Strong Q. Increasing dividend, $1.5B in share repurchases, 18% eps growth (ex currency) and full year forecast raised.
Tag: PM
There was a nice little piece this weekend in the WSJ about on of our favorite stocks/companies here at ValuePlays, Phillip Morris International (PM)
From the WSJ:
With most of the world in recession, expensive habits are fading fast. But international tobacco companies are still making smokers pay up for a hit.
While many consumer-products companies have capped prices, the likes of Philip Morris International and London-listed British American Tobacco are raising them. With cigarette sales likely in permanent decline in some markets, producers have focused on price.
Heard on the Street columnist John Jannarone explains to Simon Constable how premium cigarette manufacturer Philip Morris is actually getting a boost from foreign governments. Plus how industry consolidation is giving profits an extra lift.
That has helped some tobacco companies smoke market expectations. PMI’s shares have risen 8% since Thursday morning, when it said higher prices had boosted second-quarter profits. In the European Union prices rose about 5%, the fastest pace in over a year, according to Thilo Wrede of Credit Suisse.And tax laws can actually work in favor of premium tobacco companies. Many countries tax cigarettes by the pack rather than as a proportion of the retail price.
That has caused low-end cigarette prices to rise more quickly than premium cigarettes. In France, for instance, premium cigarettes only cost 15% more than the cheapest option, according to Morgan Stanley’s David Adelman.
PM reported last week and raised full year guidance. Shares are up over 40% from the March lows and 8% last week as a result of earnings. They currently have a dividend yield of 4.5%.
Disclosure (“none” means no position):Long PM
Wall St. Media 7/23
Talking about Phillip Morris International (PM) and natural gas (UNG)
Disclosure (“none” means no position):Long PM, UNG
Wall St. Media 7/23
Talking about Phillip Morris International (PM) and natural gas (UNG)
Disclosure (“none” means no position):Long PM, UNG
This is a great quarter…..just great…
- Reported diluted earnings per share of $0.79 versus $0.80 in 2008, including the items detailed on Schedules 4 and 13
- Excluding currency, reported diluted earnings per share up 22.5%
- Adjusted diluted earnings per share of $0.83 versus $0.87 in 2008, including the items detailed on Schedule 12
- Excluding currency, adjusted diluted earnings per share up 17.2%
- Increases its forecast for 2009 full-year reported diluted earnings per share to a range of $3.10 to $3.20, from $2.85 to $3.00, which includes the Colombian Investment and Cooperation Agreement charge of $0.04 per share. Excluding currency, diluted earnings per share are projected to increase by approximately 10%-13%
- Declared a regular quarterly dividend of $0.54 during the quarter
- Spent a total of $1.4 billion to repurchase 34.7 million shares of its common stock in the quarter
- Announced agreements to purchase the South African affiliate of Swedish Match for ZAR 1.75 billion (approximately $222 million) and the Colombian cigarette manufacturer, Productora Tabacalera de Colombia, Protabaco Ltda. for $452 million
NEW YORK, July 23, 2009 – Philip Morris International Inc. (NYSE / Euronext Paris: PM) today announced diluted earnings per share of $0.79 in the second quarter of 2009, down 1.3% from $0.80 in the second quarter of 2008, including the items detailed on the attached Schedules 4 and 13. Excluding currency, reported diluted earnings per share were up 22.5%. Adjusted diluted earnings per share were $0.83, down 4.6% from 2008 adjusted earnings per share of $0.87, including the items detailed on the attached Schedule 12.
Dividends and Share Repurchase Program
Acquisitions and Agreements
On July 2, 2009, PMI announced it had entered into an agreement to acquire Swedish Match South Africa (Proprietary) Limited (SMSA) for ZAR 1.75 billion (approximately $222 million). The transaction is subject to South African regulatory approval and is expected to be completed by the end of the year. It is anticipated that the acquisition will be immediately marginally accretive to PMI’s earnings per share.
As we have said here before I am using PM as a dollar devaluation play also for reasons stated here. This is a pretty simple investment. We all know the economics of tobacco are unbelievable. We also know that PM has a first class management team. So the only thing really getting in the way of continued long term gains are governments trying to get a piece of the pie. Other than that, it should be pretty clear sailing…
Disclosure (“none” means no position):Lomg PM
A global giant, Phillip Morris International (PM) grows larger…
New York, July 10, 2009 – Philip Morris International Inc. [NYSE/Euronext Paris: PM] (PMI) announced today that it has entered into an agreement to purchase 100% of the shares of privately owned Colombian cigarette manufacturer, Productora Tabacalera de Colombia, Protabaco Ltda. (Protabaco), for $452 million.
Protabaco is the second largest tobacco company in Colombia, with an estimated 2008 volume of 6.1 billion cigarettes and an approximate market share of 31.8%. The Company reported net revenues of approximately $107.6 million in 2008. Its leading brands include Mustang, Premier and President.
“We are extremely pleased to reach this agreement with Protabaco in order to continue to build our business in this important and strategic market,” said Miroslaw Zielinski, President of PMI’s Latin America and Canada Region. “This strategically compelling transaction will provide PMI with an excellent opportunity to further develop Protabaco’s strong brand portfolio and reflects the continuing confidence we have in the future of Colombia, its economy and the tobacco industry.”
In 2005, PMI acquired Compañía Colombiana de Tabaco S.A. (Coltabaco). Since then, PMI has continued to invest in Coltabaco, its employees and its infrastructure, as well as in social and economic programs in Colombia, including investments in the tobacco growing sector.
“This is an excellent development for Protabaco and our employees,” said Jaime Delgado, General Manager Protabaco. “PMI is well known as a successful manufacturer and marketer of quality tobacco products and we believe they are in an excellent position to continue to develop our strong brands and strong organization.”
The transaction, which is subject to competition authority approval and final confirmatory due diligence, is projected to be immediately marginally accretive to PMI’s earnings per share and is expected to close within the next six months.
This is one of the very few investments I am comfortable buying and holding for a VERY LONG time….many years.
Aside from the stunning fundamentals of the tobacco business, there is the currency play here.
The potential for growth in this business is vast, the business has a great fundamentals (they make a legal product for pennies they sell to addicts for dollars) and most importantly, they have a dominant market position in almost every market they play in. Oh, did I mention the almost 5% dividend yield?
What are the risks to it? A massive global effort to ban cigarettes. Is it likely? No. Why? Tax revenue… If the US can’t ban them because they are enslaved to their tax revenues (and Master Settlement payments) then they wont be banned anywhere else. When you add in the scenario in which many cigarette companies are in fact quasi-state run institutions and Phillip Morris has actually partnered with them, the “banning” question becomes even more remote…
So you have a business that is global, without the US litigation risks, a 5% dividend yield, vast/growing markets and a product people who use it will not do without…
It is a great business…
Disclosure (“none” means no position):Long PM
Buy and Hold Dead? Um…No
Been hearing this a ton lately. Problem with the statement is it taking a blanket approach and doing that in anything, is wrong. Those who typically espouse it say that the S&P 500 has done a round trip over the past decade so those who “bought it” have made no money. But, do most of us “buy the S&P”? No one I know does.
I’m going to take a look at the longest holding I ever had…Altria (sold last December).
I bought it in late 1999 in the midst of the “Master Settlement” and Chapter 11 fears for them. The buying thesis was simple:
1- Addicts will buy their products
2- They can’t go Chapter 11 because those suing them (States) need the money they provide
3- Because of that, their long term health was assured.
The purchase price for Alria was $21.65 a share and when I sold it was $16.75. In addition to that I received $21 a share in the Kraft (KFT) spin-off (sold immediately), $48 a share in Phillip Morris International (PM) shares (still held and today worth $42).
Oh, and over the 9 years I held it I received $23.25 a share in dividends.
Here is a 10-yr. chart of Altria.
Now the temptation would have been to dump it in 2003 as it fell and then even again in 2004 as it dipped. But why? Just because the price fell?
Questions to have asked yourself then:
- Were the fundamentals of the tobacco business impaired?
- Did the legal environment deteriorate?
- Did management do something that changed the earnings profile of the company in a negative way?
The answer to all of those questions was no and in reality the legal environment improved steadily in those years to the point then CEO Camilleri said prior to the PM spin, “the current legal environment is the best we have seen it in years”.
So in 9 years here is the tally:
That is a 18% annual return over those 9 years for doing…….nothing…
A very similar scenario has unfolded with McDonalds (MCD) since I first bought during the “Mad Cow” scare. While not as extreme, and I did make the HUGE mistake of selling Chipolte (CMG) shares when I received them in the spin, it has been a fantastic investment.
Has the market done a round trip the past decade? Yes. Are there plenty of companies whom over that time have gone up/down and then back to start? Yes. BUT, if you buy it low enough and pay attention to its business environment/prospects to determine your selling time, you can avoid many of the losses.
Altria’s business environment never deteriorated over the 9 years and in fact dramatically improved over where it was at purchase. I sold it in December because I felt that changed and PM International has a superior one. The same can be said of McDonalds, it environment is still improving with its very successful move into coffee and consumer trade to value.
Have it missed any? Sure. Dow Chemical (DOW) comes to mind. I got caught up in the Rohm & Hass/Kuwait deals and their potential benefits while the surrounding business climate deteriorated. The stock fell to a low of $6 from $50’s in 2005 (my original cost was $26 in 2002). While I lost a bunch of unrealized profits, between $8 and $9 in March of this year I was able to lower my cost basis to $14 with several purchases. Again, when we add in $9.32 in dividends received since 2002, we are still up nicely, although not nearly as much as before..not nearly.
Am I selling Dow now? No. The Rohm deal is done and the business environment, while I missed the downside, looks to improve going forward. This will still turn out just fine eventually IMO, it will just take some time. We’ll see…
Beware of “X investing theory is dead” proclamations. There are plenty of value folks who do great, plenty of day traders who do great and plenty of swing/momentum ones that do. There are also plenty of all three that do awful.
Find good ones in the style that fits you and get to know them. Blogs & twitter allow unprescedented communications between investors, take advantage of it.
Disclosure (“none” means no position):Long PM, MCD, DOW, none
Received Phillip Morris International (PM) shares from Altria in last years spinoff. Due to the deteriorating US legal environment for tobacco recently, I sold my long time holding Altria (MO) in December and now only still hold PM shares.
I consider PM the company of the two with better longer term prospects and business environment.
One overlooked investment thesis for PM is that it is a hedge against the general devaluation of the US dollar. PM sells tobacco in other nations in their local currencies, it then convert those currencies to US dollars for reporting purposes. As the dollar falls in value, those conversions yield more dollars for shareholders.
For those who do not want to go through the whole presentation, slide 67 is the applicable slide. The comments were:
In August last year, we raised our dividend by 17.4% to an annualized rate of $2.16 per share and we have confirmed our willingness to exceed our target 65% dividend payout ratio in 2009. At the current stock price, our dividend provides an attractive yield of approximately 5.2%.
We have completed over half the $13 billion two year share repurchase program that we initiated in May 2008 and are one of the few major companies in the world to have maintained their share repurchase program throughout the current financial crisis.
All in all we expect to return some $9 billion in cash to our shareholders during 2009.
So we have a 5% dividend yield and a company growing earnings 10-12% annually. Based on that earnings growth, we should see a dividend next year or $2.43 a share for a current yield of 5.7%. PM did say they may consider exceeding that (65% of earnings) this year which would boost it higher.
Disclosure (“none” means no position):Long PM
Tobacco and The FDA: A Partnership
Here is a flashback to a post I wrote in April 2008.
Let’s take a look at the FDA Tobacco Bill and see what effect it may have on the industry.
The bill would effect tobacco products manufactured and sold primarily by R.J. Reynolds Tobacco (RAI), Loews Corp.’s Lorillard Tobacco (LTR), Vector Group Ltd.’s Liggett Group (VGR), British American Tobacco (BAT) and Altria (MO) in the US.
The bill will enable the FDA to prevent the introduction of new cigarette brands.
“`(1) NEW TOBACCO PRODUCT DEFINED- For purposes of this section the term `new tobacco product’ means–
`(A) any tobacco product (including those products in test markets) that was not commercially marketed in the United States as of June 1, 2003; or
`(B) any modification (including a change in design, any component, any part, or any constituent, including a smoke constituent, or in the content, delivery or form of nicotine, or any other additive or ingredient) of a tobacco product where the modified product was commercially marketed in the United States after June 1, 2003.
`(2) PREMARKET APPROVAL REQUIRED-
`(A) NEW PRODUCTS- Approval under this section of an application for premarket approval for any new tobacco product is required.”
Now, what could cause a new product to be denied?
“(2) DENIAL OF APPROVAL- The Secretary shall deny approval of an application for a tobacco product if, upon the basis of the information submitted to the Secretary as part of the application and any other information before the Secretary with respect to such tobacco product, the Secretary finds that–
`(A) there is a lack of a showing that permitting such tobacco product to be marketed would be appropriate for the protection of the public health;”
In other words, do not expect a new cigarette to be introduced in the US. What is here now is what will be here 20 years from now. If you are Altria (MO), and have over 50% market share, this is very good news indeed. It also means that recently introduced low cost products may come under review and alterations to the product may become necessary that will substantially raise the cost of it. A shrinking cost basis for consumers between brands, will most likely cause many to “trade up” to the premium brand.
Currently, any litigation risk in cigarettes surrounds alleged fraud. Fraud in marketing and fraud in labeling. What will the FDA bill do? It completely removes the risk of litigation for fraud and allows the tobacco companies to tell consumers that they are complying with government product safety standards. By doing this they assure a safer product produced under the guidance of the FDA. Let’s look.
Since most of the current litigation is of the “Light” cigarettes, lets go to that section.
SEC. 911. MODIFIED RISK TOBACCO PRODUCTS.
`(a) In General- No person may introduce or deliver for introduction into interstate commerce any modified risk tobacco product unless approval of an application filed pursuant to subsection (d) is effective with respect to such product.
`(b) Definitions- In this section:
`(1) MODIFIED RISK TOBACCO PRODUCT- The term `modified risk tobacco product’ means any tobacco product that is sold or distributed for use to reduce harm or the risk of tobacco-related disease associated with commercially marketed tobacco products.
This means FDA approval of all claims on “light” and “low tar” cigarettes. This clause means that FDA approval of these cigarettes does give their stamp of approval that “light” is “safer”.
What are the conditions for approval?
Approval-
`(1) MODIFIED RISK PRODUCTS- Except as provided in paragraph (2), the Secretary shall approve an application for a modified risk tobacco product filed under this section only if the Secretary determines that the applicant has demonstrated that such product, as it is actually used by consumers, will–
`(A) significantly reduce harm and the risk of tobacco-related disease to individual tobacco users; and
`(B) benefit the health of the population as a whole taking into account both users of tobacco products and persons who do not currently use tobacco products.
They do not have to be “safe”, just “safer” than the current choice to legally be called “light”.
The bill also requires the FDA to inspect tobacco sellers for counterfeit cigarettes and report instances to the applicable Attorney General “immediately”. This has been a very large issue for domestic manufacturers as foreign “knockoffs” have entered the country and cost Altria millions of dollars in annual revenue. The bill effectively makes the FDA the “sheriff” and forces them to protect the market.
Could the FDA ban tobacco? The bill says no.
“`(3) POWER RESERVED TO CONGRESS- Because of the importance of a decision of the Secretary to issue a regulation establishing a tobacco product standard–
`(A) banning all cigarettes, all smokeless tobacco products, all little cigars, all cigars other than little cigars, all pipe tobacco, or all roll your own tobacco products; or
`(B) requiring the reduction of nicotine yields of a tobacco product to zero,
Congress expressly reserves to itself such power.”
Will Congress ban tobacco? Never…..How will the States ever replace the billions of dollars in tax revenue they receive from taxing them?
What the bill does is stop the FDA from banning tobacco and forces them to endorse it…..
The final bill passed yesterday (it is not materially different that the previous bill above)and cheers were heard from many in the Tobacco industry. That ought to have been clue #1, that this was not as advertised by those in government.
It essentially creates a government sponsored Tobacco Cartel in the US that cannot be broken into by outside players. Personally, I do not care either way. I am no longer an Altria shareholder, preferring to holds my Phillip Morris International (PM) share received in the spin off from Altria.
The government can’t kill Tobacco as they rely on it too much for tax revenues. As a matter of fact, states who are receiving master settlement money have already mortgaged the future there selling bonds based on that revenue. The final bill mandate the FDA cannot remove nicotine from cigarettes so they will still be just a addicting. The bill “reduces advertising” it claims. So what? They hardly advertise now? But, hey, at least the warning labels will get bigger because we know people pay attention to those…yeah..
This bill will only serve to strengthen Big Tobacco in the US and considerable expense to US tax payers and is yet another example of why government needs to stay out of business.
Disclosure (“none” means no position):Long PM, none
6/1 Appearance on Wall St. Media
Talking about oil (USO), natural gas (UNG), General Growth Properties (GGWPQ) and Phillip Morris International (PM).
See more video at Wall St. Media
Disclosure (“none” means no position):
International Currencies and Tobacco $$
This is a piggyback to a post two weeks ago about Phillip Morris International (PM) and their guidance for 2009.
In the post I was looking at the possible effect of the US Dollar on their results. Yesterday CFO Hermann Waldemer was in NYC and gave the following talk on the subject (slide presentation is at the end):
We expect our underlying business performance to add 33 to 48 cents to our EPS in 2009, representing a growth rate of 10 to 14%. This strong performance will regretfully be overshadowed by a significant currency hit. Our EPS guidance for 2009 is based on exchange rates prevailing in early February.
Making predictions about currencies is particularly difficult at present due to the huge volatility, which is illustrated by the fact that the adverse currency impact would have been 40 cents, or only half, at the exchange rates prevailing just a few weeks ago in mid December 2008.
The chart shows the evolution in the exchange rate of the Dollar against the Euro for the period 2007 through early 2009.
PMI benefited from a favorable currency situation during the first nine months of 2008. In September, the US Dollar started to strengthen significantly as it was perceived as a “safe haven” in turbulent financial times. As a result, there was an adverse currency impact from the Euro on our fourth quarter results.
After significant volatility in December, the US Dollar has once more strengthened in the wake of election optimism in the USA and weak economic data in the EU and stood at 1.28 in early February, when we established our EPS guidance.
Since the beginning of September, we have also witnessed a strong depreciation of many emerging market currencies against the US Dollar, the most notable being the 47% decline in the value of the Russian Ruble and the 74% decline in the value of the Ukrainian Hryvnia.
Many in the investment community have expressed surprise at the magnitude of the currency unfavorability that we have disclosed. Let me try to explain this impact in greater detail first by addressing our exposure by underlying currency. As we mentioned during our earnings call, the currencies in the key emerging markets of Mexico, Russia, Turkey and Ukraine account for 58 cents of the total foreseen adverse variance of 80 cents, while other emerging market currencies are 11 cents negative.
The decline in the Euro is expected to have an adverse impact of 13 cents and other developed market currencies another 16 cents. This is expected to be partially offset by a 15 cent positive impact from the Japanese Yen and a 3 cent positive impact generated by the conversion of our Swiss Franc costs into US Dollars at more favorable rates.I would like to stress that the breakdown of the variance is based on underlying currencies and that this does not necessarily equate to the impact on individual market profitability. Let me elaborate further.
Currency, whether positive or adverse, has a straight line impact on net revenues. From our discussions, it appears that some models used outside PMI, which cannot replicate the underlying details of our business model, have sought to simplify the complex effect of currency movements by applying a similar rule to profitability. However, the relationship between currency and OCI is neither linear nor simple nor consistent across our wide range of markets. What happens is that the impact of favorable and unfavorable currency movements on OCI is also influenced by the extent to which there are elements in the cost structure that are not in local currency.
Let me use a theoretical example to illustrate this. Market X has net revenues of $2.0 billion, but faces a currency depreciation of 25%. The impact on net revenues will be a decline of $500 million or 25% to $1.5 billion. If all the costs were in local currency, they would also go down by 25% and OCI of $1.2 billion in this example would decline to $900 million.However, if half the costs in this market were in US Dollars, be they leaf costs, direct materials or marketing expenses, then total costs in this market would decline not to $600 million but to $700 million. As a result, OCI would decline to $800 million, or by 33%, and the OCI margin would decrease from 60% to 53%.
The same effect would of course work in reverse in the event that the local currency appreciated.
To what extent can we directly protect ourselves against currency swings through hedging?
Let me reiterate that it is our policy never to carry out income hedges – or what we call “translation hedges”. Such hedges are purely speculative and would have a significant unpredictable impact on the company’s profitability. We at PMI run a solid and prudent business and therefore will not speculate on currencies.
However, we do seek to protect our business, where appropriate and feasible, through so-called “transaction hedges”. The two main examples are the hedging of the Japanese Yen on the sale of cigarettes to our affiliate in Japan and the hedging of the US Dollar on the purchase of tobacco leaf.Opportunities for additional transaction hedges are however quite limited. They are generally not available at acceptable costs due to the large interest differentials and the applied volatility charges or simply non-existent in large quantities in our key emerging market currencies.
He then looked at how currencies can effect costs:
Let’s look at PMI’s cost structure.
In 2008, our total costs above the OCI line were $16.2 billon, of which $9.3 billion represented Costs of Goods Sold and $6.9 billion marketing, overheads and other expenses.Tobacco leaf is the single largest component in our cost structure with $3.6 billion in 2008. In terms of currency denomination in our P&L, 26% of these costs are in US Dollars, 48% in Euros and 26% in other currencies.
PMI purchases tobacco leaf from a number of countries. The most important sources of leaf are Argentina, Brazil, Greece, Malawi, Turkey and the USA.
Tobacco leaf is fundamentally a US Dollar denominated agricultural crop. However, PMI converts a large part of its leaf purchases into Euros for inventory and balance sheet valuation purposes and this currency is subsequently used in transactions with local affiliates.
Direct materials account for $2.4 billion in costs. In terms of currency, 60% are in Euros, 26% in Dollars and 14% in other currencies.
Other elements of our Cost of Goods Sold total $3.3 billion with the majority of these costs being denominated in local currencies, which here would include part of the Euro total due to our large production volume in the EU.
Likewise our $6.9 billion in sales allowances, marketing expenditures, overheads and other expenses above the OCI level are predominantly accounted for in local currency, though with 12% the Swiss Franc is relatively important, reflecting the location of our operations center in Lausanne, Switzerland.
While this gives you the overall picture, it should be stressed that there are significant regional variations in the currency split of PMI’s costs, as illustrated here with the examples of Indonesia and Russia.
In Indonesia, 88% of our costs are in Rupiah, while in Russia only 39% of our costs are denominated in Rubles. This reflects the greater Dollar and Euro sourcing of leaf tobacco and direct materials in Russia. In Indonesia, we are able to include local tobacco in our cigarette production and cloves are sourced locally. In both countries, marketing and support function costs are predominantly accounted for in their respective local currency.
The Russian example also highlights the importance to PMI not only of movements of the Ruble against the Dollar but also the Ruble against the Euro.
Let me close this section on currency by highlighting the fact that the Japanese Yen is the only major currency which has appreciated in value since the beginning of 2008. All our other main currencies have moved in the same unfavorable direction, some with large declines, thus amplifying the adverse impact. History has generally shown that large currency swings tend to be at least partially reversed over time so we are optimistic that these strong currency headwinds will be temporary.
Here is the slide presentation:
Phillip Morris International 2/17/2009 Presentation
Disclosure (“none” means no position):Long PM
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Another Loss for Tobacco in Court
I have a feeling this is but the tip of an iceberg for Altria (MO)….
A major blow for the tobacco industry, reports THE WALL STREET JOURNAL, “A jury decided Thursday that a longtime chain-smoker’s death from long cancer was caused by nicotine addicton, a potentially costly loss for tobacco giant Philip Morris and an important test for thousands of similar Florida lawsuits.”
This was the first of 8000 such personal-injury cases. In 2006, the FL Supreme Court had upheld the complaint that the tobacco industry had knowingly sold potentially harmful products while hiding the health risks. However, it also tossed the $145 billion jury award in a class action lawsuit. As a result, plaintiff attorneys began filing personal injury complaints.
In this particular case, filed by Elaine Hess a widow of a smoker, the attorneys are expected to request millions of dollars. For BigTobacco, this could be bankruptcy by a millions of cuts.
When I sold Altria in December of last year at the time I said:
Altria. It has been a wonderful investment bought back in 2000 for a now adjusted $4 a share it has produced shares of Kraft (KFT), sold, and Phillip Morris International (PM), still held. It has also produce thousands of dollars in dividends over the years. I will hold PMI as it yields 5%, has great growth prospects and little ligation risk.
But, I fear things are going to take a turn for the worse here domestically and with already owning shares of the international tobacco operations, it is time to exit. Will the upcoming purchase is UST (UST) help earnings? Yes. Will it offset the upcoming deluge of lawsuits against the company? Not so sure. Having Tom Daschle at HHS is also a bad omen. Whatever grand plans he has for universal health care will undoubtedly be funded in part on the back of cigarette companies through litigation or its customers through oppressive taxes.
The irony of the tax argument is that it is a “negative” not “progressive” tax. We know the less education a person has, the more likely they are to smoke. We also know that those with less education tend to be lower income earners. It this case, raising taxes to these addicts decreases their disposable income to fund grand ideas of health care for all. Nice…”soak the poor”
Now Daschle has flamed out, but insert whomever is next and the song is the same
State governments starved for cash will not “kill the golden goose” and bankrupt tobacco companies (that and tobacco lawyers are infinitely smarted than legislators). BUT, they also will be determined to leave little behind for shareholders….
Hypocrisy at its highest
Disclosure (“none” means no position):None
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