judgment over the same period of any well known value player.

Importantly, mixing Value investors and Efficient Market players (calling them investors is an abomination of the word) in the same room is like watching two vastly different cultures trying to communicate. They can’t. They are so culturally different that the terms, “value”, “return”, “analysis” which stand for defining action and criteria for one have no equal meaning in the other. What is even more bazaar is that in most instances they do not understand why they don’t understand each other as they each believe they are perfectly correct in their views of assessing investment opportunities.

I am a Value investor. There are truly very few of us vs. other investors. My guess is less than 2%.

Mark-to-Market accounting is an abomination of reasoning during periods of market disruption such as we just experienced when the SEC banned short selling. Unfortunately, there are more of them than us, but fortunately the market will and is currently righting itself even with the mistakes we have made and continue to make. Philosophically we need the majority of investors to not get it right so that us few can take advantage of the deep discounts not produced in any other way.

All will be well even if the current stimulus package is passed. It may just take longer.

Disclosure (“none” means no position):

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"Buffett Metric" Does NOT Say It Is Time To Buy $$

So, there is a chart and a story going around regarding Berkshire’s (BRK.A) Warren Buffett that just does not jive to me. Hat Tip to “Davidson” for pointing bringing it to my attention..

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First, here is the chart:

Here is the story that follows:

Fortune Magazine) — Is it time to buy U.S. stocks?

According to both this 85-year chart and famed investor Warren Buffett, it just might be. The point of the chart is that there should be a rational relationship between the total market value of U.S. stocks and the output of the U.S. economy – its GNP.

Fortune first ran a version of this chart in late 2001 (see “Warren Buffett on the stock market“). Stocks had by that time retreated sharply from the manic levels of the Internet bubble. But they were still very high, with stock values at 133% of GNP. That level certainly did not suggest to Buffett that it was time to buy stocks.

But he visualized a moment when purchases might make sense, saying, “If the percentage relationship falls to the 70% to 80% area, buying stocks is likely to work very well for you.”

Well, that’s where stocks were in late January, when the ratio was 75%. Nothing about that reversion to sanity surprises Buffett, who told Fortune that the shift in the ratio reminds him of investor Ben Graham’s statement about the stock market: “In the short run it’s a voting machine, but in the long run it’s a weighing machine.”

Not just liking the chart’s message in theory, Buffett also put himself on record in an Oct. 17 New York Times op-ed piece, saying that he was personally buying U.S. stocks after a long period of owning nothing (outside of Berkshire Hathaway (BRKB) stock) but U.S. government bonds.

He said that if prices kept falling, he expected to soon have 100% of his net worth in U.S. equities. Prices did keep falling – the Dow Jones industrials have dropped by about 10% since Oct. 17 – so presumably Buffett kept buying. Alas for all curious investors, he isn’t saying what he bought.

To examine this we need to go back the beginning.

One must remember that in the late 1960 Buffett closed the “Buffett Partnership” because at that time he felt “there were no values” in the general stock market. Yet, according to both the chart above and the story, Buffett would have been buying at this time.

If we fast forward to the mid 1970’s, a time when Buffett said he felt like “a guy in a whorehouse with a suitcase of cash” because stocks we so cheap, we see the above charts value level was actually below 50%. In fact, most of the largest positions in Berkshire’s portfolio, American Express (AXP), Coke (K), Gillette now PG (PG) and The Washington Post (WPO) were accumulted during this time. In fact, Buffett’s buying continued through the 1980’s and until the mid 1990’s when he then found equity values were overpriced, refrained from buying during the tech bubble and was called “out of touch” (he was later proven very right).

Again, looking at the chart we see during that at this time frame the chart values had crept back to the 75% level of the mid 1960’s when Buffett was a seller.

What is inmportant to note and what has been lost in the “Buffett is buying rhetoric” is that Warren’s three largest recent investments, totaling roughly $10 billion, Dow Chemical (DOW), GE (GE) and Goldman Sachs (GS) were NOT stocks purchases, they were preferred investments.

Essentially Buffett is betting their share prices will all rise, in the next 3 to 5 years, when the convertibles convert to common stock. Until then, he has a bond paying 10%. With Treasuries paying essentially nothing, Buffett has found a vehicle that pays 10% to park his cash.

Did Buffett pen the link article above? Yes. To be sure Warren is buying an interest in US companies as witnessed above, just not their common stocks (except Burlington Northern (BNI)).

Buffett’s preferred purchases are not an endorsement of cheap US equities, if anything it says he would rather be a bondholder than an equity one……for now.

Disclosure (“none” means no position):Long Dow, GE, none

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"Davidson": Panic at The White House

My readers, named “Davidson” by me has submitted the following piece…

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He writes:

The panic in Obama’s recent speeches as he attempts to railroad the Democratic spending bill is without thoughtful analysis. Unfortunately, this reflects the misunderstandings of his advisors who believe that throwing spending at the lack of liquidity is the solution.

How wrong can so many people be!!!

The issue is that Mark-to-Market is providing a false view of the value of assets. Brian Wesbury and others have suggested a “Cash Flow” methodology, i.e. if the debt security is paying its interest and principal streams then it should be valued according to the risk of non-payment along bonds that are paying. This is a simple model and one that can be trusted as it is based on the realities of commerce.

This does not require another $800bil of spending. This requires 20min of discussion and a flip of the accounting switch. We may need a few guarantees as well.

Just where do we get people who cannot see the simplicity of this! It is Mark-to-Market that has caused many $billions of write offs. These need to be reversed and then let the market pricing mechanism get to work.

It is frustrating to watch so much intelligence go to waste and even do great damage because they are panicked.

For more on mark-to-market, here is a post I wrote in March 2008.

Here is a bit of a rant I wrote on it in May of 2008

Disclosure (“none” means no position):

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Davidson Writes: "Was 2008….. 1987?"

This did get me to thinking…….

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There were many similarities, 1987 vs. 2008. To understand the dynamics will lead to understanding how a quick recovery is possible this time around.

Both 1987 and 2008 had a period of debt accumulation to enhance investment returns with leverage. Then it was a series of LBO’s. This time the debt was elsewhere but the main point is that part of the market was over-levered.

In 1987 the trigger for the crash was one Dan Rostenkowski, Dem-IL, Chairman of the House Ways and Means Committee, who angered that LBO’s were causing labor reductions to produce gains for the financially privileged introduced a retroactive tax law which would be in effect as of Jan 1 of 1987. This law if enacted would make all the year’s LBO’s uneconomical. It was changing the tax laws after much had occurred. He did the same in 1986 to completely rewrite the tax law as it pertained to tax shelters thus making them no longer as attractive and thus helped kick the S&L’s into a swan dive that resulted in a major bail out because the S&L’s had already closed on deals which now resulted in immediate losses.

The 1987 proposed legislation came out of committee late on Oct 13th, the market began to slide. The slide continued the 14th&15th (Thurs&Fri) but many were as yet unawares of the proposed law. They found out over the weekend as the news spread and a 10 sigma event began in Europe and hit us on Oct 19th with the help of “Portfolio Insurance” which was run by computers, never designed or tested for a massive sell off and in fact multiplied the sell off in the subsequent crash. Only one keen observer, Robert Bartley of the WSJ wrote about this at the time. The rest of the word did not understand what truly happened. A single individual had attempted to change the investment rules over night. Rostenkowski let the legislation die quietly.

The crash of 2008, i.e. what happened in Oct.&Nov., was also the work of one individual changing the playing field in a market already fragile. This was one SEC Chairperson Chris Cox who had eliminated the short sale rule saying he did not have the capacity to monitor the market in June 2007, then decided to ban the only defensive tool HF’s had to limit portfolio volatility w/levered positions of 20:1. He banned short selling. Now the HF’s were forced to sell levered positions outright, banks called margin for fear of losses and the market hit a vacuum. Cox changed the playing field and the participants had to adjust as quickly as possible. Just as in 1987.

Most will not see it this way. Most will point to the build up of debt in HF’s, sub-prime lending, the extraordinary period of Greenspan’s cheap money, the mistakes by certain regulators, the avarice of certain politicians and the mortgage agencies, but this was not an economic collapse. This was an economic slowdown and had begun at the end of 2005 when auto and home sales had peaked.

We were in an economic slow down with financial institutions at risk and we were in an orderly correction when Cox changed the rules and the wild collapse shattered investor confidence.

What we have today is shattered trust. No one knows what the rules are at the moment. It is not that liquidity is not available. It is that liquidity is not moving about the system. People with reasonable credit scores cannot buy cars or houses at the moment because of the fear of the unknown that was inspired by Cox’s single thoughtless decision.

Yes, jobs are being lost not because individuals are over levered, but more because of the fear of lending the copious funds that are available. Ah yes. There is also the issue of the Mark-to-Market rule that was never expected to see an overnight change in value as we have seen. Cox should have suspended this but did not. Mark-to-Market was meant to be a helpful investor tool in an orderly declining market place, something to keep the financial institutions honest. When Mark-to-Market valuations are registering default levels for perfectly healthy securities then you know the rule should be modified.

Much of the value destruction today is the result of accounting rules designed for a functioning market pricing mechanism meeting a frozen market pricing mechanism because one person changed the playing field.

This is not a Depression and does not even have to be a Recession. It is solvable. The rules have to be modified to produce fair valuations and to get pricing mechanisms working again. The head of the SEC can do this. It is quite simple.

Trust is what is missing. We need to revive it.

“Davidson” is the pseudonym for a reader who must remain anonymous…..

Disclosure (“none” means no position):None

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Davidson Writes About Treasuries & What They Tell Us

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I have named my optimistic and very intelligent new writer “Mr. Davidson”. It is a brilliant pseudonym and maybe someday I will be able to explain it.

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Davidson Writes:

If you learn the effect of psychology on markets you will come to know that you cannot predict bottoms or tops. These are unpredictable turns in market psychology and is directly tied to the use of margin in how fast greed can turn to fear. No one has a handle on this although many claim to have modeled some market behavior or other only to have a 10 sigma event prove the model wrong. Long Term Capital is the most well known, but lately the market is strewn with disproved models. AIG hung its hat on a model by a Wharton/Yale professor and “poof”

You cannot model human behavior. You can observe, you can place a historical deviation to it, but you better not hang 20xleverage as so many have done and lost.

There is no better indicator of market psychology than the Treasury yield chart. All maturities are rising. This reflects substantial flow of funds into other opportunities. If fear still ruled, you might see the longer term maturities rates rise while the T-Bill rates remained low or even turn negative once again. Not so. All maturities show fund outflows. THIS IS THE TURN!

Buffett recognizes this among others.

He also provides the following chart:

Of it he says:

We have already witnessed a return to par of the LQD ETF(Invest Grade Corp) and a substantial rise in the HYG ETF(HiYield Corp) as well as rises in all the indices since November. House sales appear to be finding a bottom, The insider buying is extraordinarily high, investor and consumer pessimism at record 30yr+ levels, savvy investors announce new commitments(Buffett, Ackman, Berkowitz, Cumming and many not as well known) weekly.

Changes are there for all to see if only they would give up listening to the endless stream of negative headlines. Markets turn without fan fair in the gloom of pessimism. I think the best time is to invest is now.

Treasury rates are rising across all maturities as this chart from Don Hay’s recent note indicates. The best interpretation in my opinion which has been offered by only few observers thus far is that capital is flowing from Treasuries to other parts of the economy and securities markets. The desperate hoarding of cash that has been a hallmark of the current economic slump is diminishing in my view.

I remain positive that the current financial issues will be resolved and that this chart provides strong evidence for this.

Disclosure (“none” means no position):

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Warren Buffett Likes Bacon

Berkshire Hathaway (BRK.A) has purchased $300m of Harley Davidson’s (HOG) debt. The real news is he is getting 15%, so much for credit “loosening up”.

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Disclosure (“none” means no position):Long HOG

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