Einhorn, Congress, Blame, Bespoke
– A good article from the UK
– Ironic….as they rail about Wall St. greed, they exhibit their own
– Looks like the SEC and Congress has more than their share of blame
Einhorn, Congress, Blame, Bespoke
– A good article from the UK
– Ironic….as they rail about Wall St. greed, they exhibit their own
– Looks like the SEC and Congress has more than their share of blame
This is a classic…
From the FT:
Click here for music to go along with words
A long, long time ago,
I can still remember,
How much wealth there was in the Square Mile,
And I knew that if I had my chance,
I could make it in finance,
And maybe I’d have money for a while.
But subprime assets made me shiver,
With every product I’d deliver,
Bad news in the press(es),
Just look at those CDSs.
I can’t remember if I cried,
When my salary was pushed aside,
But something resounded worldwide,
The week the IB died.
So bye, bye, Lehman Brothers (LEH) and I,
Needed credit to get better but the credit was dry,
Hank Paulson’s Fed had carved up the pie,
Saying, AIG’s (AIG) too big to die,
AIG is too big to die.
Why’d Fuld wait, put all at stake,
Did he think he’d make more at a later date?
Greedy finance tycoons,
Now Barclay’s buying, let’s be frank,
A pretty cheap investment bank,
Can you hire me, real soon?
Well, I know that it’s a lot to ask,
When Einhorn’s taken us to task,
Using our balance sheet to guise,
Our level 3 assets’ demise.
Now Morgan Stanley’s (MS) feeling short,
And BofA’s (BAC) Merrill’s (MER) last resort,
The banking system’s pretty morte,
The week the IB died.
I was saying,
Bye, bye, Lehman Brothers and I,
Needed credit to get better but the credit was dry,
Hank Paulson’s Fed had carved up the pie,
Saying, AIG’s too big to die,
AIG is too big to die.
Now for four years we’d been on the phone,
Selling mezzanine CDOs,
But that’s not how it used to be,
When Dick came in, we just did bonds,
Good thing he helped us right that wrong,
By buying Aurora Loan LLC,
Oh, and while the Fed was looking ‘round,
They thought they’d try and shoot us down,
The market was all broken,
Bank lending was a croakin’,
And while we unwind our trading book,
The head hunters all have a look,
The hedge funds are put on the hook,
The week the IB died,
I was saying,
Bye, bye, Lehman Brothers and I,
Needed credit to get better but the credit was dry,
Hank Paulson’s Fed had carved up the pie,
Saying, AIG’s too big to die,
AIG is too big to die…
Here is the original post
Disclosure (“none” means no position):None
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In a just filed SEC notice, David Einhorn and Greenlight Capital sold 3.58 million shares of Helix Energy (HLX) at $26.40 a share.
The move come just a day after he added shares at prices between $26 and $28 each.
Disclosure (“none” means no position):None
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In a just released SEC filing, David Einhorn, through his various Greenlight entities added another 1.25 million shares of Helix (HLX)
Full SEC Filing
In a filing last week, Einhorn disclosed a 11% of 10.2 million share stake in the energy services company.
Disclosure (“none” means no position):none
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In a just released SEC filing, David Einhorn, through his Greenlight entities has purchased 11% of Helix Energy Solutions (HLX).
In the filing, Einhorn discloses purchases bringing his ownership to 10.2 million shares through 4 entities.
Here is the recent activity
Helix Energy Solutions Group, Inc. (Helix) is an international offshore energy company providing reservoir development solutions and other contracting services to the energy market, as well as to other oil and gas properties. Helix operates in the Gulf of Mexico, North Sea, Asia Pacific and Middle East regions. The Contracting Services segment utilizes the vessels and offshore equipment that when applied with the methodologies reduce finding and development (F&D) costs. The Oil and Gas segment is engaged in prospect generation, exploration, development and production activities. On December 11, 2007, the Company’s wholly owned subsidiary Cal Dive (CDI) completed the acquisition of Horizon Offshore, Inc. (Horizon). In July 2007, the Company acquired the remaining 42% interest in Well Ops SEA Pty Ltd. On September 30, 2007, Helix 30% working interest in the Phoenix oilfield, the Boris oilfield and the Little Burn oilfield to Sojitz GOM Deepwater, Inc.
Disclosure (“none” means no position):none
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Some updated Short Math…
Holder Name—Shares—%
ESL Investments, Inc.—65,639,184—51.0%
Fairholme Capital Management LLC—16,110,090—12.5%
Legg Mason Capital Management, Inc.—12,503,168—9.7%
Pershing Square Capital Management—6,746,568—5.2%
ClearBridge Advisors—4,789,523—3.7%
Perry Capital—2,694,95—22.1%
Davis Advisors—2,020,96—11.6%
Dalal Street, Inc.—517,608—0.4%
T2 Partners Management LP—50,625—0.0%
Greenlight Capital, Inc.—11,240—0.0%
Total held by above—111,083,919—86.2%
Total Outstanding—128,800,000
Short Interest—33,656,888—26.1%
Share Not held by Above Holders—17,716,081—13.8%
Here is why I added some shareholders to the list.
ClearBridge Advisors is actually owned by Legg Mason and considering Bill Miller’s influence at the entire firm I wouldn’t think it is crazy for the ClearBridge PMs and analysts to be communicating with or with directly with Bill Miller and his team.
Perry Capital is a no brainer to be added to the list as Rchard Perry is actually on the Board of Directors at SHLD. One other interesting tidbit is that Richard Perry worked on the Arb desk at Goldman during the Robert Rubin years (according to this months Fortune magazine). This is te same desk that Eddie Lampert worked on.
Dalal Street (Mohnish Pabrai), Davis Advisors, Greenlight (David Einhorn) and T2 (Whitney Tilson) are all well known for being value guys who will hold onto positions for extended periods as long as the position is trading sufficiently below intrinsic value. Einhorn, Tilson and Pabrai will all be presenting at the upcoming Value Investor Congress.
So over 86% of the shares outstanding are being held by long-term value investors which is really a great sign. The shares sold short is almost double the number of shares that we estimate are in the trading float…but the real question is does it really matter? If the long-term holders listed above hold their shares in a margin account, then those shares can be borrowed and shorted. So the answer to the question really is no. However if all these holders were to move their holdings to the cash account or requested their share not be lent out then that would create a situation where the maximum number of shares that could be borrowed at approximately 17.7mm.
Disclosure (“none” means no position): Long-SHLD
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This is beautiful stuff. David Einhorn’s Greenlight Capital has files a 13D/A in MI Development (MIM) in regards to its investment in Magna Entertainment Corp. (MECA). The letter is classic Einhorn. First he reviews his prior concerns, then lists managements dubious actions, then questions them reminds them of their duty.
First the details, according to the filing:
(a) Greenlight LLC is the beneficial owner of 2,234,000 Class A Shares. Greenlight Inc. is the beneficial owner of 2,466,000 Class A Shares. Mr. Einhorn, as the principal of Greenlight and the Affiliates is the beneficial owner of 5,036,335 Class A Shares.
(b)Greenlight LLC is the beneficial owner of 4.8% of the outstanding Class A Shares. Greenlight Inc. is the beneficial owner of 5.3% of the outstanding Class A Shares. Mr. Einhorn is the beneficial owner of 10.9% of the outstanding Class A Shares. These percentages were determined by dividing the number of Class A Shares beneficially owned by each of the reporting persons by 46,160,564, the number of Class A Shares outstanding as of June 30, 2008, as reported in the Issuer’s Second Quarter Report 2008, filed as an exhibit to Form 6-K on August 8, 2008.
In the accompanying letter, Einhorn says:
Dear Sirs:
We are writing to express our concern about MI Developments’ (“MID”) investment in Magna Entertainment Corp. (“MEC”). Given the dire situation at MEC, the MID Board needs to take the necessary actions to enforce or preserve the value of MID’s $267 million senior debt investment in MEC and not compound the risk to MID by continuing to fund MEC or extending the maturity of existing debt.It is clear that MEC is in serious financial trouble. According to the MEC press release issued on August 5, 2008, “… the Company has needed and will again need to seek extensions from existing lenders and additional funds in the short-term from one or more possible sources.” MEC’s stock price has fallen over 90% since MID’s Board of Directors claimed in 2005 that it was adopting its own recommendation to direct management to maximize the return on MID’s current and future investments in MEC by examining the funding necessary for MEC’s strategic plan, stabilizing MEC’s capital structure, and assessing all reasonable financing alternatives for MEC. At that time MID’s Board determined that MEC was poised for growth and Frank Stronach expressed a vision that MEC would become the most profitable company in the world.
While we disagreed at the time with the Board’s assessment of MEC’s prospects, MID asserted that this was simply a question about short-term versus long-term value creation and that reasonable people could disagree.
Since Magna spun-off MEC over eight years ago, there has been a favorable environment for the U.S. consumer, and the gaming industry has experienced significant growth. MEC failed to create any value during that favorable part of the cycle. Instead, it has been a case-study in mismanagement and poor resource allocation. Its prospects were dim even before the cycle turned against the U.S. consumer and the gaming industry.
MEC’s situation and prospects are no longer matters on which reasonable people can disagree. The facts are obvious and beyond dispute: MEC has utterly failed as a business enterprise. More money, time and resources will not resuscitate it under Mr. Stronach’s leadership or anyone else he appoints to pursue his so-called vision. After many years of failure, MEC still has no viable business plan.
MEC’s plan to eliminate its debt by December 31, 2008 has also failed. On MEC’s conference call on August 6, 2008 (the “MEC Call”), Mr. Stronach stated “…we do not expect to achieve our previously announced targets of eliminating our debt by December 31, 2008.” In addition, MEC’s 10-Q for the quarter ended June 30, 2008 (the “MEC 10-Q”) states that “…we do not expect to execute the Plan on the originally contemplated schedule, if at all.” (emphasis added). Even MEC’s convertible subordinated bonds that mature shortly are now trading at only fifty cents on the dollar.
The MEC debt reduction plan has been such a dismal failure that according to the MID press release issued on August 8, 2008 (the “MID Release”), MEC’s net debt has actually increased by $21.6 million, from $564.5 million to $586.1 million, during the period from December 31, 2007 to June 30, 2008 when debt reduction was supposed to be MEC’s main priority.
MID’s equity investment in MEC is clearly no longer a strategic investment. Yet in the face of the rapidly deteriorating situation at MEC, the MID Board has continued to extend the maturity of the senior debt owed to it by MEC.
In light of MEC’s financial situation, we would have expected MID to see that MEC took aggressive steps to reduce its debt, or otherwise attempt to stabilize its financial situation. Instead, the MEC 10-Q threatens the abandonment of its plan to sell assets to reduce debt by stating “…given the announcement of the MID reorganization proposal, and pending determination of whether it will proceed, we are in the process of reconsidering whether to sell certain assets that were originally identified for disposition under the Plan.” Mr. Stronach made a similar statement during the MEC Call.
On the MEC Call, in an ominous and thinly veiled threat to the public MID shareholders, Mr. Stronach said “…I have some — call it some chips in my hand which the MID shareholders would like to have. And I have no problems releasing those chips or giving up those chips, providing it’s a fair thing for MEC.”
A reasonable interpretation of this statement in light of Mr. Stronach’s MID reorganization proposal is that Mr. Stronach intends to hold MID hostage until MEC is fully funded and Mr. Stronach has received a very large personal pay-off at the expense of the MID shareholders.To that end, among other things Mr. Stronach has overseen (1) MID’s failure to implement any of its own 2005 Board approved resolutions; (2) the inexplicable “destruction” of MID’s relationship with its largest customer (Magna) which Mr. Stronach also controls; (3) MID dramatically increasing its exposure to the deteriorating investment in MEC through project financings and bridge loans on which MEC has been unable to perform; and (4) MID and MEC’s repeated failures to implement any recognizable business plan.
MID shareholders have been threatened that if they don’t capitulate to Mr. Stronach’s demands, MID will continue to fail to take any action to create shareholder value and, in fact, will destroy additional value through unlimited support of MEC, including perhaps buying the company. Undoubtedly this is why a majority of them were intimidated enough to support a reorganization proposal that otherwise made no sense.
We at Greenlight will remain vigilant in our efforts to protect ourselves and our fellow minority shareholders from what we believe to be oppressive treatment. We have never before witnessed such overt aggression by a business leader against a company he controls.
Despite Mr. Stronach’s actions and intentions, each and every member of the MID Board of Directors has a fiduciary duty to all of the shareholders of MID, not just to Mr. Stronach, and the Board must explore all of MID’s alternatives with respect to MEC, not just the ones that Mr. Stronach wants. It may be that Mr. Stronach can vote his shares on matters subject to shareholder vote as he wishes. However, there are many protective actions MID’s Board can take that do not require a shareholder vote and would mitigate the harm that Mr. Stronach is trying to inflict on the company.
MID’s Board must stop expending any more funds to prop up the value of the MEC equity, should not bail-out MEC’s subordinated bondholders and should stop coercing (including by failing to take affirmative action to protect shareholders) the MID shareholders into approving Mr. Stronach’s terms. MID’s Board is duty bound to resist Mr. Stronach’s efforts to use MID’s money in this regard.
Given that MEC’s equity is no longer a strategic investment for MID, rather than blindly continuing to extend the maturity of the senior debt, MID should act like an independent third-party lender and explore all of its options with respect to MEC. There are several possible options MID’s Board can implement that would not require Mr. Stronach’s personal support, including foreclosing on the senior debt or marketing its MEC debt position for sale to a third party. MID’s Board of Directors has a fiduciary duty to protect the shareholders of MID, not to focus as Mr. Stronach says on what’s a “fair thing for MEC.”
By continuing to extend the senior debt, rather than exploring all of their options, the MID Board is endangering MID’s senior debt investment in MEC and is making repayment of the debt in full less likely with each passing day.
If MEC fails to repay its debt to MID in full, the members of the MID Board will be held accountable for failing to fulfill their fiduciary duty to the MID shareholders. We minority shareholders are looking to you to protect our interests from Mr. Stronach’s continued irresponsible, uneconomic and self-serving support of MEC.
Mr. Stronach said during the MEC Call, “I wouldn’t throw money in an empty hole.” Why has so much of MID’s money met exactly that fate?
This is what makes Einhorn so good, not only does he seem to have a better handle on the companies he invests in that those who run them do, he, unlike them in many cases has more concern for shareholders than they.
Disclosure (“none” means no position):none
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The SEC is ridiculous. When it comes to financials like Citi (C), Fannie (FNM), Freddie (FRE), Bear Sterns (BSC), Merrill Lynch (MER), Lehman (LEH) and Morgan Stanley (MS), the only people telling the truth are the shorts like Ackman, Einhorn, Loeb and Tilson. Why isn’t the management being investigated? Virtually every public statement they have made had in the end has been erroneous and the shorts, who have been right, are being called “rumor mongers”. If it is true, is it a rumor?
Is this like Bill Clinton and “it depends on what your definition of “is” is”?
Anyway, read what Loeb has to say about it in his Q2 letter dated 7/25.
During the second quarter of 2008, the market witnessed a significant increase in
regulatory activity by the SEC and other government entities. Over the past several
weeks, the SEC has served subpoenas on over 50 different hedge funds, seeking
information relating to short sales in Bear Stearns and Lehman Brothers, and the
dissemination of rumors about those companies in the market.This investigation comes at the same time that the SEC has implemented several other
measures designed to address short-selling. On July 15, 2008, the SEC instituted a 30-day emergency measure aiming to make the short-selling of certain financial institutions more difficult by requiring all sellers to borrow or enter into a bona fide agreement with the share lender to borrow the securities prior to the short sale.The SEC also recently announced that it is concerned about the deliberate spreading of false rumors by short-sellers – known as rumor mongering – which some have claimed led to the Bear Stearns implosion. To this end, the SEC announced that its regulators would immediately begin conducting examinations of broker-dealers and investment advisers to determine whether they have sufficient procedures in place to protect against the dissemination of false rumors.
As you may recall, the SEC conducted an audit of Third Point last year after we
registered as an investment advisor. During the course of the audit, the examination staff noted that we regularly communicate with portfolio managers at other hedge funds about investment and trading ideas. The SEC later informed us that it had commenced a formal investigation of Third Point primarily relating to these types of communications. Such conversations permit us to test our hypotheses and refine our thinking and, as a result, we believe that participating in give-and-take with other managers is in the best interest of our investors. Our outside counsel has examined this matter thoroughly and assured us that our position is consistent with the securities laws and that we have not violated any law in connection with these communications.Regulatory matters are certainly playing a significant role in the life of hedge funds as the obligations and demands of the current regulatory environment continue to increase. However, rest assured that we have a strong operational and legal team to assist me in these endeavors, and as a result, all of us on the investment team at Third Point remain completely focused on our investment activities and maximizing returns for our investors.
Is the fact that the company’s are able to place the “safe harbor” disclaimers after their filings that eliminate them from investigation? Does that magically make whatever they say, when it turns out to be spectacularly wrong a “mulligan”?
When it was required of company’s to place the “investment risks” and safe harbor in the filings, is it now the unintended consequence of those actions the fact that management is now able to paint as rosy picture as humanly possible on the business and those statements and the presumptions they give investors are only good for the day they are filed? Have we, in a effort to get “more disclosure” from them, in essence, indemnified management from any legal recourse for their public statements?
Yet, short sellers are not protected from making the same statements, only in an opposing thesis, even if that thesis is ultimately born out as accurate? Are we only protecting optimism, even if it is disingenuous, for lack of a better word while punishing honest pessimism?
Now, it is true that cases have not been brought by the SEC (yet) but, let’s be honest, one would be painfully naive to think that SEC investigations of 50 hedge funds would not have a chilling effect on those who might be inclined to short sell. If shorting Lehman is going to bring and SEC investigation and additional legal costs, is it worth it for the small fund? Probably not.
Is the SEC trying to shut down communications between hedge funds? What is a rumor and what is an opinion? Are they issuing subpoena’s to execs at Citi, Merrill and Lehman asking for all their internal communication and communications they have had with each other so we cab ascertain when they new they would need additional capital and if this contradicts public statements?
Personally, I do not have the stomach to be a short, not in my nature. If you can do it, go for it. The SEC ought to require shorts to disclose their positions, just like longs do. But, they ought not single them out for dissection because we do not like what they say.
Don’t kill the messenger because you do not like the news, go after the guys who created the bad news the messenger delivers…
Disclosure (“none” means no position):Long C, none
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Do you think Lehman Brothers (LEH) will ever admit David Einhorns know more about their business than they do? Me either…….
The WSJ is reporting that Lehman will announce:
“a loss of $1.8 billion or more, instead of the modest profit they previously expected. If the dour projections come true, Lehman’s losses since the start of March would total at least $4.5 billion — or more than the firm churned out in profit during fiscal 2007.”
Now this means Lehman will be forced to:
1- Sell valuable real estate business
2- Sell Neuberger Berman
3- Dumped CDO’s for pennies in a Merrill Lynch (MER) like firesale
4- Raise more equity through additional common share or debt issuance
5- Some combination or all of the above
Most of this began coming to a head in June when Lehman began attacking David Einhorn, who had shorted the stock and had appeared on CNBC stating his thesis for doing so.
Only a day or so later, Lehman began buying back shares to reassure investors of the confidence in the stock.
A week later, Einhorn gave this interview after essentially everything he said came to fruition. It is important to note he said in June more losses were to come.
Three days later, CFO Erin Callan was done
Why, why is anyone investigating or threatening to investigate Einhorn or Ackman when nothing, nothing that has come out of a bankers mouth in the last year has been born out to be remotely accurate.
Shouldn’t they be the ones in front of investigators????
Is there anyone left at Lehman other than CEO Dick Fuld left to take the fall…finally?
Disclosure (“none” means no position):none
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This is a great read from Grant’s Spring Investment Conference. Discuss is Lehman(LEH), Carlyle Capital, Allied Capital (ALD), Merrill Lynch (MER).
Disclosure (“none” means no position):None
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This is really good stuff. Einhorn is great to listen to..
I like how cerebral he is. He does not get to worked up about what folks say ans sees the situation for what it is. I think to be a visual short seller you have to be that way. It is easy to see how Ackman and he get along so well (or at least work together so well).
Part 1
Part 2
Part 3
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Einhorn, Partners, SEC, Buying
– Hey Monsanto (MON), isn’t SmartStax a partnership with Dow Chemical (DOW)? You’d never know it from their earnings call.
– Somebody is getting smart.
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Einhorn, Partners, SEC, Buying
– Hey Monsanto (MON), isn’t SmartStax a partnership with Dow Chemical (DOW)? You’d never know it from their earnings call.
– Somebody is getting smart.
Visit the ValuePlays Bookstore for Great Investing Books
Well, at least if they actually do it..
The SEC may force investors to disclose short positions and may take additional steps to rein in rapid-fire short sales, Chairman Christopher Cox said. The SEC is examining whether to require short sellers to reveal “substantial” stakes, just as investors must disclose significant positions in companies. The agency may also reinstate a version of the so-called uptick rule, which barred short sales of stocks when prices are falling, he said Thursday in testimony to the House Financial Services Committee.
The regulator is trying to strike a balance between installing a “circuit breaker, or something that keeps things from running away,” and providing trading liquidity, Cox told the House panel.
Now, I have stumped here many times that disclosure for some should mean disclosure for all. If you are long or short you ought to be required to disclose it.
When asked, Whitney Tilson said, “Many short-sellers will object to disclosure because there is such a stigma associated with short selling,”. I partially agree and at the same time disagree with Whitney. I agree short sellers will balk at the rule but I also think part of the “stigma” associated with short selling is because it is often done in the shadows, since no disclosure it necessary. Anything that is viewed being done in secret, is always going to be viewed sceptically.
Admittedly, Tilson, Ackman and Einhorn do not fall into this camp as they are upfront and honest with the investor community about their actions. Thus they tend to be viewed (at least by those other than their targets) as “short investors” rather than traders that “pile on” falling stocks. It does make a tremendous difference.
When the above mention three short something, it is because they view a fundamental flaw in the business, not because they think “banks stock will fall”. They are almost betting on the extinction of the company like Ackman and Tilson in MBIA (MBI) and Ambac (ABK) (although both have reduced short positions in those) and Einhorn in Lehman (LEH).
Far from a “we can make 20% here”, it is a “this thing ought to go to zero”.
The SEC is right to require disclosure, the more open everything is, the better. I think the more open it is, the less short sellers would be viewed as though they are “boogymen”.
Disclosure (“none” means no position):None
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This is the speech that lead to the book, “Fooling some of the People”
Part 1:
Part 2:
Part 3:
Here is the book:
Disclosure (“none” means no position):
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