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General Growth Files 10K: Comments on Liquidity

This is shaping up to be a classic game of chicken. Just read what General Growth Properties (GGP) has to say.

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Liquidity

Since the third quarter of 2008, liquidity has been our primary issue. As of December 31, 2008, we had approximately $169 million of cash on hand. As of February 26, 2009, we have $1.18 billion in past due debt and an additional $4.09 billion of debt that could be accelerated by our lenders.

The $900 million mortgage loans secured by our Fashion Show and The Shoppes at the Palazzo shopping centers (the “Fashion Show/Palazzo Loans”) matured on November 28, 2008. As we were unable to extend, repay or refinance these loans, on December 16, 2008, we entered into forbearance and waiver agreements with respect to these loan agreements, which expired on February 12, 2009. As of February 26, 2009, we are in default with respect to these loans, but the lenders have not commenced foreclosure proceedings with respect to these properties. Additional past due loans include the $225 million Short Term Secured Loan which matured on February 1, 2009 and the $57.3 million mortgage loan secured by Chico Mall. The $95 million mortgage loan secured by the Oakwood Center, with an original scheduled maturity date of February 9, 2009, was extended to March 16, 2009.

The maturity date of each of the 2006 Credit Facility ($2.58 billion) and the Secured Portfolio Facility ($1.51 billion) could be accelerated by our lenders. As a result of the maturity of the Fashion Show/Palazzo Loans, we entered into forbearance agreements in December 2008 relating to each of the 2006 Credit Facility and Secured Portfolio Facility.

Pursuant and subject to the terms of the forbearance agreement related to the 2006 Credit Facility, the lenders agreed to waive certain identified events of default under the 2006 Credit Facility and forbear from exercising certain of the lenders’ default related rights and remedies with respect to such identified defaults until January 30, 2009. These defaults included, among others, the failure to timely repay the Fashion Show/Palazzo Loans. Without acknowledging the existence or validity of the identified defaults, we agreed that, during the forbearance period, without the consent of the lenders required under the 2006 Credit Facility and subject to certain “ordinary course of business” exceptions, we would not enter into any transaction that would result in a change in control, incur any indebtedness, dispose of any assets or issue any capital stock for other than fair market value, make any redemption or restricted payment, purchase any subordinated debt, or amend the CSA. In addition, we agreed that investments in TRCLP and its subsidiaries would not be made by non-TRCLP subsidiaries and their other subsidiaries, subject to certain ordinary course of business exceptions. We also agreed that certain proceeds received in connection with financings or capital transactions would be retained by the Company subsidiary receiving such proceeds. Finally, the forbearance agreement modified the 2006 Credit Facility to eliminate the obligation of the lenders to provide additional revolving credit borrowings, letters of credit and the option to extend the term of the 2006 Credit Facility.

On January 30, 2009, we amended and restated the forbearance agreement relating to the 2006 Credit Facility. Pursuant and subject to the terms of the amended and restated forbearance agreement, the lenders agreed to extend the period during which they would forbear from exercising certain of their default related rights and remedies with respect to certain identified defaults from January 30, 2009 to March 15, 2009. Without acknowledging or confirming the existence or occurrence of the identified defaults, we agreed to extend the covenants and restrictions contained in the original forbearance agreement and also agreed to certain additional covenants during the extended forbearance period. Certain termination events were added to the forbearance agreement, including foreclosure on certain potential mechanics liens prior to March 15, 2009 and certain cross defaults in respect of six loan agreements relating to the mortgage loans secured by each of the Oakwood, the Fashion Show/Palazzo and Jordan Creek shopping centers as well as certain additional portfolios of properties.

Pursuant and subject to the terms of the forbearance agreement related to the Secured Portfolio Facility, the lenders agreed to waive certain identified events of default under the Secured Portfolio Facility and forbear from exercising certain of the lenders’ default related rights and remedies with respect to such identified defaults until January 30, 2009. These defaults included, among others, the failure to timely repay the Fashion Show/Palazzo Loans. On January 30, 2009, we amended and restated the forbearance agreement relating to the Secured Portfolio Facility.

Pursuant and subject to the terms of the amended and restated forbearance agreement, the lenders agreed to waive certain identified events of default under the Secured Portfolio Facility and agreed to extend the period during which they would forbear from exercising certain of their default related rights and remedies with respect to certain identified defaults from January 30, 2009 to March 15, 2009. We did not acknowledge the existence or validity of the identified defaults.

As a condition to the lenders agreeing to enter into the forbearance agreements described above, we agreed to pay the lenders certain fees and expenses, including an extension fee to the lenders equal to five (5) basis points of the outstanding loan balance under the 2006 Credit Facility and Secured Portfolio Facility in connection with the amendment and restatement of the forbearance agreements relating to such loan facilities.

The expiration of forbearance and waiver agreements related to the Fashion Show/Palazzo Loans permits the lenders under our 2006 Credit Facility and Secured Portfolio Facility to elect to terminate the forbearance and waiver agreements related to those loan facilities. However, as of February 26, 2009, we have not received notice of any such termination, which is required under the terms of these forbearance agreements.

In addition, we have approximately $1.60 billion of consolidated property-specific mortgage loans scheduled to mature in the remainder of 2009. Finally, we have significant accounts payable and liens on our assets, and the imposition of additional liens may occur.

A total of $595 million of unsecured bonds issued by TRCLP are scheduled to mature on March 15, and April 30, 2009. Failure to pay these bonds at maturity, or a default under certain of our other debt, would constitute a default under these and other unsecured bonds issued by TRCLP having an aggregate outstanding balance of $2.25 billion as of December 31, 2008.

We do not have, and will not have, sufficient liquidity to make the principal payments on maturing or accelerated loans or pay our past due payables. We will not have sufficient liquidity to repay any outstanding loans and other obligations unless we are able to refinance, restructure, amend or otherwise replace the Fashion Show/Palazzo Loans, 2006 Credit Facility, Secured Portfolio Facility, other mortgage loans maturing in 2009 and the unsecured bonds issued by TRCLP which are due in 2009.

Our liquidity is also dependent on cash flows from operations, which are affected by the severe weakening of the economy. The downturn in the domestic retail market has resulted in reduced tenant sales and increased tenant bankruptcies, which in turn affects our ability to generate rental revenue. In addition, the rapid and deep deterioration of the housing market, with new housing starts currently at a fifty year low, negatively affects our ability to generate income through the sale of residential land in our master planned communities.

We have undertaken a comprehensive examination of all of the financial and strategic alternatives to generate capital from a variety of sources, including, but not limited to, both core and non-core asset sales, the sale of joint venture interests, a corporate level capital infusion, and/or strategic business combinations. Given the continued weakness of the retail and credit markets, there can be no assurance that we can obtain further extensions or refinance our existing debt or obtain the additional capital necessary to satisfy our short term cash needs. In the event that we are unable to extend or refinance our debt or obtain additional capital on a timely basis, we will be required to take further steps to acquire the funds necessary to satisfy our short term cash needs, including seeking legal protection from our creditors. Our potential inability to address our past due and future debt maturities raise substantial doubts as to our ability to continue as a going concern. The accompanying consolidated financial statements have been prepared in conformity with accounting principles generally accepted in the United States of America applicable to a going concern, which contemplates the realization of assets and the satisfaction of liabilities in the normal course of business. Accordingly, our consolidated financial statements do not reflect any adjustments related to the recoverability of assets and satisfaction of liabilities that might be necessary should we be unable to continue as a going concern.

So, we know the reason they have not been forced into bankruptcy, the $595 million due March 15 and the $2.25 billion that was due 12/31/2008 is all non-recourse to GGP. For the remained of 2009, there is $1.6 billion due that is tied to property mortgages.

So, GGP is sitting there in this filing saying they are preparing a bankruptcy filing essentially “unless you refinance or convert” your debt.

Let’s not forget that Citigroup (C), a major lender of GGP also owns 5% of the equity (this is a recent position). We have a company looking at its lenders saying we’re going to file and lenders saying we do not want to refi the debt and deep down you do not want to go Chapter 11.

Why don’t the banks want to refi and see a Chapter 11? Look at housing. The last think banks want to have is impaired commercial loans on one of the nation’s largest REIT’s. Any impairments on these loans would the cause “mark to market” write-downs on their whole portfolio’s. Bad news…

So, what will happen. The best solution would be for debtors to convert to equity outside of Chapter 11. Shareholders get diluted big time but anyone buying shares today already expects that to happen. Even if this does end up in a Chapter 11, my opinion is that this is not a loss for shareholders.

Ultimately this is looking as though March 15 will be a showdown at the OK Coral. Gonna be fun to watch..

FULL 10K

Disclosure (“none” means no position):

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General Growth Properties Files 8-K: A Look Through $$

A closer look reveals things are far better than the market assumes and for those who enjoy irony, the “worse case scenario”, may actually be the best….

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General Growth (GGP) currently has ownership interest in, or management responsibility for, over 200 regional shopping malls in 44 states, as well as ownership in master planned community developments and commercial office buildings. The Company’s portfolio totals approximately 200 million square feet of retail space and includes over 24,000 retail stores nationwide.

Results from the Press Release:

Chicago, Illinois, February 23, 2009 — General Growth Properties, Inc. (NYSE: GGP) (the Company) announced today its results of operations for the fourth quarter of 2008. Core Funds From Operations (Core FFO) per fully diluted share for the fourth quarter of 2008 were $0.72, Funds From Operations (FFO) per fully diluted share were $0.70 and Earnings per share — diluted (EPS) were zero. For the full year 2008 Core FFO was $2.83, FFO was $2.72 and EPS was $0.10. Although FFO per fully diluted share for the fourth quarter of 2008 increased from the $0.64 of FFO per fully diluted share for the fourth quarter of 2007, both Core FFO and EPS declined in the fourth quarter of 2008, as compared to the fourth quarter of 2007. Both the quarterly and annual 2008 and 2007 comparable periods had significant items that affected FFO comparability, including provisions for impairment, tax restructuring benefit and strategic review costs. A supplemental schedule showing such items and their impact on 2008 and 2007 FFO is provided with this release.

FINANCIAL AND OPERATIONAL HIGHLIGHTS
• Core FFO is defined as Funds From Operations excluding the Real Estate Property Net Operating Income (NOI) from the Master Planned Communities segment and the (provision for) benefit from income taxes. Core FFO for the fourth quarter of 2008 was $231.0 million, or $0.72 per fully diluted share, as compared to $271.2 million, or $0.92 per fully diluted share, for the fourth quarter of 2007. While the aggregate of minimum rents and tenant recoveries remained essentially flat for the quarter, overall declines in the general economy, and the retail market specifically, impacted our retail properties causing revenue reductions in overage rents, and other income (for items including promotion, sponsorship, and parking income). Cost reductions in marketing, repairs and maintenance, supplies, contracted services, security, landscaping, and personnel costs, did not fully offset our revenue declines.

• FFO was $222.2 million in the fourth quarter of 2008 as compared to $190.4 million in the fourth quarter of 2007, an increase of approximately $31.8 million. FFO was significantly impacted by items as detailed in the attached supplemental schedule. Excluding such items, FFO declined in the fourth quarter of 2008 as compared to the fourth quarter of 2007 as a result of lower comparable NOI in the retail and other segment and higher interest expense.

• EPS were zero in the fourth quarter of 2008 compared to $0.24 in the fourth quarter of 2007, substantially all of which was due to the items listed in the attached supplemental schedule and the matters affecting Core FFO and FFO described above.

2009 Maturing debt and liquidity concerns

We are primarily focused on our near and intermediate term loan maturities. The refinancing market remains at a standstill. We are considering all strategic alternatives and are continuing our discussions with our lenders. In addition, we have suspended our cash dividend, halted or slowed nearly all of our development and redevelopment projects, systematically engaged in certain cost reduction or efficiency programs, reduced our workforce by over 20% and sold certain non-mall assets. We currently have approximately $1.179 billion of past due debt and approximately $4.09 billion of debt that could be accelerated. However, our lenders have not yet exercised any of their remedy rights with respect to such debt. In addition, we have $1.44 billion of consolidated mortgage debt and approximately $595 million of unsecured bonds scheduled to mature in the balance of 2009 that remains to be refinanced, repaid or extended. In the event that we are unable to extend or refinance our near and intermediate term loan maturities, we may be required to seek legal protection from our creditors.

Given the uncertainties concerning our ability to refinance maturing loans and the impact of potential strategic alternatives, we will not provide Core FFO guidance for 2009 at this time.

Here is the debt maturity schedule:

Debt Covenant Ratios:

SEGMENT RESULTS

Retail and Other Segment
• NOI declined 2.4% from the $718.9 million reported for the fourth quarter of 2007 to $701.8 million for the fourth quarter of 2008. This reduction in NOI is primarily due to decreased revenue primarily due to declines in overage rents and other income.

• Comparable NOI from consolidated properties decreased 4.1% in the fourth quarter of 2008 versus the fourth quarter of 2007.

• Comparable NOI from unconsolidated properties at the Company’s ownership share for the fourth quarter of 2008 declined by approximately 10.0% compared to the fourth quarter of 2007. Declines in termination income in 2008 (due to certain individually large terminations in 2007) and foreign currency translation rate differences between periods caused the comparable NOI decline for unconsolidated properties to be significantly larger than that of the comparable consolidated properties.

• Revenues from consolidated properties declined approximately 3.2% for the fourth quarter of 2008, or approximately $27.5 million, to $840.5 million as compared to $868.0 million for the same period in 2007 primarily due to declines in overage rent and other income.

• Revenues from unconsolidated properties at the Company’s ownership share declined slightly for the fourth quarter 2008 as compared to the fourth quarter of 2007, to $162.2 million from $163.2 million, as increased minimum rents from certain expansions and renovations opened since late 2007 and certain ownership increases in properties owned through our international joint ventures were more than offset by overage and other income declines across the segment.

• Comparable tenant sales, on a trailing twelve month basis, decreased 3.8% compared to the same period last year.

• Sales per square foot, on a trailing twelve month basis, decreased 4.2% compared to the same period last year.

• Retail Center occupancy decreased to 92.5% at December 31, 2008 from 93.8% at December 31, 2007.

Now much has been said about the property that GGP holds and how it has deteriorated in value. BUT, if we look at recent land sales from their planned communities, we see the opposite is happening:

Here are the top ten tenants in Retail Operations:

None of these large tenants are in danger of leaving avoid in a Chapter 11 proceeding. GGP derives 60% of rents from anchor stores and 40% from the remainder.

Breakdown by region:

So, no two ways around it. The debt is crushing them but operations are performing just fine, very well actually given the current climate. Also, the value of the real estate on the books is clearly below it actual value. The more one looks at it, one has to hope they file Chapter 11, clear the debt and start over.

The opportunity here is really impressive…

Disclosure (“none” means no position):Long GGP

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General Growth Properties: A Look at Real Estate Values $$

I am buying shares of General Growth Properties (GGP) today as I feel there is deep value in them.

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Where is the value? General Growth is a U.S. based, publicly traded Real Estate Investment Trust. The Company currently has an ownership interest in or management responsibility for a portfolio of more than 200 regional shopping malls in 44 states, as well as ownership in master planned community developments and commercial office buildings. The Company portfolio totals approximately 200 million square feet of retail space and includes over 24,000 retail stores nationwide. The Company is listed on the New York Stock Exchange under the symbol “GGP”. For more information, visit the Company Web site at www.ggp.com.

GGP carries it’s real state holding at cost and according to its 2007 annual report, the total is $28 billion. If we take the 200 million sq. feet of retail space they have, the cost basis is $140 a sq. foot.

Now, let’s look at the MIT Transaction based cost index for the 2008 year. This matters because it takes into account what sold for what, not an estimated value.

Retail Current Cost

Using the $195 a sq. foot price from MIT, we get a real estate value for GGP of $39 billion. GGP has a current market cap of $115 million meaning it sells for .3% of its real estate value, that is point 3% not 3%. With $27 billion of debt outstanding and due in 4 years, if we subtract that from the current property value there is still $12 billion or $36 a share of value left in the properties (based on 331 million shares outstanding as of last 8K). Now, of course the actual amount will vary depending on what properties are sold where but we have a good indication by using national numbers because GGP does have holdings nationally.

To further boost a valuation, we can look at the age of the properties. Starting on F-61 of the above linked annual report we see that only $3 billion of the $28 billion total has been acquired since 2007. These properties one could argue were purchased at inflated prices and perhaps worth only equal too or slightly below carrying cost. The majority of the properties are 2002 and earlier giving a large boost to the “carry coast being far less than market value” theory.

Perhaps this is why Bill Ackman has taken a stake in 25% of the company.

The Loans:

On Feb. 12th GGP said:

On February 13, 2009, General Growth Properties, Inc. (the “Company”) and certain of its subsidiaries, including Oakwood Shopping Center Limited Partnership (collectively with the Company, the “Company Parties”), Citicorp North America, Inc., as a lender and as administrative agent for the other lenders party thereto, and certain additional lenders (collectively, the “Lenders”), entered into a First Amendment to Loan Agreement (the “Amendment”) which amended the Loan Agreement dated as of January 30, 2006 by and among the Company Parties and the Lenders for the mortgage loan secured by the Company’s Oakwood Shopping Center located in Gretna Louisiana (the “Loan”). Pursuant and subject to the terms of the Amendment, the maturity date of the Loan was extended to March 16, 2009. The Loan’s original maturity date of February 9, 2009 had previously been extended pursuant to agreements between the Company Parties and the Lenders.

The Company is currently in default under certain of its loans. As previously announced, the Company has entered into forbearance agreements with certain of its lenders pursuant to which such lenders have agreed to forbear from exercising certain of their default related rights and remedies under such loans. However, the forbearance agreements related to mortgage loans secured by the Company’s Fashion Show and Palazzo shopping centers located in Las Vegas, Nevada expired on February 12, 2009. The expiration of these forbearance agreements permitted the lenders under the Company’s 2006 Credit Facility and 2008 secured portfolio facility to terminate the previously announced forbearance agreements related to these loan facilities. However, the Company has not received notice of any such termination, as required by the terms of such forbearance agreements. In addition, the Company has also been unable to enter into or extend forbearance or similar agreements for its other mature secured mortgage loans, and there can be no assurance that it will be able to do so. The Company continues to work with its lenders with respect to loans under which it is in default or may be in default in the near future.

What does it all mean. Simply, even if GGP were forced into bankruptcy, the actual value of it exceeds the debt meaning there is still large value for shareholders. At $.43 cents a share, the upside is stunning and the downside is limited to your investment, $.43 cents.

What will the lenders do? Think about it. Do the lenders really want to start writing down commercial real estate loans for one of the largest property owners in the US by forcing it into bankruptcy? No. Why? In our “mark to market” world we now live in, this would mean that debt on other strapped REIT’s would then have to be “marked down” also causing more billion dollar losses for banks. Not good.

This is the reason for the various debt extensions for GGP.

Earnings come out today after being delayed for two weeks. One has to expect some news to accompany them. I am buying shares ahead of it

Disclosure (“none” means no position):Long GGP

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Pershing Square Files 13F….Back to the Beginning $$

No more AIG (AIG), Lowes (LOW) or Mastercard (MA). Ackman did not take Wells Fargo (WFC) shares in the Wachobia (WB) buyout, he added REIT’s General Growth Properties (GGP) and Alexanders (ALX) 

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So, what is the “back to the beginning” stuff? Remember a young college student Bill Ackman? He paid half his tuition as a student by snapping up shares in Alexander’s Inc. at $8.50, days before the retailer went bankrupt. As he suspected, the real estate proved so valuable the shares now trade at nearly $57 (in 1993 when it was reported). Alexanders now trades at $157,down from $425 in September.

For those wondering, the General Growth Properties investment is an identical bet by Ackman (read more about it here).

November 2008 Filing:

Feb. 2009 Filing

Disclosure (“none” means no position):

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Barron’s on Ackman and Gates Recent Purchases

Barron’s talks about Ackman’s purchases of General Growth (GGP) and Gates’s of Otter Tail (OTTR)


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Disclosure (“none” means no position):Long GGP, none

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Ackman Files 13D/A in General Growth Properties $$

Ackman now has an interest in nearly 25% of General Growth Properties (GGP) shares

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On 12/8 Ackman disclosed a 18% economic interest.

In today’s filing he has boosted that to 24%

“This Amendment No. 2 (this “Amendment No. 2”) amends and supplements the statement on Schedule 13D, as previously amended to date (the “Schedule 13D”) by (i) Pershing Square Capital Management, L.P., a Delaware limited partnership (“Pershing Square”), (ii) PS Management GP, LLC, a Delaware limited liability company (“PS Management”), (iii) Pershing Square GP, LLC, a Delaware limited liability company (“Pershing Square GP”), and (iv) William A. Ackman, a citizen of the United States of America (collectively, the “Reporting Persons”), relating to the common stock, par value $.01 per share (the “Common Shares”), of General Growth Properties, Inc., a Delaware corporation (the “Issuer”). Capitalized terms used herein but not defined herein shall have the meaning set forth in the Original 13D.

As of January 9, 2009, the Reporting Persons beneficially owned an aggregate of 22,901,194 Common Shares (the “Subject Shares”), representing approximately 7.4% of the outstanding Common Shares. The Reporting Persons also have additional economic exposure to approximately 52,000,000 Common Shares under certain cash-settled total return swaps (“Swaps”), bringing their total aggregate economic exposure to 74,901,194 Common Shares (approximately 24.1% of the outstanding Common Shares). Although this Schedule 13D filing reflects additional purchases of Common Shares and Swaps, the Reporting Persons total beneficial ownership percentage and aggregate economic exposure has decreased due to the dilutive effects arising from the conversion of 42,350,000 common partnership units held in the Issuer’s operating partnership into 42,350,000 Common Shares, as announced by the Issuer on January 5, 2009.”

Here is the trading data:


Disclosure (“none” means no position):None
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Pershing Betting General Growth (GGP) Goes Under $$

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Reuters Reports:

Hedge fund Pershing Square Capital Management, one of General Growth Properties Inc’s GGP.N biggest shareholders, is betting the No. 2 U.S. mall owner will file for bankruptcy — and equity investors will end up big winners, a person familiar with the firm’s thinking said.

Pershing Square declined to comment. General Growth, whose top properties include Fashion Show in Las Vegas and Faneuil Hall in Boston, declined to comment.

Bankruptcy usually leaves stock investors with plenty of nothing, but General Growth is an unusual case. It has almost $30 billion of assets on its books, and just about $27 billion of debt.

But most of the company’s real estate assets are recorded on its books at their historical value, and many were bought years ago, meaning their value now is likely substantially higher. The company’s problems are not with its assets, but with refinancing maturing debt in frozen markets.

Historically, companies whose assets are worth much more than their liabilities have gone through bankruptcy in a way that leaves shareholders intact, which is what Pershing Square is banking on, the person familiar with the firm’s thinking said.

It continues

General Growth is not the first company to \find itself in this bind. Amerco Inc (UHAL.O), parent of moving truck rental company U-Haul International Inc, filed for bankruptcy in 2003 after a dispute with its former auditor and multiple accounting restatements left it unable to refinance debt.

The company listed $1.04 billion of assets and $884 million of liabilities in its bankruptcy filing, and had considerably more assets off its balance sheet as well. Its shares tripled during bankruptcy, and rose more than fourfold after it emerged from bankruptcy in 2004.

Pershing Square sees parallels between Amerco and General Growth. The founding families of both companies own substantial blocks of stock, giving them a real incentive to refrain from diluting shareholders’ stakes during bankruptcy.

And General Growth is still generating more than enough cash flow to service its debt and meet other day-to-day obligations, just as Amerco was. Pershing Square views General Growth as having trouble refinancing its debt due to broader difficulties in the commercial mortgage market in the weeks after Lehman’s Chapter 11 filing.

It all makes much more sense now. It is also the most likely reason Citi (C) balked at restructuring GGP dent even though they own 5.3 of the shares. They, like Pershing probably perceive more value during and post bankruptcy that without..


Disclosure (“none” means no position):None
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Does Ackman & General Growth Properties Have Anything to Do With Target? $$

What is the plan here? We know General Growth (GGP) is in a tight spot. But, with Citi (C) taking a 5% stake, the debt is all but assured to be refinanced. Some thoughts at the end, does it have to do with Target?

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Hedge fund manager William Ackman’s Pershing Square Capital Management LP disclosed that it owns a 7.5 percent stake in General Growth Properties. Pershing Square directly owns a total of 20 million shares in the REIT.

The company also said it owned 48.5 million shares through total return swaps, bringing its economic interest in the company to 68.6 million shares (over 18%).

SEC Filing

“The Subject Shares are beneficially owned by the Reporting Persons. Furthermore, the Reporting Persons entered into Swaps for the benefit of Pershing Square, L.P. (the “PSLP Swaps”), Pershing Square II, L.P. (the “PSII Swaps”) and Pershing Square International, Ltd (the “PSIL Swaps”, collectively with the PSLP Swaps and PSII Swaps, the “Pershing Square Swaps”) on the dates described on Exhibit 99.1. The Pershing Square Swaps constitute economic exposure to approximately 18.1% notional outstanding Common Shares in the aggregate, have reference prices ranging from $0.49 to $1.58 and expire on the dates described on Exhibit 99.1.

Under the terms of the Pershing Square Swaps (i) the applicable Pershing Square Fund will be obligated to pay to the counterparty any negative price performance of the notional number of Common Shares subject to the applicable Pershing Square Swap as of the expiration date of such Swap, plus interest at the rates set forth in the applicable contracts, and (ii) the counterparty will be obligated to pay to the applicable Pershing Square Fund any positive price performance of the notional number of Common Shares subject to the applicable Pershing Square Swap as of the expiration date of the Swaps. With regard to the Pershing Square Swaps, any dividends received by the counterparty on such notional Common Shares will be paid to the applicable Pershing Square Fund during the term of the Swap. All balances will be cash settled at the expiration date of the Swaps. The Pershing Square Funds’ third party counterparties for the Pershing Square Swaps include entities related to BNP Paribas, Citibank, Morgan Stanley and UBS. “

Here is the trading data:

Now, if we really want to go further with this we could look at Target (TGT). The buying here coincided with Target’s lukewarm response to Ackman’s Target REIT plan. It picked up heavily after his second proposal to the company.

After Target dismissed it, Ackman added over 25 million share directly and another 30 million through the swaps. I rarely find too much pure coincidence in timing like this.

What then? Perhaps he could offer up GGP to Target (TIP REIT) to expand it presence? Perhaps off to have GGP run TIP REIT to take the burden of running it off Target execs hands? After all, it was one of the objections Target put forward, albeit a very weak one.

Perhaps placing them into a JV to share the running and vastly expand the footprint of them…it would also give Target access to cheap land to expand.

Who knows…….something is up though…


Disclosure (“none” means no position):None
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Ackman Takes 12% Position in General Growth Properties

Now, is it just a coincidence with the Target (TGT) situation? Ackman now has a 12.5% total interest in General Growth Properties (GGP).

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From the SEC Filing:
Item 5. Interest in Securities of the Issuer
(a), (b) Based upon the Issuer’s quarterly report on 9/30/08 10-Q, 268,314,510 Common Shares were outstanding as of November 10, 2008. Based on the foregoing, the Subject Shares represented approximately 7.5% of the Common Shares issued and outstanding as of such date.
Pershing Square, as the investment adviser to the Pershing Square Funds, may be deemed to have the shared power to vote or direct the vote of (and the shared power to dispose or direct the disposition of) the Subject Shares. As the general partner of Pershing Square, PS Management may be deemed to have the shared power to vote or to direct the vote of (and the shared power to dispose of or direct the disposition of) the Subject Shares. As the general partner of Pershing Square, L.P. and Pershing Square II, L.P., Pershing Square GP may be deemed to have the shared power to vote or to direct the vote of (and the shared power to dispose or direct the disposition of) the Common Shares held for the benefit of Pershing Square, L.P. and Pershing Square II, L.P. By virtue of William A. Ackman’s position as managing member of each of PS Management and Pershing Square GP, William A. Ackman may be deemed to have the shared power to vote or direct the vote of (and the shared power to dispose or direct the disposition of) the Subject Shares and, therefore, William A. Ackman may be deemed to be the beneficial owner of the Subject Shares for purposes of this Schedule 13D.
(c) Exhibit 99.2, which is incorporated by reference into this Item 5(c) as if restated in full herein, describes all of the transactions in Common Shares and Swaps that were effected during the past sixty days by the Reporting Persons for the benefit of the Pershing Square Funds.
(d) No other person is known to the Reporting Persons to have the right to receive or the power to direct the receipt of dividends from, or the proceeds from the sale of, the Common Shares covered by this Schedule 13D, except that dividends from, and proceeds from the sale of, the Common Shares held by the accounts managed by Pershing Square may be delivered to such accounts.
(e) Not applicable.
Item 6. Contracts, Arrangements, Understandings or Relationships with Respect to Securities of the Issuer
The Subject Shares are beneficially owned by the Reporting Persons. Furthermore, the Reporting Persons entered into Swaps for the benefit of Pershing Square, L.P. (the “PSLP Swaps”), Pershing Square II, L.P. (the “PSII Swaps”) and Pershing Square International, Ltd (the “PSIL Swaps”, collectively with the PSLP Swaps and PSII Swaps, the “Pershing Square Swaps”) on the dates described on Exhibit 99.2. The Pershing Square Swaps constitute economic exposure to approximately 12.5% notional outstanding Common Shares in the aggregate, have reference prices ranging from $0.49 to $0.70 and expire on the dates described on Exhibit 99.1.
Under the terms of the Pershing Square Swaps (i) the applicable Pershing Square Fund will be obligated to pay to the counterparty any negative price performance of the notional number of Common Shares subject to the applicable Pershing Square Swap as of the expiration date of such Swap, plus interest at the rates set forth in the applicable contracts, and (ii) the counterparty will be obligated to pay to the applicable Pershing Square Fund any positive price performance of the notional number of Common Shares subject to the applicable Pershing Square Swap as of the expiration date of the Swaps. With regard to certain of the Pershing Square Swaps, any dividends received by the counterparty on such notional Common Shares will be paid to the applicable Pershing Square Fund during the term of the Swap. With regard to the balance of the Pershing Square Swaps, any dividends received by the counterparty on such notional Common Shares during the term of the Swaps will be paid to the applicable Pershing Square Fund at maturity. All balances will be cash settled at the expiration date of the Swaps. The Pershing Square Funds’ third party counterparties for the Pershing Square Swaps include entities related to Citibank, Morgan Stanley and UBS.
The Pershing Square Swaps do not give the Reporting Persons direct or indirect voting, investment or dispositive control over any securities of the Issuer and do not require the counterparty thereto to acquire, hold, vote or dispose of any securities of the Issuer. Accordingly, the Reporting Persons disclaim any beneficial ownership of any Common Shares that may be referenced in such contracts or Common Shares or other securities or financial instruments that may be held from time to time by any counterparty to the contracts.
In addition to the agreements referenced above, the Reporting Persons from time to time, may enter into and dispose of additional cash-settled total return swaps or other similar derivative transactions with one or more counterparties that are based upon the value of Common Shares, which transactions could be significant in amount. The profit, loss and/or return on such additional contracts may be wholly or partially dependent on the market value of the Common Shares, relative value of the Common Shares in comparison to one or more other financial instruments, indexes or securities, a basket or group of securities in which the Common Shares may be included or a combination of any of the foregoing.


Full Filing

Now, General Growth Properties recently expressed doubts it could keep operating due to looming near-term debt.

The Chicago-based retail property company has $1.13 billion in debt coming due, including $900 million in secured mortgage debt due November 28 on two of its Las Vegas shopping centers and $58 million of corporate debt on December 1, the company said in a Securities and Exchange Commission filing.

It also faces another $3.07 billion due next year, according to the SEC filing.

“In the event that we are unable to extend or refinance our debt or obtain additional capital on a timely basis and on acceptable terms, we will be required to take further steps to acquire the funds necessary to satisfy our short term cash needs, including seeking legal protection from our creditors,” the real estate investment trust said in the filing.

“Our potential inability to address our 2008 or 2009 debt maturities in a satisfactory fashion raises substantial doubts as to our ability to continue as a going concern.”

Will Ackman provide some financing?

This is going to be good…..

If nothing else..the words Ford (F) or GM (GM) will not enter the vocabulary..


Disclosure (“none” means no position):None
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Autonation Inc (AN)= $ 9,778,491
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